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Between 1993 and 2016, the U.S. exchange traded fund (ETF) market has proliferated 
from one product worth $6.5 million USD to 1,455 products worth over $2 trillion USD. Despite 
its dramatic growth, the ETF market has yet to be the subject of sociological inquiry even though 
fields such as the social studies of finance have begun examining the origins of index derivatives 
(Millo 2007), options (MacKenzie 2006), hedge funds (Hardie and MacKenzie 2007), and 
foreign exchange markets (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002). Thus, the purpose of this 
dissertation is to provide the first historical sociology of ETF innovation in the United States, 
using an approach inspired by the social studies of finance.  
This project empirically traces the emergence of the ETF by compiling an account of 
precursory strategies, concept development, regulatory negotiations, and early product 
marketing. The concept of agencement is used to frame the historical narrative of the ETF as a 
product of two distinct assemblages that formed in the U.S. between 1970 and 2000: first, the 
socio-technical integration between humans and their technologies that affected trading 
strategies, and second, the collaborative relationships that were formed between innovators and 
regulators. The mixed qualitative research consists of 36 interviews triangulated with archival 
records, documents sourced through Freedom of Information Act requests, private collections, 
and government files. Concluding analysis suggests that strategies foreshadowing the ETF began 
to emerge as early as the 1970s, and innovator-regulator collaborations were integral to early 
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Chapter One  
Introduction  
What is the most heavily traded stock in the world? Take a moment to make a guess. Apple? 
Google? The plausible answers to this question may seem straightforward with the prominence 
of global energy companies such as Shell, media and service providers such as Facebook, Nokia, 
or AT&T, financial institutions such as HSBC or Barclays, pharmaceuticals such as Pfizer, and 
other multinational corporations such as Microsoft or Coca-Cola.  
Chances are that you have just named a corporation similar to the ones listed above. Apple 
and Microsoft, for example, are often thought to be the heaviest traded US-listed stocks as they 
have average daily trading volumes worth between $3 billion and $5 billion USD. But what if 
the most heavily traded stock in the world was not a corporation? What is there left to choose?  
There is a stock that dwarfs even the largest global conglomerates with trading volumes 
worth almost $25 billion USD every single day.1 This stock is named the SPDR S&P 5002 (most 
commonly referred to as the “Spider”, “SPDR”, or “SPY”), and it is a product called an 
exchange traded fund (ETF). Chances are that most individuals outside of finance have not heard 
of these, but exchange traded funds like the SPDR dwarf the largest corporations in the world 
when it comes to their asset inflows and the sheer volume traded every day. Since their 
																																																						
1 Values in USD as of September 30, 2014. Data provided by Bloomberg & State Street Global Advisors. Retrieved 
from https://www.spdrs.com/librarycontent/public/Why%20SPY%20Size%20 
Liquidity%20and%20Low%20Cost%20of%20Ownership.pdf 
2 ‘SPDR S&P 500’ stands for Standard & Poor’s Depository Receipts that track the Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock 
Market Index. The S&P 500 is comprised of the 500 largest American companies listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ.  
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development in the United States,3 ETFs have become some of the most heavily traded products 
in the world and represent trillions of USD in global investments.  
ETFs were officially launched in 1993 when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
granted exemptions to the Investment Company Act of 1940 to permit their structure to trade on 
stock exchanges. While the ETF structure has changed dramatically between its initial design 
and modern day offerings, all ETFs have similar features. An ETF is an investment company that 
is bought, sold, and traded on a stock exchange just like a corporate stock and fluctuates in price 
depending on supply and demand in the market. Unlike a corporate stock, however, ETFs pool 
the assets of investors and invest in various stocks: ETF holdings are most commonly referred to 
as its ‘basket’ or ‘portfolio’. Purchasing one ETF share gives an investor exposure to every 
investment in the ETF’s basket. Initially, ETFs were only permitted to track designated indexes 
such as the S&P 500, meaning that an ETF had to replicate accurately the index constituents in 
its basket and mirror the returns of the index (minus any operating expenses). These index-
replicating ETFs are the first formally recognized ETFs despite the fact that precursory products 
began entering the market (to varying degrees of success) as early as 1989. 
It is helpful to think of an ETF as analogous to a bouquet of flowers: Each flower stem 
represents a different stock. To buy each flower stem individually and design your own bouquet 
from scratch would be a costly and time consuming endeavour, especially if you are not an 
expert in floral design. Thus, florists prepackage and sell arrangements of flowers as bouquets. 
Purchasing a bouquet is a cost-effective and convenient way for individuals to purchase flowers, 
just as ETFs are a cost-effective and convenient way for investors to access a variety of stocks, 
																																																						
3 Canada launched the first successful ETF in the world in 1990 (Chapter Seven), though was inspired by a failed 
futures-backed product created by the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (Chapter Five). As the US market has greatly 
eclipsed all other markets in both size and rate of innovation, this project focuses on the US market as the primary 
innovator of the ETF.  
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bonds, commodities, currencies, futures, and combinations thereof.  
Since its initial launch, the ETF industry has expanded rapidly: The availability of ETFs in 
the United States alone has expanded from one ETF worth $6.5 million USD in 1993 to 1,455 
ETFs worth $2.1 trillion USD in 2015.4 Since their explosive growth in the US, sizeable ETF 
markets have developed in economies around the world with heavy trading occurring across 
North American, European, African, and Asian-Pacific markets.   
While early ETFs were only permitted to track stock indices, as of 2008, ETFs were allowed 
to invest in commodities and currency futures as well as physical commodities and currencies.5 
In the same year, the SEC permitted ETFs to be actively managed - that is, to hire investment 
advisors to develop custom portfolios that do not track designated indices. Currently, the type of 
ETFs available in the global marketplace are seemingly endless: ETFs may invest in domestic 
stocks or bonds, sector-specific stocks, international stocks or bonds, stocks and bonds, 
commodities, currencies, futures, and even other ETFs.6 
Despite the recent interest around rulings that permit many new styles of ETFs and the 
implications these rulings have in current markets, this project seeks to tell the origin story of the 
ETF. To date, no sociological analysis or history of the ETF has been provided in the social 
sciences. Of the plethora of books and media that focus on the U.S. ETF industry, none provide a 
wholly accurate analysis of the precursory innovations and infrastructure that enabled this 
																																																						
4 As of April 2015. Figures are compiled from the Investment Company Institute Research & Statistics Centre. 
Retrieved from http://www.ici.org/research/stats/etf/etfs_04_15 
5 The majority of ETFs in the US are regulated by the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940. ETFs that 
invest in the futures on commodities or currencies are regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) under the Commodity Exchange Act (42 Stat. 998, 7 U.S.C. 1). ETFs that invest in physical commodities 
and currencies are regulated by the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933 (48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C.). 
6 There are also synthetic ETFs that do not invest in physical assets, yet seek to mimic the return of physical ETFs. 
Synthetic ETFs achieve similar returns to physical ETFs by investing in swaps and other financial derivatives 
instead of the physical stocks. They have been popular for they give investors access to illiquid (thinly-traded) 
markets, hard to access markets, and investing strategies that would be too expensive for physical ETFs to employ 
(such as inverse or leveraged index returns).  
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product to first emerge. In addition, much of the information available to the public is not 
correct. For example, some of the large investment companies in the United States and Canada 
state that the Toronto Stock Exchange produced the first ETF in the world in 1990.7 However, as 
the SPY ETF is arguably the most well known ETF, it is commonly (though incorrectly) referred 
to as the first ETF even though it launched in 1993.8 A quick glance at some of the most popular 
investment books and newspaper articles reaffirms these industry claims as the authors equate 
the launch date of these products as the beginning of the ETF industry.9 While this project does 
not dispute that the ETFs produced by the Toronto Stock Exchange and the SPY ETF were the 
first of the modern day ETFs (for they exhibit the ETF structure most commonly seen in markets 
today), their launch did not mark the inception of industry. Instead, as this project will show, the 
first ETF was launched in Philadelphia in 1989 - one year before the Canadian ETF and four 
years before the SPY. The environment surrounding the emergence of early ETFs and their 
immediate precedents is little known outside professional circles. More so, few academic studies 
have focused on how the Philadelphia ETF emerged and none have addressed the sociological 
importance of the ETF as a financial innovation.10 Thus, the purpose of this project is to 
introduce the ETF to a sociological audience - particularly those with an interest in innovation 
and regulation - by tracing how the initial concept materialized and through what regulatory 
processes it was refined into the first formal ETF product. 
 
																																																						
7 BlackRock’s Learning Center lists the Canadian ETF, TIPs, as the first ETF in the world (BlackRock 2017).  
8 Educational material provided by three popular ETF providers reference the SPY as the first ETF: refer to 
Vanguard (2017), Invesco PowerShares (2017, 2), and Fidelity (2017). Another popular provider, Deutsche Bank, 
does not provide ETF history prior to 2003 (Deutsche Asset Management 2017).  
9 Publications such as the Wall Street Journal (2006), the Wall Street Journal Personal Finance Guide (2017), the 
ETF Database (2015), and authors such as Ferri (2009), have all listed the SPY as the first ETF in the world.  
10 The existing literature on the ETF industry is outside of the sociological discipline and will be covered in Chapter 
Two.  
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Sociology and the ETF   
 
Sociology has long been interested in cultural and normative explanations of groups and their 
economies. Finance, however, emerged gradually as a specialized system within the economy 
and sociology has only recently begun to investigate its effects. The world has become 
increasingly financialized as governments, banks, and corporations rely more and more heavily 
on financial networks, products, and rhetoric as a mode of stabilization and organization.  
Financial transactions now take place without money or commodities ever physically 
changing hands as the process of financialization has been mirrored by exponential 
advancements in technology. These innovations take many forms: stock tickers, computing 
systems, trading screens, analyst reports, automated trading algorithms, telephones, regulatory 
frameworks and processes, and financial models all constitute financial technology that affects 
the way in which human beings participate and construct the financial realm.  
Events such as the global financial crisis in 2007-2008 and the European sovereign debt 
crisis from 2010 onwards have brought increased attention to the activities that constitute finance 
and the foundation that these activities provide for the modern state and societal organization. In 
response to the explosive growth of (and reliance on) financial activity, sociologists are 
questioning where this system of finance came from and what processes were responsible for its 
growth since the twentieth century.11  
How are we to think sociologically about financial actors and artefacts? Traditional sociology 
conceptualizes an economic actor as a purely human entity, whether it be an atomistic individual 
																																																						
11 See Knorr Cetina and Preda’s (2014) edited volume, The Oxford handbook of the sociology of finance, for a 
collection of recent sociological literature on the history and activities of financial markets.    
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(in the neoclassical tradition) or a group of human beings acting as a collective. Applying this 
economic concept of the human actor to studies of financial sociology, however, is difficult 
because the integration of human decision making with technological devices means that human 
beings are not isolated entities: A human being cannot participate in the financial realm without 
the use of computing technology and the deployment of large scale networks of other humans 
and their technologies. Thus, to understand what makes financial activity possible, this project 
argues that it is useful to move beyond a human-centric economic sociology and examine the 
relationship between human activity and technological capability.  
Recently, Michel Callon has advocated that agencement is useful in understanding financial 
actors and the processes responsible for the deep integration of finance into modern market 
societies. Agencement refuses to distinguish between human beings and technological 
equipment: Instead, agencement refers to the assemblage of humans and equipment and the 
unique form of agency - the socio-technical actor - that this assemblage presents. The socio-
technical actor is a clear departure from the human-centric agency favoured by economic 
sociology and is, as this project will suggest, a useful framework for studies concerning the 
construction of financial artefacts such as the ETF.  
With the above in mind, this project seeks to understand why a financial product called the 
ETF emerged and how it quickly rose to prominence as one of the most prolific financial 
products in recent decades. This project will thus involve a thorough examination of the 
conditions, strategies, and arrangements that preceded the ETF. Examining various assemblages 
- and more specifically, agencement - means that this project will focus largely on socio-
technical relationships: The fusions of human beings and their technologies - whether it be rules 
and regulations, computing technologies, or communications - that create the financial actor that 
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shapes (and is shaped by) the the marketplace. These relationships will be studied to uncover the 
extent to which socio-technical entities such as regulatory rulings and trading technologies were 
integrated into the development of the ETF.   
Throughout the following chapters, the ETF will be framed as a product of two relationships: 
First, the socio-technical relation between humans and their technologies, and second, the 
relationship between financial innovators and financial regulators. Chapter Two offers a 
literature review where both new and old sociological and economic approaches to financial 
innovation and regulation are addressed. The shortcomings from each approach will be used to 
provide a basis for advancing assemblages and agencement as a viable alternative to 
understanding the emergence of innovation (and the regulation of that innovation) in the 
financial marketplace. Chapter Three outlines the research approach and organization, and 
provides justification for the mixed methods approach chosen.  
Chapters Four through Eight present the substantive research findings. Chapter Four will 
examine how the introduction of computing technology enabled market participants to develop 
new ways of participating in the financial markets. As technology developed and markets 
expanded in the 1970s and 1980s, traditional stock picking gave way to the trading of equities 
baskets and futures and options on entire indices. For the first time in history, actors were able to 
group stocks and derivatives into a basket and trade the entire basket simultaneously. With the 
popularity of such strategies exploding into the 1970s, regulators began to frame the markets in a 
manner which encouraged efficient technological solutions over the gentleman’s agreements of 
the decades prior, primarily through regulatory overhauls such as the 1975 Exchange Act 
amendments. In these reforms, the SEC mandated electronic communications networks, intra-
agency systematization, and encouraged the use of trading technology as a means to increase the 
	 16	
efficiency and liquidity of the markets. Analysing this transition will demonstrate how the rise of 
computing technology reconstructed financial agency from human-centric to something realized 
by an individual in participation with electronic devices: In other words, a socio-technical 
agencement. This chapter will demonstrate that as the financial marketplace was becoming 
increasingly technological in structure, what constituted financial activity was drastically 
redefined. These socio-technical relationships created, for the first time, an environment where 
strategies that foreshadowed the ETF could emerge.  
Chapter Five is a case study of the first ETF in the world, a product called the Cash Index 
Participation Unit (CIPs) that was pioneered by the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX) in 
1989. This chapter will begin with an overview of the response of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to the 1987 market crisis, focusing on how regulatory solutions encouraged socio-
technical relationships between humans and technology. Of notable focus will be the SEC 
requests for increased experimentation into basket products as a solution to the illiquid and 
poorly hedged markets of the decade prior. Chapter Five will demonstrate that the first ETF, the 
Philadelphia Cash Index Participation Unit, was a result of two factors: The unique environment 
created by the rise of computing technology in the decades prior and the regulatory response to 
the 1987 crisis. The lawsuit and delisting of the CIPs contract due to disputes over regulatory 
jurisdictions between the SEC and CFTC will be analysed as an event that contributed to the 
redefinition of the ETF product in subsequent years. The concluding analysis will explain in 
what ways innovators and regulators participated in defining CIPs as the first exchange-traded 
product, setting a precedent for ETF product development moving forward. This analysis will 
challenge traditional conceptualizations of innovators and regulators as competing bodies and 
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instead demonstrate how they formed productive collaborations to become co-constituents in the 
CIPs’ emergence.  
  Chapter Six will examine the role that financial theory played in the construction of early 
ETF products such as Leland O’Brien and Rubinstein’s SuperTrust. To begin, the work of Harry 
Markowitz and Modern Portfolio Theory will be analysed for its role in readjusting the goals of 
money managers away from traditional stock-picking and aligning them with index and basket 
strategies. The SuperTrust project will be the subject of focus for two reasons: First, the product 
was adopted directly from financial theory, even quoting theory as a precedent in its initial 
application, and second, it was the first exchange-traded product to receive exemptions from the 
1940 Exchange Act regulations. As these exemptions form the basis of ETF legitimacy in the 
markets today, the approval process will be analysed as a product of socio-technical assemblages 
between innovators, regulators, and their devices. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how 
the construction of early ETFs was a result of the real-world adoption of theoretical constructs.  
Chapter Seven presents a case study of the innovation flows of ETF design between the 
United States and Canada. While the first product concept - the CIPs - emerged at the 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange in 1989, its failure due to regulatory barriers inspired Canadian 
developers at the Toronto Stock Exchange to refine the product for Canadian investors. After 
receiving approval from Philadelphia to adapt their product structure, the Toronto Stock 
Exchange launched their refined version of the ETF product, called the Toronto Index 
Participation Units (TIPs), in 1990. In 1993, the SPY ETF (discussed above) was adapted from 
the TIPs and launched on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). Throughout these structural 
refinements, the same concept - an index-tracking basket - was maintained. This chapter will 
present a case study on the development of Barclay’s Global Investors iShares ETFs in both 
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Canada and the United States. Barclay’s translation of iShares from Canada to the U.S. will be 
presented as an example of how innovation flows and the assemblages that enable them impact 
real ETF development. In conclusion, a discussion of bricolage and its implication in the 
refinement of ETF design will be presented.  
Chapter Eight will explore the factors that enabled the ETF industry to proliferate at an 
unprecedented rate after its lackluster start with the failed CIPs (Chapter Five) and SuperTrust 
(Chapter Six) ETFs. In this chapter, three events will be analysed to determine the extent to 
which they enhanced the growth and depth of the ETF marketplace. First, the historical shift 
from commission to fee-based advisory structures will be analysed as an event that created 
demand for discount advisory operations - ‘mom and pop’ investment shops - and cost-efficient 
retail products such as ETFs. Second, the regulatory amendments to the Unlisted Trading 
Privileges legislation will be discussed as these amendments greatly enhanced the competitive 
relationship between the AMEX and NYSE, resulting in a multitude of new ETFs being brought 
to market and the eventual failure of the AMEX to keep pace with ETF innovation. Third, these 
events will be analysed for their role in assembling something known as the registered 
investment advisory (RIA) channel, a channel that created a strong demand for ETFs and 
catalyzed the explosive growth of the ETF marketplace for small, retail investors. This chapter 
will conclude with a discussion about the organization of the retail channel and its impact on 
ETF innovation.  
Chapter Nine provides a summary discussion of the empirical and theoretical analysis 
conducted throughout the chapters. In conclusion, the state of the current U.S. ETF industry will 
be discussed and opportunities for future research outlined.  
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To reiterate, the emergence and proliferation of ETFs should be of interest to those in the 
social sciences concerned with the nature of financial activity - such as the conditions that 
facilitate and regulate innovation. It is in this field that this project hopes to make its largest 
contribution by asking three questions: What factors instigated precursory innovations and 
concepts? Under what conditions was the ETF formally defined and regulated? What caused the 


























The purpose of this project is to construct the first historical sociology of the US exchange-
traded fund (ETF) market. The goal of this research is to contribute to the empirical robustness 
of agencement as a sociological mode of inquiry by determining the extent to which technical 
innovations informed - and were informed by - common market behaviour. Additionally, this 
research questions in what ways regulators and innovators move beyond their traditionally 
dichotomized institutional relationships to affect innovative practice in financial markets.  
Inspired by the actor-network tradition, this research analyses how the ETF emerged out of 
networks of material and semiotic relations referred to as agencements. To accomplish this, 
understanding the history of how social and economic study has approached the study of 
financial markets over time is imperative. This will introduce the newest field in the study of 
markets, the social studies of finance and its socio-technical actor. Following this discussion, the 
prominent literature on financial innovation will be analysed and grey areas concerning 
institutional relationships will be addressed. Of particular prominence will be the literature on the 
regulation of innovation, for it implies that the regulation of innovation is a competitive process 
in which an innovative concept is transformed it into a bounded product. Last, the prominent 
literature on financial regulation will be addressed. As this is a particularly broad field, focus will 
be placed on capture theory and theories of joint regulation, for they offer the most popular 
approaches with which to understand the relationship between innovators and regulators. To 
conclude, the concept of regulatory agencement will be introduced in order to contribute to the 
regulatory scholarship.   
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Does economics + sociology = economic sociology? 
	
The Parsonian divide 
	
The historical relationship between sociology and the study of markets is complex. As this 
project seeks to contribute to a burgeoning field of literature, the social studies of finance, the 
discussion of the emergence of this field and its relation to traditional economics, sociology, and 
economic sociology is imperative. Moreover, analysing where financial artefacts come from 
entails analysing how we are to think of the market itself; questioning innovation and regulation 
involves reflecting on how the study of the market has evolved over time and what it means to 
participate in the financial realm today.  
 Beginning in the 1960s, the Parsonian divide between economic and sociological 
explanations of market behaviour resulted in a delineation between the institutional and 
individual explanations of economic structure.12 As summarized neatly by Stark: “You, 
economists, study value; we, sociologists, will study values. You will have claim on the 
economy, we will stake our claim on the social relations in which economies are embedded” 
(Stark 2000, 1, emphases added). As a result of this divided approach, sociological inquiry 
focused on the institution as the value creator in economic markets13 and economic inquiry 
focused on the instrumental rationality and individual choices between means and ends as the 
primary explanan for broad market arrangements.   
In earlier decades, Weber’s (1922) economic sociology sought to provide an action-based 
explanation for social phenomena as an alternative to the institutionally focused sociology of the 
																																																						
12 Refer to Stark (2000) and Camic (1987) for a detailed description and history of the ‘Parsons’ Pact’ between 
economics and sociology.   
13 For case studies using this approach, refer to Salisbury (1962), Firth (1967), Swetnam (1973).  
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time. This sociological framework sought not to privilege the individual at the expense of the 
social, and certainly not to reduce social action to individual rational choice, but provide a 
framework to understand social phenomena in terms of the purposive action of the individuals 
composing it. In other words, Weberian economic sociology sought to extend sociological 
analysis to understand collective arrangements in terms of individual action. As individual action 
is itself a result of specific motivations, understanding why individuals choose to act, Weber 
argued, is the most appropriate method in which to understand the social collective in which they 
are involved.  
Despite Weber’s attempts to extend institutionally focused sociological analysis to “…the 
subjective understanding of the action of the component individuals” (1922, 15), the divide 
between the individual and social accounts of economic structure remained largely entrenched in 
sociological narratives. Resultantly, “one of the most important developments in modern social 
science…[was] the race to fill the void created by mainstream economics’ failure to do research 
on economic institutions” (Swedberg 1997, 161). The major development to bridge the divide 
between these two accounts is attributed to Mark Granovetter, whose work was largely inspired 
by Polanyi’s (1957) substantivism14 and conceptions of market societies. 
 
New economic sociology 
	
																																																						
14 Substantivism was a departure from the prevalent formalist approaches of the time. Formalist models suggest that 
economic principles (e.g. rational decision making, utility maximization, etc.) may be successfully applied to non-
market societies (for example, see Firth 1961). The substantivist model introduced by Polanyi suggests that these 
economic principles cannot successfully be applied to non-market or pre-industrial societies because these societies 
are not organized by the same principles of rational choice and profit maximization.  
	 23	
Granovetter’s theoretical and empirical work sought to address the inadequately deep 
exploration of institutions in economic research.15 Attempting to go beyond the dualistic 
accounts between individualistic accounts of behaviour and the structure of social institutions, 
Granovetter introduced the social network as a specific sociological concept in order to 
demonstrate how social actions are necessary to explain economic action and should not be left 
on the wayside in economic assumptions.16 Granovetter argued for the social construction of 
economic institutions and inspired economics and sociology - and the newly coined ‘new 
economic sociology’ - to explore both economic and non-economic goals of actors. Perhaps most 
notably, his work on social networks introduced the concept of embeddedness in order to depart 
from individualist accounts of economics by embedding accounts of economic action within 
networks of social and normative relationships.  
Granovetter’s theory advanced three major claims: first, that weak ties17 in interpersonal 
relations are a crucial means by which information is able to diffuse across a large social distance 
(Granovetter 1973; 1985); second, that economic institutions are social constructions that arise 
from individual actions, and individual actions are bound by the social worlds they occupy 
(Granovetter 1992); and third, that the economy is embedded within these networks of 
interpersonal relations, making the sociological viewpoint a crucial element in understanding 
economics (Granovetter 1985). Using this approach, the new economic sociology was able to 
																																																						
15 This is not to say that there were improper institutional studies at the time. For example, Douglass North (1990) 
had produced exceptional economic research that sought to explain institutional change during this time though it 
was not yet a popular area of exploration.  
16 “…the pursuit of economic goals is normally accompanied by that of such non-economic goals as sociability, 
approval, status, and power” (Granovetter 1992, 270). 
17 The strength of ties may be considered “…a combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the 
intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services” that characterize interpersonal relationships (Granovetter 
1973, 490).  
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suggest how networks among individuals and their social collectives spread information to 
reduce economic uncertainties and construct stable markets.18  
While Granovetter’s approach was a crucial development to bridge the gap between 
individual and social accounts of economic events such as the construction and transformation of 
markets, its theoretical framework remains too narrow and empirically fragile to account for the 
development of ETFs.19 For example, while Granovetter is able to explain how weak ties 
facilitate the flow of information between individuals and social networks (1985, 482), his theory 
does not clearly explain how coordination is then achieved between the various networks. That 
is, largely omitted is an explanation of how mutual expectations within social networks are 
affected by larger social structures such as political arenas and other bodies examined by 
institutional theory.20  
Moreover, Granovetter’s theoretical interest in the structure of social networks, while vital, 
prevents him from achieving a more holistic approach to examine the forces that play a role in 
constructing financial markets. Specifically, his focus on the role of human agency in 
information transfer prevents him from addressing the extent to which financial artefacts may 
also be constructed by technical devices. Said another way, Granovetter’s concept of the ‘actor’ 
remains highly human-centric: His account of networks rests solely with human capacity and 
does not distinguish between technological apparatus that may effectively contribute to or alter 
the realm of possibilities for information flows and decision making capabilities.  
																																																						
18 Refer to Granovetter’s work on the strength of weak ties for a detailed analysis of how information transfer 
between networks occurs (1973), or Harrison White’s extensive work on markets and social structure (2004). 
Granovetter has credited White’s early work as inspiration for his work on the strength of weak ties.  
19 A prominent empirical critique of Granovetter’s work comes from Fligstein and Mara-Drita: “The major 
limitation of the network approaches is that networks are sparse social structures, and it is difficult to see how they 
can account for what we observe in markets” (1996, 657). 
20 Granovetter critiqued that economic institutionalism was insufficient and not practical for his framework because 
“all members of…institutions are interpreted as the efficient outcome of rational individuals pursuing their self-
interest” (1990, 94).		
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Last, Granovetter does not explain the conditions under which ‘the economic’ itself becomes 
embodied; instead, his theory of embeddedness suggests that the economic is placed within 
larger social, human-centric networks. This framework prevents him from addressing the extent 
to which the socio-technical actor has economizing effects (Çalişkan & Callon 2009), whether it 
be a foreign exchange trader interacting with their computer, or an analyst making decisions 
based off of economic reports. For purposes of this project, a framework that explains how the 
economic is not simply embedded within the social, but constructed by the joint achievement of 
both the social and technological is necessary as the role of financial technology becomes 
increasingly prominent in financial markets.  
To reiterate, this socio-technical concept is of crucial importance for the construction of 
financial artefacts: while inherently social, markets are often very dependent on new technical 
innovations that provide alternative or previously unimagined pathways for agency to be 
expressed. While Granovetter’s account stays true to his goal of creating a multi-layered 
approach to lessen the gap between individual behaviour and social networks in economic 
sociology, the narrow - albeit robust - theoretical framework and human-centric concept of 
agency prevents it from being a suitable approach to explain the very technical construction of 
financial devices such as ETFs.  
Departing from Granovetter’s concept of the network is the institutional theory of Neil 
Fligstein and his proposed concept of strategic action fields.21 Strategic action fields are the 
fundamental units that govern social life, where actors (individuals or social groups) act in order 
to organize their competing interests and goals: a field may be framed at any social level, 
whether at the interpersonal, institutional, state, or global level. These fields see “actors interact 
																																																						
21 See also: Bourdieu (2005) and White (2001) for prominent literature on field theory.  
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with knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of the 
field, the relationships in the field (including who has power and why), and the field’s rules” 
(Fligstein & McAdam 2011, 3). Fligstein uses fields to explain how social relations between 
institutions and states are key to understanding how markets emerge, similar to institutional 
theory within organizational studies that stresses how new arrangements emerge because of 
organized interests.22  
Fligstein’s approach is distinctive in that it brings a previously under-represented element 
into the sociological analysis of markets: Politics. Fligstein (1996) conceptualizes ‘markets as 
politics’ to demonstrate how markets and politics are mutually constitutive by forming 
competitive relationships to create hierarchies. In introducing politics into his sociological 
analysis, Fligstein is able to detail how markets emerge in the struggles for dominance between 
meso-level interest groups such as communities, political bodies, and firms. 
Strategic action fields are used to illuminate how each unique field of organizational interest 
creates a unique arrangement, resulting in a plurality of social relations across various social 
fields. Strategic action fields are made analogous to Russian nesting dolls in Fligstein’s 
publications to represent the large variety of ways in which institutional interests and states come 
mutually to constitute new markets depending on the boundaries of the field in question: there 
may be fields within fields, or one broad field encompassing all other arrangements, or one field 
comprised of very specific characterizations depending on how theorists conceptualize the 
parameters of their research.23 This approach thus departs both from neoclassical economic 
																																																						
22 See Chandler (1990) and Gerlach (1992) for literature on organizational theory.		
23 “All collective actors are themselves made up of SAFs [strategic action fields]. When they interact in a larger 
political, social, or economic field, that field also becomes a SAF. In this way, SAFs look a lot like Russian dolls: 
open up a SAF and it contains a number of other SAFs” (Fligstein & McAdam 2011, 3; see also Fligstein & 
McAdam 2012); “The boundaries of SAFs are not fixed, but shift depending on the definition of the situation” 
(Fligstein & McAdam 2011, 4).  
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theory, which stresses how markets trend towards one maximum-efficiency arrangement, and 
also from Granovetter’s concept of network relatedness. Fligstein’s analysis provides for a 
multiplicity of distinct arrangements depending on the field in question.  
Fligstein’s field theory was developed in order to remedy the stratification of contemporary 
sociology into competing theories, research subfields, and specialized perspectives: As he writes, 
sociology has “…distinct ‘theories’ (or, perhaps more accurately, theory contests) for social 
movements, organizations, religion, culture, and so on” (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 2), leading 
to an increasing inability of the discipline to comment on the overall social structure of markets. 
Because of this stratification, much of the work undertaken in economic sociology cannot 
sufficiently account for the emergence, stability, and transformation of markets. For example, 
Giddens’ (1984) concept of structuration offers a method to examine how the mediation between 
actors and pre-existing social structures guides social life, but is unable to explain the type of 
action that occurs within a particular field when it undergoes radical transformation. The field 
theory of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) focuses on explaining why stability occurs and is 
prolonged within fields.  
While institutionalists are able to explain why stability occurs in fields through conformity to 
common social rules, Fligstein seeks to move beyond their explanations and emphasize the role 
of power and interests in bringing about new fields or bringing established fields into turmoil. In 
the above scholarship, none focus on theories of power and interests and how these work to bring 
about transformation. Distinctively, Fligstein’s field theory moves away from those institutional 
theories that study the stabilization of fields in order to emphasize how fields are always in 
continuous flux as actors jockey to improve their positions within the field. These dynamics lead 
Fligstein to conceptualize fields as composed of incumbents, challengers, and governance units 
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in order to illuminate that social collectives change in reaction to strategic decision making and 
the quest for status.   
Despite the development of strategic action fields as an answer to calls for a more holistic 
economic sociology that can encompass market emergence, stability, and change, Fligstein’s 
approach is still not deep enough to explain the construction of a highly technical financial 
market. Notably, the theory of fields does not examine in enough depth how the institutions 
jockeying for hierarchical stability are themselves constructed. Resultantly, field theory is unable 
to address underlying processes that affect the formation of meso-level decision making 
processes. Without examining the socio-technical relationships that form the possibilities of an 
institution’s agency, a fuller picture of the processes that are responsible for a market’s 
construction is not possible. While Fligstein may offer an empirically broader approach to 
economic sociology than Granovetter, and one that is more expansive in its inclusion of political 
aspects and focus on structural change, his field theory remains subject to similar critiques: there 
remains a lack of attention to the technical infrastructure that makes social coordination and 
expressions of agency possible. 
 
The social studies of finance  
	
It was not until Michel Callon’s work that the concept of agencement was applied to 
economic sociology to understand financial markets through ‘market devices’: a market device 
refers to the “material and discursive assemblages that intervene in the construction of 
markets…Instead of considering distributed agency as the encounter of (already ‘agenced’) 
persons and devices, it is always possible to consider [agency] as the very result of these 
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compound agencements (Callon, Millo, and Muniesa 2007, 2).24 While there is no fully adequate 
French to English translation for agencement, it is often translated to mean ‘an assemblage of 
various components’. As MacKenzie points out, however, ‘assemblage’ may have too passive a 
connotation, because Callon’s usage of agencement also includes agence, or agency (MacKenzie 
2009, 20-21).  
The passivity of ‘assemblage’ will also be invoked within this project, for there exist socio-
technical arrangements that are not necessarily agency-producing agencements. Assemblage 
theory, like agencement, demonstrates that the totality of an arrangement produces something 
that the underlying elements could not produce on their own: in other words, that the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts. Unlike agencement, however, assemblages do not produce 
agency.  
By adopting agency into its translation, agencement comes to denote the productive power of 
arrangements and how they influence the possibilities for action: “Agencements denote socio-
technical arrangements when they are considered from the point [of] view of their capacity to act 
and to give meaning to action” (Callon & Çalişkan 2005, 24-25). Thus, agencement positions 
social theorists to conceptualize a market as an ‘achievement’ (Çalişkan & Callon 2009, 371) 
rather than an a priori product of social networks. Agencement illuminates how human beings 
along with technological equipment become socio-technical actors that can construct and give 
meaning to markets. Callon’s socio-technical actor thus provides a deeper understanding of what 
constitutes agency than the human-centric actor described in Granovetter’s and Fligstein’s 
theories. 
																																																						
24 Deleuze had previously used the term agencement for different purposes, though his concept will not be examined 
in this project.  
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Financial artefacts have not been a historically popular topic in economic sociology, though 
have recently become of interest to a subfield called social studies of finance. Studies on option 
markets (MacKenzie 2006), index derivative markets (Millo 2007), foreign exchange markets 
(Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002), stock markets (Muniesa 2004), derivatives exchanges 
(MacKenzie & Millo 2003), the New York Stock Exchange (Beunza and Millo 2015), and 
securities analysts (Beunza and Garud 2007) have been conducted to determine where these 
markets come from and how they are constructed, whether it be through economic theory, 
technical devices, or financial engineering. As these sociological projects detail, a financial 
product is not just a technical exercise, nor is it an ipso facto result of social networks as the 
traditional theorists may advocate. The emergence of new products and markets cannot be 
explained solely by the role of self-interested actors attempting to exploit market inefficiencies, 
nor are they the result of purely institutional power struggles. Financial markets and their 
artefacts must be considered an achievement precisely because it takes the unique intersection of 
these complex processes - the social in joint venture with the technical - to construct an artefact 
in its entirety.   
Many emerging studies emphasize agencement as a useful concept for understanding what 
constitutes particularities of modern financial markets. Beunza & Stark (2004), for example, 
conduct an ethnographic study of an investment bank’s interpretive communities and 
demonstrate that such communities cannot exist independently of the use of technological 
instruments and the particular physicality of offices that facilitate discussions.25 Hardie & 
MacKenzie (2007) describe how a hedge fund is an entity comprised of arrangements of 
technical devices (calculative tools such as the Turkish yield calculator) and the distributed 
																																																						
25 See also Hardie & MacKenzie (2012).  
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cognition of actors that makes trading possible.26 Millo (2007) discusses how the construction of 
index-based derivatives involved the struggle between innovations in the derivatives market and 
the establishment of new jurisdictional authorities for the SEC (Securities and Exchange 
Commission) and CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission).  
As the research examining financial agencement reveals, a market device cannot be 
disassociated from the socio-technical relationships within the network comprising it: human 
beings, technologies, and semiotic networks are intertwined into an irreducible relationship that 
illuminates how a financial entity may possess multiple ontologies depending on the 
arrangements of elements that comprise it (Callon 2005; Callon & Muniesa 2005; Callon et al 
2007; Lépinay 2011). Framing economic sociology using agencement moves beyond both 
Granovetter’s and Fligstein’s economic sociology: First, agencement moves beyond 
Granovetter’s concept of embeddedness to provide a more holistic understanding of the type of 
conditions and socio-technical relationships that are responsible for the emergence of a financial 
market or device. In conceptualizing agency as the result of the fusion of human beings and their 
devices, the market is not simply embedded in social networks, but constituted by the distinctive 
forms of agency that only socio-technical arrangements make possible.  
While the multiplicity of possible arrangements is reminiscent of Fligstein’s multiplicity of 
fields, agencement and assemblages offer an alternate approach for they both bring individuals 
and devices into the analysis. That is, agencement moves beyond Fligstein’s strategic action 
fields by focusing on the construction of the social networks that seek hierarchical stability. In 
																																																						
26 Derived from Hutchins (1995), distributed cognition is crucial to the literature discussing financial agencement. 
Distributed cognition emphasizes that learning occurs not solely through an individual, but through the individual’s 
participation with others as well as artefacts. For example, a student trying to solve a maths problem may speak with 
other classmates or a teacher while also making use of a pen and paper or calculator. Knowledge is not derived 
purely internally, but through interactions with social and material artefacts. For an example of how this concept is 
applied in the social studies of finance, refer to Hardie & MacKenzie’s (2007) paper on hedge funds.		
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“…envisaging institutions as socio-cognitive prostheses” (Çalişkan & Callon 2009, 380), 
agencement is able to move past the competitor-incumbent structurations of markets to 
demonstrate how each institution is itself a result of socio-technical constructions. These 
constructions, such as technological innovation and the distributed cognition of actors, offer a 
deeper understanding of what relationships come to constitute the boundaries of markets and 
trajectories of innovative practice. Thus, examining ETFs as an agencement is distinctive for it 
directs sociological inquiry to examine the oft-invisible socio-technical relationships that are 
responsible for their existence. 
Bringing the ETF into the sociological field of study - the social studies of finance in 
particular - will be beneficial for this product has not yet been explored sociologically. The 
majority of literature on the ETF is strictly quantitative and, not surprisingly, produced by 
scholars working in the field of business studies, finance, and economics. For example, recent 
literature focuses on developing and testing various performance measurements of ETFs 
(Charupat and Miu 2011; 2013; Svetina 2010),27 ETF volatility (Madhavan 2012), trading 
strategies using ETFs (Tse 2015; Mohamad et al 2015; Li et al 2012; Diaz-Rainey and Ibikunle 
2012), and asset allocation.28 Of the literature that discusses the history of ETFs, many do not 
provide a complete or wholly accurate narrative of where the concept first emerged (see Chapter 
One), with the exception of two works by former AMEX senior vice president, Gary Gastineau 
(Gastineau 2010; Gastineau and Weber 1999).29 Thus, a historical sociology of the ETF will 
																																																						
27 Performance measurements include data such as ETF tracking error and pricing efficiencies. These will be 
discussed in later chapters.  
28 There are several peer-reviewed journals that are relevant to those interested in ETFs and asset allocation, such as 
the Journal of Asset Management and Portfolio Management. The bulk of literature regarding ETFs and asset 
management or portfolio construction are industry publications such as Barron’s or Institutional Investor.  
29 Gastineau has developed an exceptional history of early ETF developments such as index participation units and 
the SPY ETF, though his accounts are marketed to specialist audiences in finance and provide a technical history of 
product development.   
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offer a useful contribution to the social studies of finance and provide an introduction to a 





Innovation takes many forms in finance, though may be generally understood as the 
introduction of new products, services, production processes, or organizational forms (Dale and 
Wolfe 1998). The motivation for innovation,30 the environmental conditions that affect 
innovation,31 the pace of innovation,32 the diffusion of innovation,33 and the welfare effects of 
innovation34 have all been researched at length and offer both theoretical and empirical 
approaches.35 
 In the last thirty years, an interdisciplinary field called innovation studies has developed that 
ties together economics, science and technology studies, business studies, and sociology. This 
field of literature may be divided into economic, systemic, and meso-level accounts of 
innovation (Castellacci et al 2004). In these accounts, “…the functioning of markets merges with 
																																																						
30 Scherer and Ross (1990); Duffie and Rahi (1995). 
31 Refer to Cohen and Levin (1989), Cohen (1995), Campbell (1988), and Dale and Wolfe (1998) for research into 
the environmental conditions that encourage innovation.  
32 The pace of innovation is often related to the availability of technology, macroeconomic conditions, regulatory 
environment (White 2000; Ben-Horim and Silber 1977), and tax laws.   
33 Tufano (1989), Saloner and Shepard (1995), Molyneux and Shamroukh (1996), Sinha and Chandrashekaran 
(1992); Akhavein, Frame, and White (2005).		
34 Van Horne (1985), Tufano (1989), and Diaz-Rainey and Ibikunle (2012). Literature in this field has increased 
dramatically since the financial crisis in 2007.  
35 Literature on financial innovation offers both empirical and theoretical approaches. For example, the works by 
Berry, Levinsohn, & Pakes (1995), Bresnahan (1986), and Petrin (2002) each attempt to quantify the benefits 
surrounding the emergence of particular innovations, while Ross (1976) and Allen & Gale (1994) attempt to link the 
emergence of innovations with theories of investor demand.  
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that of the innovation process” (Callon 2016, 29), making innovation inseparable from market 
activity (Malbera 2006; 2007).  
Macroeconomic studies of innovation tend to focus on the role of innovation in economic 
growth. For example, new growth theory has constructed models demonstrating how endogenous 
growth is driven through R&D and rent-seeking by profit-maximizing firms (Romer 1990; 
Aghion and Howeii 1992; Nelson and Winter 1982). Economic accounts of innovation are often 
inspired by Schumpeterian theory (1934; 1939). Other approaches tend to adopt Schumpeter’s 
hypothesis that it is large firms and those with considerable market power who are the most 
efficient innovators. Specifically, large firms are able to provide a wider range of products than 
their smaller competitors (1950).36 The complexities of microeconomic accounts of innovation 
have also inspired systemic approaches that emphasize innovation systems. Innovation systems 
theory examines how institutional organization and education affect economic performance and 
innovation (Castellacci et al 2004, 9-11).37 Network analysis at the firm-level has also been 
popular in empirically demonstrating how collaborative networks have a positive correlation to 
firm innovation (Ahuja 2000; George, Zahra, and Wood 2002; Stuart 2000; Vinding 2002).  
While fruitful, these approaches are not structured to take into account how the firms 
themselves develop their interests and how their innovations are conceptualized and formed into 
material artefacts. Thus, a similar critique may be made to the innovation studies literature that 
was made to Fligstein and Granovetter’s institutional theory: The current literature comprising 
innovation studies is not rich enough to take into account the socio-technical processes that 
construct the environment required for innovative artefacts to develop and to inform 
																																																						
36 Scherer (1984) has reached the opposite conclusion: Smaller firms are able to innovate more rapidly for they lack 
many of the competitive pressures that large firms face. This will be discussed in later chapters.  
37 This approach is often used comparatively across countries. Refer to Cooke (1992) or Nelson (1993) for 
representative empirical studies.  
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institutional-level decision making. This makes the above literature from innovation studies 
inadequately deep for studies such as this one which analyse how artefacts materialize and are 
attributed their specific characteristics in highly technical financial markets.   
The framework of bricolage provides a useful alternative to the above literature for it 
analyses how innovations emerge out of existing material and semiotic infrastructure. Unlike the 
institutional literature on innovation and studies of financial engineering - which often imply that 
innovative products begin as a pre-defined project and actors use a set of purpose driven tools to 
construct it - bricolage is a process constituted by the gathering and recombination of existing 
resources. As such, a bricoleur translates the original purpose of their artefacts in order to serve 
new ones. In the words of Levi-Strauss, the bricoleur’s universe “…is the contingent result of all 
the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the remains of 
previous constructions or destructions” (1966, 17).  
 As a meta-framework, bricolage subscribes to the human-centric conception of agency 
which provides an incomplete account of how agency forms and is expressed in the financial 
markets. Bricolage describes actors manipulating and shaping their environments. While this is 
not problematic in itself, it does deny the unique socio-technical agency that is illuminated when 
one considers how a human being simultaneously shapes and is shaped by their devices. Thus, 
while bricolage is able to adequately account for how innovations first emerge, it falls short 
when examining the relationship between human beings and their objects. 
The literature in innovation studies represents the institutional processes through which 
financial innovation occurs. However, a crucial aspect of the innovative process also includes the 
regulation of innovation, for this process makes the difference between an innovative concept 
and formally defined product. Institutional research has been crucial in analysing the struggles 
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that are involved in the construction of new financial markets, such as the struggles between 
innovators and regulators. The regulation of financial innovation is most pertinent to this project 
because the ETF emerged immediately after well-publicized struggles between innovators and 
regulators. Most prominent of this literature are the papers authored by both Merton and Miller, 
which will be examined in depth.  
 
Miller’s cat and mouse game 
	
Miller (1986) argues that financial innovation is catalyzed by changes in financial regulation 
and governmental tax policies. As Miller posits, there is particularly strong pressure to innovate 
around prohibited, profitable transactions and interest-rate ceilings for the immediate benefit of 
the innovation is realized in the form of tax money saved (1986, 461).38 Miller’s account of 
innovation may be visible in the ETF case study: For example, the American market crash in 
2000 led to policy decisions that cut interest rates, creating a favourable borrowing environment 
that may have catalyzed the expansion of financial firms and their products. From 1999-2001, for 
example, the total number of ETFs created by US firms and listed on US markets increased from 
30 to 102. Empirically supporting Miller’s theory that innovation occurs in reaction to policy are 
Tufano (1995) who demonstrates how American low-par stock development resulted from 
changes in state securities tax, Silber (1983) who discusses capital controls, and Kane (1977, 
																																																						
38 Miller (1986) develops a striking example of this by documenting the rise of the Eurobond market in response to 
the US government’s 30% withholding tax rules in the 1960s. The Eurobond market was developed by moving the 
center for dollar-denominated bonds from New York to London. This development also succeeded in bypassing the 
SEC’s burdensome new-issue prospectus requirements, thus illustrating his point that innovations arise in reaction to 
tax or regulatory requirements.  
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1984, 1988) who discusses dynamic regulation.39  
However, Miller’s account brings innovation and regulation into a dichotomous and 
conflicting relationship. This position leads him to make claims such as: “the contribution of the 
CFTC to progress and innovation…has almost always been to slow it down and impede it”; 
“Important regulatory…obstacles must be overcome”; and “…the existing [tax and regulatory] 
burdens were increasingly binding…the innovative wave then triggered was much like a snake 
bursting through its old skin” (1986, 468-471). While Miller acknowledges that regulatory 
policies may indirectly inspire innovative practices, his argument is framed so as to dichotomize 
the relationship between regulators and innovators much in the same way that Fligstein 
conceptualizes competitor-incumbent roles: Regulation inspires innovations insofar as the 
regulation is unduly restrictive to market participants. In response, innovation is catalyzed to 
correct the burden imposed by the regulation.  
This creates a cat and mouse scenario explaining the impetus for and regulation of financial 
innovation. In this style of game, action is characterized as a contest involving constant pursuits 
as each player attempts to either capture or evade capture. The cat - in this case, the regulator - is 
unable to achieve a lasting capture of the mouse - the innovator - who is able to constantly evade 
and outwit their opponent. In this game, there is no endpoint as participants cannot reach a 
lasting agreement (Gibbons 1992). For every policy introduced by a regulator, the innovator has 
a profit-incentive to readjust their strategy in order to evade constriction. In Miller’s approach, 
regulators and innovators are ultimately non-cooperative. This promotes a competitive narrative 
between starkly defined, isolated entities in discussions of the regulation of innovation. Indeed, 
the cat and mouse game has been used as an analogy in much literature on the regulation of 
																																																						
39 Dynamic regulation refers to the process of regulation-induced innovation and innovation-induced re-regulation. 
For a discussion on this dynamic, refer to Herring (1999, specifically 294-297).  
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innovations40 such as convertible bonds (Cockerill 2000), shareholder rights (McCafferty 1996; 
Nadeem 2008), and mortgage-backed securities (Giman 1996).  
 
Merton’s feedback loops  
	
Merton’s work on the relationship between financial innovation and regulation (1990; 1992; 
1995) shares a similar sentiment to Miller’s in that it constructs a dichotomous - though less 
severely so - relationship between innovators and regulators. Akin to Silber’s work on the 
emergence of innovations (1975, 1983), Merton theorizes that innovation occurs in order to 
remedy market inefficiencies (e.g. asymmetries in information), leading to more complete 
markets.41 Interestingly, while innovators and regulators may be working opposite one another in 
the short run - as exogenous rules often are imposed to control innovators over the short term - 
the resulting adaptions in innovative practice are fed back into future regulatory frameworks, and 
so on, creating a different regulatory dialectic than Miller’s over the long term. Merton argues 
that “…the long run role of regulatory change as an exogenous force for financial innovation is 
limited” (1990, 268) because successful innovations are slowly incorporated into the regulatory 
framework, entangling the initial disparate innovation and regulation into an interdependent 
relationship moving forward.42 This conceptualization paints a more complementary picture of 
the innovator-regulator relationship by constructing a ‘feedback loop’ of interaction.43  
																																																						
40 Cat and mouse analogies have most recently been replaced by the more aggressive narratives from capture theory, 
which will be discussed later in this section.  
41 “…innovations may improve efficiency by expanding opportunities for risk sharing…lowering transaction costs 
and by reducing asymmetric information and agency costs” (Merton 1995, 463). 
42 See also: Merton (1995) for detailed analysis of this feedback loop.  
43 Throughout the literature, the diffusion of innovations (separate from the emergence of innovations) is most often 
treated dialogically; innovators and adopters of innovations participate in a communicative discourse instead of a 
linear one-way transfer of information as participants sift through information (Rogers & Kincaid 1981). Many 
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This feedback loop inspires a more plausible account of the dialogical relationship between 
innovators and regulators than Miller’s for it allows conceptualizing innovation as a dialectical 
process. By framing innovation through an innovation-regulation feedback loop, Merton is able 
to demonstrate how innovations need not be designed solely to circumvent regulation. Instead, 
innovations develop to exploit any inefficient and unintended side effects of policy, possibly 
enhancing financial regulation in the long term.44 Nevertheless, Merton too is guilty of 
constructing the innovator-regulator relationship as a divided one between opposing interest 
groups. To illustrate: Merton’s depiction of ‘innovation spirals’ portrays financial innovation as 
opportunistic and socially optimal as the innovation corrects the negative side effects of 
regulatory constraint. Meanwhile, his depiction of regulators as clumsy and uncoordinated leads 
Merton to claim that “…it is wholly unrealistic to expect financial innovation to proceed along a 
balanced path” (1990, 270) due to the ever present regulatory disruption. Innovations correct 
regulation insofar as they are allowed to spiral through the regulatory framework: “a single 
minded policy focused exclusively on [protecting the balance between innovation and 
infrastructure] could derail the engine of innovation and bring to a halt the financial system’s trip 
to greater efficiency” (1990, 270). Though the severity of the divide between innovators and 
regulators is lessened in this instance, where regulators and innovators intersect in the innovative 
process remains unclear. 
 
																																																						
theorists explain how the diffusion of innovations occurs through herd behaviour (Shiller 2000), bandwagon effects 
(Allen & Gale 1994), innovation spirals (Merton 1990; 1992, 268), and chain reactions (Miller 1986). 	
44 Swaps have been explained by Miller as innovations designed to evade capital control restrictions to prevent 
domestic capital flight, though Merton offers an alternative conceptualization by demonstrating how swaps were 
designed in order to reduce the unintended side effects of such capital regulations on risk and diversification 
(Merton 1990, 1995).  
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Socio-technical innovation   
	
As evidenced in the above literature, there exists a dichotomy between innovators and 
regulators though the severity of this divide varies. Despite the variations, the majority of the 
literature on innovation is able to fit within the realm of strategic action fields: the relationship 
between regulators and innovators is thought to be a political-economic struggle for dominance 
and stability. The limitations of these approaches, however, make it necessary to construct a 
richer account of how innovators are themselves constructed by socio-technical elements. This 
will help to move away from the institutional and human-centric depiction of relationships and 
agency.  
A primary goal of socio-technical analysis is to understand the actors and devices that 
construct meaningful action and the processes under which they come together.45 Applying 
socio-technicality to financial innovation will help analyse how devices equip human cognition 
and how, in turn, the resulting calculative agency creates new potentialities. In this project, 
socio-technical analysis will be used to understand how innovations originate and how they are 
transformed from concepts to stable objects. First, this will involve analysing how the 
introduction of electronic trading technologies influenced the ability of traders to experiment 
with new strategies and how these experimentations, in turn, created an environment where ETFs 
first became possible. Second, the relationship between regulators and innovators will be 
examined to understand how their interactions negotiated the ETF into a tradeable security. Last, 
the socio-technical equipping of the regulatory apparatus will be examined to understand how 
regulators partner with their devices to construct and shape policy.  
																																																						
45 Cochoy offers an excellent analysis of how assemblages are able to unite market participants (2007).   
	 41	
The preeminence of innovators and technical infrastructure, while crucial to the 
materialization of the ETF, are not the only significant factors in the ETF’s historical emergence. 
Ultimately, the regulation of financial markets, participants, and products are of equal worth in 
the historical sociology of financial artefacts for they mediate the tensions between formal rules 
and organization on one hand, and the transience and fluidity of the innovative process on the 
other. Financial regulation - specifically, the regulation of innovation - will thus be the subject of 
the following section.  
 




The concept of responsibility in financial markets is not considered ‘as granted’, but instead 
ought to be defined by the multiplicity of devices that construct it.46 Frequently, financial 
regulators come to the forefront of popular media during periods of market turbulence as they 
often force decisions as to who is to act, when, and under what circumstances. Perhaps most 
importantly, regulatory bodies are important mediators between innovative concepts and 
formally defined securities, making them a crucial participant in the qualification of new 
financial products.47 Thus, examining the innovation of artefacts like the ETF necessitates 
																																																						
46 Refer to Laurent (2012) for a representative study on how responsibility has been constructed in the 
nanotechnology market.  
47 It is imperative to make a distinction between the qualification and construction of a financial artefact as they each 
illustrate a varying degree of intervention imposed on the development of financial products. Qualification refers to 
how an object is attributed qualities throughout its development (Callon et al 2002; Callon and Muniesa 2005), 
whereas construction - like engineering - refers to how an object of regulation is explicitly designed.  
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discussions on the relationship between regulatory structures and the actors that introduce 
products, systems, or services that challenge the existing regulatory framework.  
Financial regulation exists in order to protect consumers,48 oversee the integrity and 
organization of markets,49 and to maintain the competitive equality of institutions (Dale and 
Wolfe 1998). The sweeping deregulatory policies of the 1980s and the process of globalization 
has caused exponential increases in integration between regulators and those they regulate. 
Financial governance is no longer equated solely with government and financial actors are no 
longer a clearly defined entity. The horizontal and vertical integration of firms has proliferated 
the cross selling of financial services and new types of business being conducted by domestic, 
transnational, and international agreements. In this new decentralized era, understanding the 
relationship between financial regulators and the bodies they regulate is paramount to 
understanding how new artefacts develop.  
Institutionally focused literature has been helpful in examining the meso-level struggles that 
are involved in the construction of new financial markets such as the struggle between regulators 
and innovators. The literature from new political economy echoes these sentiments by suggesting 
that regulations are the result of such power struggles between interested parties (Bryan & 
Rafferty 2006). Emerging literature from new political economy is attempting to strengthen 
institutional analysis by bringing renewed focus to the relationship between politics and financial 
markets. Of particular prominence in regulation theory has been the work on capture, which has 
been growing in popularity since the 1950s. 
																																																						
48 For example, regulatory penalties exist to deter excessive risk taking that would harm investors. The US has 
prohibited broker-dealers from trading penny stocks in retail accounts unless strict conditions are met (Securities 
Exchange Act Rule 15g-2).  
49 This includes anti-money laundering and market manipulation legislation (USA PATRIOT ACT Section 352; 
FINRA Rule 3310).   
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Capture theory  
	
Generally, regulatory capture may be defined as when an “…agency is more responsive to 
the desires of an entity that it is supposed to be regulating than it is to the general public” 
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report 2011, xviii). The concept of regulatory capture 
originally began as theoretical observations about governmental corruption as early as 
Aristotle.50 Discussions on what constitutes corrupt ruling transitioned into a more subtle 
discourse concerning the trade-offs that exist between public and private interests beginning in 
the 1950s, and inquiries spread rapidly into the 1970s as discussions advocating for deregulation 
in the US peaked. The deregulatory efforts in the ensuing years further encouraged exploration 
into capture and in what ways private interests were being favoured in regulatory overhauls.51 As 
Novak states, “…linked between the scholarly development of the capture thesis and the more 
general resurgence of interest in competition and private enterprise…were being forged” (2013, 
31). 
Bernstein was the first to apply capture theory to the Securities and Exchange Commission: 
“Senators…expressed concern because pressure for the grant of broad discretionary authority to 
the SEC came not from supporters of the SEC…but from businessmen who feared that their 
activities would be hamstrung if the statutory standards became more specific” (1955, 52). 
Similarly, Landis (1960), called for a reappraisal of the activities of US agencies such as The 
																																																						
50 “…the true forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a 
view to the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one, or 
the few, or the many, are perversions” [1996, 71; Book III].		
51 Simon Johnson has related a wave of deregulatory policies in the US to the confluence of campaign financing and 
personal connections between Wall Street and Washington (2009).   
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Federal Trade Commission, The National Labor Relations Board, and the SEC in light of 
apparent conflicts of interest and ex parte proposals.52 Similarly, Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), 
and Peltzman (1976) examined how regulators were acquired by industry and used to further 
private interest.  
Since the 2007 crisis, the capture thesis has been reintroduced with a sense of urgency from 
popular media. The former Chief Economist of the International Monetary Fund declared that 
“…it is all about capture…It is coming from Wall Street, Wall Street influencing the New York 
Fed, unduly having this excessive power in the Federal Reserve System” (Johnson 2013, 14). 
There exists a “…political balance of power that gives the financial sector a veto over public 
policy…The banks have been exploiting this fear as they wring favorable deals out of 
Washington” (Johnson 2009). Similarly, Senator Elizabeth Warren has observed that “any effort 
to increase or reform statutory regulation of financial products is met by a powerful industry 
lobby on one side that is not balanced by an equally effective consumer lobby on the other...With 
every agency, the fear of regulatory capture is ever-present” (Warren 2007). Most recently, a 
former SEC chairman attested to the ways in which industry lobbyists would pressure 
Congressional committees and the SEC to create favourable rulemaking for the financial 
industry, going as far as to refer to the process as a “blood sport to make a particular agency look 
stupid or inept or venal” (Levitt 2010). Moreover, the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act (48 Stat. 
162) that separated commercial and investment banking activities, exponential increases in the 
amount of leverage investment banks are permitted to use, agreements to allow banks their own 
private risk regulation and standard setting for leverage (SEC 2004, 69 Fed. Reg. 34428), and 
what Johnson refers to as “a light (dare I say invisible?) hand at the Securities and Exchange 
																																																						
52 For related studies, refer to Kolko (1963) and Becker (1958).  
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Commission in its regulatory enforcement” (2009) have all led to inquiries on the strength of 
industry influence in the US financial markets.53  
In this literature, as with the literature from the decades prior, capture occurs when private 
interests invade the public sphere and damage the functioning of the regulatory apparatus (Stigler 
1971). Understanding the agencement of financial products necessitates understanding the 
relationship between these parties and under what conditions the relationship brings about an 
environment conducive to innovation.   
 
New political economy 
	
In light the financial crisis and the resulting public alarm over industry influence, the school 
of new political economy has worked to refine capture theory. Predominantly discussed in 
regards to banking regulation, regulatory capture has become synonymous with regulatory 
failure (Admanti & Hellwig 2013). Specifically, political economists have been studying how 
information and power asymmetries in governance lead to failure of new regulatory regimes. 
Goldbach (2015a; 2015b; 2016) argues that regulatory capture results when the regulated 
incentivize regulators to favour private interests, leading to a regulatory framework riddled with 
loopholes and thus eventual failure. Empirically, Goldbach (2015b) presents a striking case study 
on how global standard setting in banking regulation - specifically, the Basel II framework - 
failed because of the unchecked influence of powerful industry interests. The counterbalance for 
these interests lies with political influence, though the necessary checks and balances are often 
																																																						
53 Kwak (2013) also develops a striking connection between deregulatory policies and industry influence in light of 
the 2007 crisis.	
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difficult to implement in a system that has been organized around the interests of industry elites 
(Germain 2010). In the same spirit, Baker analyses the structure of global financial regulations 
prior to the 2010 crisis, concluding that widespread private influence in global financial 
governance “nourished the financial boom” and also led to its startling demise (2010, 647).  
Detailed refinements to the capture thesis have been advanced by Wagner (2010) and 
McCarty (2013) who construct the concept of information capture. Specifically, Wagner seeks to 
analyse information barriers and asymmetries in environmental regulation, building considerably 
on Stigler’s (1970) capture thesis. Information capture is “embedded participatory imbalances 
that emerge from the administrative legal system’s infinite tolerance of and even tendency to 
encourage information excess. Information capture allows strategic parties to effect considerable 
control over the agency’s priorities…” (Wagner 2010, 1431), notably by inflating costs to 
process the information required for public interest groups to participate in the rulemaking 
process. Similarly, McCarty (2013) and Barkow (2013) analyse how information capture 
allowed private interest groups to be unduly influential in the process of financial rulemaking.54 
In all cases, information capture becomes synonymous with the failure of the regulatory regime 
under analysis.55  
Weber (2012), McCarty (2011), and Lipson (2015) have advanced the concept of complexity 
capture which occurs when private industry is able to exploit the epistemic gap that exists 
between regulators and the regulated. Complexity capture also occurs when regulators are unable 
to keep pace with the complexities of the market they are charged with regulating. In complex 
and rapidly changing environments such as financial markets, regulators do not have the capacity 
																																																						
54 For an excellent overview of the relations between traditional capture theory and new concepts of information and 
complexity capture, refer to Becker (2016, 213-241).  
55 Moschella and Tsingou (2013) provide an excellent case study examining how the 2010 financial crisis was 
partially a result of oligarchical institutions with veto-power capturing the regulatory process in the US.  
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to adequately oversee all activities and so often depend on private industry for information and 
expertise. As Weber states, financial markets are particularly prone to this form of capture for 
they are “authentically complex, rather than merely complicated or difficult to understand” 
(2012, 645). Within this framework, regulators are often fighting a losing battle to have access to 
same amount of information as those operating ‘on the ground’.  
Using the complexity thesis, Lipson (2015) argues that regulatory failure and financial crisis 
occurs in three stages: first, the concentration of power in a few institutions leads to the ‘too big 
to fail’ dilemma where regulators and the regulated become increasingly reliant on one another;56 
second, the complexity of financial transactions, market structure, and regulatory rulebooks 
becomes overwhelming and prevents efficient regulatory function; and third, regulators become 
captured by private interest when regulators become unable to keep pace with the expertise and 
resources of the regulated.  
Similar to the literature from the decades previous, the literature on regulation from new 
political economy maintains a dichotomy where captured regulation is bad because it works 
contra the public interest, and self-determined regulation is good because it works for the public 
interest. Defining strong and weak forms57 of regulatory capture has been helpful in 
demonstrating how capture exists in degrees rather than extremes (Carpenter and Moss 2013, 11-
14), though the dichotomy between captured and unobstructed regulation remains pervasive.  
This dyad between regulators and the regulated is problematic on two fronts. First, the 
commonly used references - ‘regulators and the regulated’ and ‘public and private interests’ - are 
																																																						
56 Refer to Alessandri and Haldane (2009) for a case study on the growing interdependence between British banks 
and the state. 
57 Strong capture “violates the public interest to such an extent that the public would be better served by either (a) no 
regulation…or (b) comprehensive replacement of the policy”; Weak capture “…occurs when special interest 
influence compromises the capacity of regulation to enhance the public interest” (Carpenter and Moss 2013, 11-12).  
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neither stable nor homogeneously defined concepts. The literature has not been able to develop 
clear definitions of what constitutes public versus private interests in historical case studies. 
Moreover, it is extremely difficult to prove in what ways regulatory policies – especially 
deregulatory policies - favour private over public interest ex ante, so these claims are even more 
difficult to substantiate.  
Similarly, the literature often conflates governance with government. Globalization and 
increasing complexity is blurring the boundaries of who can act as a financial regulator. There is 
no longer an entrenched divide between public and private regulatory efforts as public-private 
regulatory efforts and self-regulatory organizations spread. That is, governance no longer equates 
to government (Dixit 2009), making the public versus private interest dichotomy misguided. To 
complicate matters further, private regulation is often accepted as a better alternative than formal 
law in rapidly changing and expertise-driven industries such as the financial industry.58 Despite 
the realities of modern regulatory frameworks, the bulk of the literature continues to erect 
inflexible boundaries between regulators and the regulated without examining in what ways 
these entities become entangled. The lack of definitional clarity of these concepts and the 
entrenched divide between them hinders the ability of the literature to advance alternative 
conceptualizations of these relationships.  
Second, the literature implies that regulators are synonymous with public interest and the 
regulated with private interest, leading to claims that regulatory failure is related to the degree of 
private interests embedded in the legislation. However, negative policy outcomes are not 
necessarily proof of captured regulatory processes as the literature seems to suggest. In all, there 
																																																						
58 One can look to the following quote as an example of this mindset: “The most effective defense against fraud…is 
counterparties’ surveillance. JP Morgan thoroughly scrutinizes the balance sheet of Merrill Lynch before it lends. It 
does not look to the SEC to verify Merrill’s solvency” (Greenspan 2007, 256).		
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exists a lack of clarity in this body of literature that prevents it from fully synthesizing the trade-
offs that exist in the construction of the regulatory apparatus and the impact this has on 
innovative practice. 
Again, this project seeks to explore where the interests of regulators and innovators intersect 
in the innovative process. To that extent, this project will question whether or not it is possible 
for regulator-innovator relations to develop without exploitive capture by private industry. To 
assist in developing this framework, it is necessary to move beyond capture theory. 
 
Joint regulation  
	
The concept of joint regulation offers a more plausible solution to capture theory and is 
directly pertinent to the questions raised by this project. A theory on joint regulation was first 
advanced by Reynaud (1979) to examine how consensus flows from the opposition of social 
actors instead of a common morality and unified social arrangement.59 This literature defines the 
consensus building in regulation as “the coexistence of several sources of constraint…that weigh 
on the actors in charge of solving conflicts and enforcing rules” (Lazega, Mounier, and Tubaro 
2011, 47). Since Reynaud, joint regulation has become a popular framework with which to 
analyse collective bargaining agreements (Wright and Brown 2013; Gold 2001) and 
environmental policy (Hanf and van de Gronden 1998), but has yet to be applied to the 
regulation of financial markets.60 
																																																						
59 Reynaud’s concept of joint regulation was developed to provide an alternative to Durkheim’s work on the 
unifying effect of the institutional system: Joint regulation “…starts not from some general regulation of society by 
social values [Durkheim’s conscience collective], but from the production by social actors of an overall body of 
joint short-term rules which are neither coherent nor continuous” (Reynaud 1979, 316).  
60 I am currently unaware of any research that applies the concept of joint regulation to the governance of financial 
markets. This is not to say that such research does not exist. 
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Joint regulation offers a more plausible approach to examining financial regulation than 
capture theory primarily in its depiction of the environments in which consensus may be reached. 
Joint regulation challenges the notion that markets in turmoil cannot produce meaningful and 
well-negotiated regulatory frameworks: If “…the most frequent relations are relations of 
mistrust, tolerance or respect, emphasizing to different degrees one or the other, but always 
taking into account the other’s power” (Reynaud 1979, 316), decision making is able to occur 
through negotiated compromise and concessions, not only through corrosive relations of capture. 
Joint regulation also offers a narrative where stark delineations between regulators and the 
regulated are mitigated in favour of bilateral discussions, consensus building, and conflict 
resolution. This echoes the sentiments advanced by Merton’s dialectical account of the 
regulation of innovation, where a feedback loop weaves the initiatives of the regulators and 
innovators together over the long term.   
While a meaningful step forward, joint regulation is not without its shortcomings. Notably, 
determining the dynamics of what constitutes captured versus free decision making is quite 
unclear. Perhaps most importantly, the concept of joint regulation can dissolve rather easily into 
capture theory if there exist large imbalances of power between negotiators (Lazega et al 2012). 
Cooperative agreements may be rejected when a participant has an incentive to defect, so it 
becomes essential for regulators to have first mover advantage in order to instill incentives large 
enough to stabilize joint initiatives.61 Because joint regulation often deteriorates into a ‘capture 
or be captured’ thesis when faced with information and power asymmetries, structural solutions 
to reduce the temptation for parties to deviate is often the focus of such studies.  
																																																						
61 Refer to Ayers and Braithwaite (1992, 162) for a discussion on regulatory strategy and intervention. 
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Gaps in the literature prevent a full understanding of financial regulation - specifically, the 
regulation of innovation. It is the goal of this project to advance a dialogue about how the 
dichotomy in regulation literature between regulators and the regulated, or the public and the 
private interest, does not fully encapsulate how the construction of financial artefacts occurs. 
Again, the goal is to explore a more integrated account of how financial actors build 
relationships to qualify and legitimate innovative financial products. As the literature on capture 
theory and joint regulation collapse too freely into a dichotomy of public versus private interests 
without analysing how those interests themselves become embodied, this project proposes that 
agencement is the most inclusive framework with which to understand the regulation of financial 
innovation. Specifically, regulatory agencement will be used to depict a participatory and highly 
integrated form of responsibility between regulators and innovators. 
 
Regulatory agencement  
	
As discussed previously, agencement refers to the assemblages of human beings and their 
devices that create meaning and make action possible. Agencement highlights how a financial 
artefact or market must be considered an achievement instead of an a priori certainty. Similarly, 
regulatory agencement attempts to bring regulatory bodies into this analysis to demonstrate how 
their mediation of innovation processes is a crucial aspect of socio-technical innovation.  
To remedy this lack of clarity surrounding the traditional divides presented in regulatory 
literature, this project seeks to redraw the conceptual boundaries slightly. Moving forward, there 
will be a deliberate attempt to construct a narrative about the regulation of innovation as an issue 
between regulators and innovators, not between public and private interest or regulators and the 
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regulated, for the following reasons: It is possible for regulators to unproblematically incorporate 
private interest into policy making, blurring the demarcation between public and private. It is 
also possible for regulators to be the regulated, in the case of self-regulatory organizations or 
bilateral agreements between public and private industry. However, the one thing a regulator 
cannot be is the constructor of financial innovations, specifically, financial products. By their 
very nature, regulators are tasked with the monitoring of financial innovation and cannot be the 
originating source.62 Thus, this project will move beyond the popular discussion of regulators-
regulated and the public-private, instead focusing on the relationship between regulators-
innovators. While a minor shift in the conceptual boundary, this reorientation will permit the 
research to fill a grey area in the regulatory literature by addressing in what ways regulators and 
innovators construct a relationship, find points of intersection, and negotiate points of 
divergence.  
Regulatory agencement will advance three distinct themes in order to aid in the empirical 
investigation of regulator-innovator relationships. First, this approach will illuminate how 
regulators participate with their internal devices to bring about new states of affairs. The 
participation with devices will include the interpretative process of rules such as The Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Pub.L. 73–291, 48 Stat. 881), the influx of technology and its impact on 
regulatory organization and decision making, the relationship of regulatory departments within 
the SEC and how the distributed cognition of actors advances policy construction, and how the 
unique relationship with all of these devices binds the regulator with their devices to create new 
expressions of agency and discourse.  
																																																						
62 As part of this research, industry professionals from both regulatory bodies and private financial firms were asked: 
“Is it possible for financial regulators to be considered financial innovators? Why or why not?” 100% of respondents 
agreed that it is impossible for regulators to be considered innovators. This will be discussed in detail in later 
chapters.  
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Second, regulatory agencement will focus on the points of intersection between regulators 
and innovators during the development phases of a financial innovation such as the ETF. 
Understanding innovators and regulators to be co-participants in financial innovation will 
challenge the existing framework that depicts these bodies as continually opposing forces. By 
reframing the conceptual orientation, commonly analysed dichotomies will be circumvented in 
order to analyse points of intersection between the regulatory and innovative processes. As this 
project will show, innovative processes are not a simple matter of whether market participants 
and technologies challenged regulatory rules, captured the regulatory arena, or were constrained 
by regulators. By examining how the relationship between regulators and innovators guided the 
ETF from a concept to a defined product,63 the ways in which regulators participate in the 
introduction of innovations to the market will be analysed.  
Lastly, regulatory agencement will contribute to the understanding of how regulators 
participate in the qualification process of innovative financial instruments. That is, this 
framework will examine how regulators attribute qualities that convert concepts into formally 
defined financial instruments. As stated previously, regulators are important mediators between 
an innovative idea and a formally defined financial instrument. Regulatory agencement will 
examine what exactly is involved in the mediation: how regulators participate with rules and 
policy, interested actors, and technical equipment to bring about a new environment where the 
new innovation is a clearly defined, legitimate entity - a socio-technical agencement.  
 
																																																						
63 This concept is similar to Beccarini, Beunza, Hoepner, and Ferraro’s (2016) use of cognitive (mis)alignment. 
Whereas Beccarini et al used cognitive alignment to explore shareholder engagement, this paper focuses on 
innovator-regulator mediation of product concepts.  
	 54	
Conclusion 
Addressing the missing pieces  
	
Synthesizing the sociological and economic literature that relates to financial innovation, and 
the regulation of that innovation, is an overwhelming task. To maintain an appropriate scope, this 
project will address two areas of bias or omission that emerge from the above scholarship. First, 
there exists a pervasive focus on human-centric agency without an adequate analysis of the role 
that technology plays in enabling new, extended expressions of agency. Second, the 
overwhelming focus on institutional decision making fails to succinctly analyse how institutions 
develop their interests, organizational structures, and relationships.  
 As discussed, the histories of traditional economic and sociological disciplines were 
distinct, with economics focusing on the rational decision maker and sociology focusing on 
institutional arrangements. This intellectual divide inspired the theories of economic 
embeddedness and organizational fields, which arose to incorporate individual, social, and 
political aspects into the emerging field of new economic sociology. However, this literature 
remains focused on human-centric conceptions of agency and does not adequately address the 
power that technological equipment has to expand the ways in which agency may be expressed. 
This is particularly problematic when the object of study is highly technological, such as a 
financial market. 
 Interestingly, the literature on innovation focuses primarily on technological innovations, 
but does not analyse in what ways technology and its users become entangled to project new 
forms of agency and redefine what constitutes a financial actor. The literature on regulation 
focuses more on strictly divided, stable actors than how these actors are themselves agenced. In 
the regulatory literature, questions still remain about how regulators themselves are constructed 
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and in what ways their agency is expressed and altered in participation their devices such as 
rules, internal organizational structures, technological processing, and inter-departmental 
relations. Understanding in what ways socio-technical arrangements influence the internal 
cognitive processes and external competitive environment is crucial to understanding where 
innovative concepts come from, how they are mediated into formal instruments, and finally, 
disseminated throughout the marketplace.  
 The lack of attention to socio-technical forms of agency is deepened by the predominant 
focus of the literature on institutional relationships, which has constructed the research narrative 
around institutional interests and power struggles. In the innovation literature, market 
participants are constructing using oppositional formulations: cat versus mouse, oppression 
versus the free market, innovators versus the regulatory apparatus. This is not problematic per se, 
as this structuring enables competitive relationships to be analysed, but a richer analysis of the 
intersections between these groups is needed.  
 The literature on regulation also falls victim to this division in its conceptual framework. 
Capture theory reduces discussions down to a dichotomy between public and private interests 
without being able to clearly define what exactly those interests constitute or where they 
intersect. As a result, this framework has a tendency to define regulators and the regulated as 
stable and unchanging entities throughout the innovative process. In reality, these bodies are 
fluid and transitory as they continue to shape and be shaped by their devices, relationships, and 
networks.  
Relatedly, the regulatory literature does not question the resoluteness of the boundaries it has 
entrenched between regulators, the regulated, the public, and the private. More so, there is no 
clear method in which to analyse how these boundaries may be broken down to find common 
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points of intersection. This institutional bias leads to strict divides between bodies without 
accounting for the extent to which their material and semiotic frameworks may be integrated. A 
more integrative account of the relationship that exists between regulators and innovators is 
needed if the agencement of the ETF is to be fully understood.  
This project seeks to make two contributions to the literature. First, this project will advance 
the empirical robustness of socio-technical analysis by examining how innovative financial 
products must be considered agencements. This will be achieved by developing a theme that 
illuminates how innovators and regulators become equipped with socio-technical artefacts. 
Second, this project will develop a theoretical alternative to the existing regulation theory by 
constructing a theory of regulatory agencement. This theory will assist in breaking down the 
common assumption that innovation is in an antagonistic relation to regulation, and will focus 
instead on how regulators are co-constitutive in innovative security design. This second theme 
will illuminate how innovators and regulators are able to mediate the transition from an 
innovative product-concept to a formally defined, bounded artefact. Taken together, these two 
guiding themes - socio-technicality and innovator-regulator relationships - will demonstrate how 
ETFs ought to be understood as a socio-technical agencement and will contribute to the growing 













The launch of exchange traded funds in the United States inspired the development of a new 
financial industry that quickly proliferated across North American, Asian Pacific, and European 
markets. This project is concerned with determining the extent to which the ETF is a product 
constructed from socio-technical forms of financial agency, two themes of which are (1) the 
socio-technical agencement of human beings and their devices and (2) the regulatory agencement 
of innovators and regulators. This chapter will begin with an overview of the guiding themes and 
research questions, followed by a discussion on research design and strategy. The collected data 
will be summarized before concluding with a discussion on the organization and presentation of 
the research findings. 
 
Research themes and questions  
	
As discussed in Chapter Two, the conceptual scheme used to analyse ETFs is agencement, 
which arises from the relationships forged among human beings and their textual, semiotic, and 
technological devices. The decision to use agencement as a conceptual framework came from the 
preliminary research that showed the subtle yet pervasive involvement of many complex 
financial processes. The multiplicity of processes involved in the development of ETFs directed 
focus to the role of relationships in constituting financial artefacts. As a result, this project is not 
solely focused on documenting one process such as technological innovation. Instead, this 
project seeks to illuminate the subtle socio-technical relationships that affected decision-making 
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behaviour and to what extent these relationships had a transformative effect on the financial 
infrastructure they were operating within.    
Preliminary research has demonstrated that there are two important relationships in the 
construction of ETFs: The socio-technical agencement of actors and their devices that led to 
technical innovation and changes in market behaviour, and the relationships that developed 
among regulators and innovators during this process of innovative change. The research has been 
guided by these two themes and research questions have been developed in response to each 
theme.  
 
Socio-technical innovation  
	
The first theme identified in preliminary research was the relationship between human beings 
and their technical devices that were the source for structural change in financial markets.  
Examples of this process in the financial markets are numerous: The shift from auditory to 
visual trading environments (from trading floors to screen-based trading) meant that financial 
actors were fusions of human beings and their devices. The market was slowly becoming 
materialized in the trader’s monitor, and the market could only be accessed by participation with 
the monitor. Electronic systems closed time gaps in data transmittal, making participants 
increasingly attuned to the visual data on the screens - technology became the apparatus through 
which decisions were made and possibilities negotiated. This increasing participation with 
technical apparatuses brings individual agents and their technological devices into one 
agencement where previous human-centric actions (e.g. manual stock trading) were combined 
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with technology to provide extensions and new forms of possibility such as automated, large-
batch stock trading. 
The socio-technical theme was used to illuminate the agencement of actors and their 
equipment and to examine the extent to which socio-technical relationships were responsible for 
the construction of ETFs. For example, the preliminary research found that the trading strategies 
that foreshadowed ETFs began in the early 1970s with a strategy called program trading.64 This 
strategy then evolved into a strategy called basket trading65 in the 1980s, which then transformed 
into index participation units66 in 1989, and culminated with the first ETF with 1993. These new 
and innovative trading strategies seem to have been inspired by technological developments 
relating to computing and automated trade technologies that made large trades easier and quicker 
to complete. 
While many various trading strategies foreshadowing ETFs have been documented by 
financial scholarship such as prominent trade publications, they remain largely unexamined by 
sociological scholarship. Currently, there is room for growth in the research of financial 
technology and its effects on the trading strategies of market participants. In addition, the 
relationship between informal trading strategies and the development of financial products 
remains largely unexplored. As a result, the first theme - socio-technical innovation - was chosen 
																																																						
64 Program trading is the practice of buying or selling a group of securities at the same time. Program trading was 
defined by the New York Stock Exchange as any one trade involving fifteen or more stocks with an aggregate value 
over one million US dollars. These trades were placed as one single order yet typically involved manually buying or 
selling approximately one hundred different securities to fulfill the order. See Auerbach & Hayes (1986, 121) for 
common program trading strategies in the 1970s.   
65 A basket trade is a single order that automatically traded an entire portfolio of stocks. Basket trading offered an 
improvement upon program trading as the securities in the basket traded as a single entity – there was no need to 
break the initial trade into its individual components.  
66 Index Participation Units were developed by the American Stock Exchange, Philadelphia Stock Exchange, and the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange from 1987 to 1988. These were sophisticated basket products whose purpose was 
to track and replicate the performance of a specific index such as the S&P 500 using a combination of securities and 
futures contracts. All were liquidated shortly after launch due to complex structures that were difficult to understand 
and regulatory confusion over who was to regulate them. 
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in order to contribute to this relatively new field of sociological scholarship. The primary 
question used to guide research and analysis along this theme was: To what extent are socio-
technical relationships between human beings and technological equipment responsible for the 
emergence of exchange traded funds? 
 
Regulatory agencement  
	
The second theme examines the relationship that exists between regulators and innovators. 
Regulatory devices - the elements that formally construct notions of responsibility in financial 
communities - are of crucial importance to the qualification67 of financial products for they force 
decisions as to who is to act, when, and under what conditions. More importantly, regulatory 
structure is a necessary bridge between innovative socio-technical processes and formally 
defined products. Preliminary research for this project examined the developments that led to the 
first formal structuring of the ETF product and found that regulatory frameworks played an 
indispensable role in shaping the socio-technical infrastructure of financial innovation. 
Early research unearthed four major developments that related to ETFs: First, the 1975 
amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that placed a heavy focus on innovating 
technologies, products, and trading strategies;68 second, the jurisdictional conflict between the 
SEC and CFTC over index innovations and the development of the first formally defined index 
baskets; third, the developments relating to the structure of index baskets that led to amendments 
of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and structuring of the first ETFs; and fourth, the 1994 
																																																						
67 In this project, qualification is used to describe how an object of regulation is attributed qualities through 
regulation. See Callon et al (2002) and Callon and Muniesa (2005) for how qualification is used in other approaches 
within the social studies of finance. 
68These amendments may also be cited as the “Securities Reform Act of 1975” in financial literature.  
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legislation to amend procedures relating to Unlisted Trading Privileges (UTP) in order to 
promote the ETF structure and market competition for the product.   
These events contributed to the development of the second narrative of this project as they 
focus the analysis on the extent to which the regulatory relationships influenced the emergence 
of ETFs. The questions used to construct a line of inquiry around this theme were: Is the impetus 
for financial innovation to find loopholes in regulation as the literature suggests, or do innovators 
and regulators have a more co-dependent relationship? If it is the case that innovators and 
regulators are co-constituents of the ETF’s innovative process, to what extent could the 
relationship be considered an agencement?   
 
Design, strategy, and data collection  
	
Project parameters  
	
While the first modern ETF in the world was created and launched in Canada69 and sizeable 
ETF markets now exist in every major financial sector in the world, the American market 
experienced the fastest and largest proliferation of ETFs and pioneered the majority of ETF-
related innovations over the past 25 years. In addition, crucial innovations that foreshadowed the 
first ETF emerged from US exchanges such as the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX). 
																																																						
69 These products were called the Toronto Index Participation Securities (TIPs) and predated the American ETF 
product by three years. The first TIPs tracked the Toronto Stock Exchange 35 index (TSE-35) and was launched in 
1990. This product rolled into another product, the iShares CDN LargeCap 60 ETF, in early 2000.  
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Geographically, this project will focus on the American financial markets because of their large 
contribution to both the number of ETF products and the notional value of these products.70  
Within the American markets, financial exchanges permeate many niches and have 
materialized markets that range from the historic to the relatively obscure. The traditional giants 
of American markets were legacy exchanges such as the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), to name 
but a few. In the 1970s, specialized exchanges such as the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(CBOE) opened, with many smaller yet highly competitive electronic communications networks 
and trading pools opening in the decades that followed.  
My preliminary document analysis has revealed that the PHLX, AMEX, and NYSE were the 
frequently mentioned financial exchanges in relation to ETFs.71 Specifically, ETF-related 
innovations were most often attributed to the AMEX with great competitive influence from the 
NYSE. As a result, the analysis of the NYSE-AMEX relationship became crucial to 
understanding the emergence of the ETF. For example, as will be covered in Chapter Eight, the 
NYSE and the AMEX had a history of gentlemanly accord guided by the unspoken rule that one 
shall not interfere with the business of the other. For years, this agreement ensured friendly 
competition until the AMEX, through their own brand of relationship-building and marketing, 
became the sole listing exchange of ETFs. As ETFs began to grow in popularity into the late 
1990s, the NYSE was forced to invoke rarely-used legislation to begin offering AMEX-listed 
ETFs for their members. What followed was likened to a war between two superpowers as each 
exchange attempted to strategically subvert the other in order to attract traders to ETFs. 
																																																						
70 As of December 2013, the US ETF market constituted 72% of the global net assets in ETFs. Data provided by 
ETFGI for the Investment Company Institute. Retrieved from http://www.icifactbook.org/fb_ch3.html   
71 Preliminary documents surveyed are official governmental and regulatory reports, press releases, newspaper 
articles, and prominent trade publications.  
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Following the leads from documents and interview data, this project focuses on the 
developments within the PHLX, AMEX, NYSE, and the authority responsible for their oversight 
- the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  
While the first modern ETF was not launched until 1989, evidence shows that precursory 
technological infrastructure began entering the marketplace as early as 1970, with the earliest 
ETF-style product launched in 1989. Thus, to develop an appropriate analysis of the environment 
that the ETF emerged from, it became necessary to analyse back to the dates when trading 
technologies began to infiltrate the market and impact the trading strategies employed by market 
participants. Thus, taking into account the developments in financial technology, trading 
strategies, and legislation - and for pragmatic reasons of time and resources - and the selected 
time period will span the years 1970 to 2000. This timeframe encompasses the specific processes 
that effectively contributed to the financial infrastructure - both semiotic and material - that 
created the conditions felicitous to the construction and proliferation of exchange traded funds. 
While ETFs have indeed undergone many changes since 2000, both official reports and 
empirical data indicate that the years between 1970 and 2000 offer the most substantial 
developments in the relations forged between technology, institutions, and regulators.  
 
Project structure  
	
This project has been structured as a case study and will focus on constructing a strong 
historical narrative about the forces in the US that influenced ETF construction. The ETF case 
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study will be used to represent an instance of the broader phenomenon72 of the role of regulation 
and technology in processes of financial innovation.  
Generally, the critiques of the case study approach typically argue that the case study has a 
tendency to exclude important processes that lead to a larger and more complete narrative 
(Campbell and Stanley 1966, 6-7).73 This project remains sensitive to these critiques and 
attempts to address them in two ways: First, by examining in what ways technology and 
regulation influenced financial innovation in the 1970s to 2000s, and second, by examining the 
validity of the socio-technical actor (as opposed to the human-centric actor) in financial 
sociology. This approach will demonstrate how ETFs were the result of a larger market narrative 
that emphasizes the importance of socio-technical relationships between actors and their devices 
and the possibilities that these relationships may bring forth. In this project, the case study 
approach will aid in discovering how complex processes of decision-making affected but one 
element of the larger market over time.  
The particularistic focus of a case study may prevent a researcher from making meaningful 
applications from their research to broader society. Indeed, the definition of case study in the 
Dictionary of Sociology includes the statement “…a case study cannot provide reliable 
information about the broader class” (Abercrombie et al 1984, 34).74 While indeed some case 
studies are unable to produce knowledge that may be widely applicable, this is not to discredit 
their value for case studies provide the preliminary data without which the study of total 
																																																						
72 See alternative definitions of the case study in Black & Champion (1976, 89-94), Nachmias & Nachmias (1976, 
42), and Feagin, Orum, & Sjoberg (1991, 2-24).		
73 While Campbell’s early work claimed that case studies are “illusory” and “of almost no scientific value” 
(Campbell and Stanley 1966, 6-7), his later writings reveal a softened position that the knowledge from case study 
research “…is the only route to knowledge - noisy, fallible, and biased though it be” (Campbell 1975, 191).  
74 Refer to Eysenck (1976) for an example of scholarship critical of the case study approach. Refer to Flyvbjerg 
(2006) and Walton (1992) for a rebuttal.  
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complexes of social action is not possible.75 Case studies focusing on a particular phenomenon - 
in this case, the construction of the US ETF market - are able to provide insights into the 
complexities of the social world that the participants are operating within, grounding theoretical 




Mixed qualitative methods using document analysis and semi-structured interviews were 
chosen for this project. To begin, individuals who held important roles in bringing the ETF to 
market and those who could help begin a ‘snowballing’ process for potential interviewees were 
selected for interviews. Keeping in mind the answers I have solicited from interview participants 
and the nature of my research topic, I am confident that this project remains under the Level One 
ethical guidelines from the School’s Research Ethics Committee. All participant accounts 
remained anonymous unless their preferences were clearly recorded to be otherwise.   
Participant suitability for this project was determined based on their role in the development 
and oversight of technical infrastructure, trading strategy and products, exchange operations, and 
regulatory mechanisms. The individuals selected were considered decision makers in their field, 
often being C-suite executives, department leaders, or recognized innovators. Due to the 
geographical concentration of American financial centers, most contacts were found to reside 
near Chicago, Washington, New York, and the State of California. Initially, the majority of 
																																																						
75 For example, Santos and Rodrigues (2009) have critiqued MacKenzie and Millo (2003) and MacKenzie (2006) 
for their sociological analysis of options. Notably, the authors argue that these cases are too isolated to be relevant to 
the general market. Despite its particularistic focus, MacKenzie’s case study on Black-Scholes has gone on to 
generate substantial interest in the performativity of financial models providing a hypothesis that can be tested in 
other cases.  
76 Refer to Glaser, Barney, & Strauss (1967) for discussions on grounded theory.		
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interviews were organized to occur in-person. However, as many of the participants are still 
actively involved in the markets and travel extensively, many interviews had to be conducted 
through Skype or telephone.  
Online questionnaires were also constructed so exceptionally busy interviewees could work 
through the questions in their own time. These questionnaires were distributed in addition to oral 
interviews for some participants whose background was not fully known.77 By receiving a 
detailed professional history of a participant before the oral interview, questions that would be 
most applicable and useful could be developed. I initially believed that an exploratory narrative 
is best fulfilled by developing an authentic conversational rapport with participants instead of 
relying on carefully constructed responses to formal questioning, though this formal questioning 
yielded extremely useful, detailed results.  
Interviewees were selected after conducting a preliminary document analysis of newspaper 
articles and prominent trade publications from the time period in question. Individuals identified 
as decision makers in their field were first chosen - these were individuals that often gave 
interviews or were referenced for their leadership and specialist knowledge. These historical 
articles were particularly useful in identifying individuals from the PHLX, as their index 
participation units were launched with great interest from the financial community. In addition to 
media publications, the 1987 market crash reports commissioned by the NYSE, AMEX, and 
SEC were consulted and the prominent authors and exchange executives contacted. The 1987 
crisis was chosen as a crucial event in the history of the ETF for it appears to be the tipping point 
for basket-style innovations: The studies commissioned after this crisis were influential in 
encouraging legislators to promote basket products as a remedy to the poorly understood 
																																																						
77 This situation often occurred when potential participants were recommended to me by other interviewees. 
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program trading strategies of the time. Last, firms that were recognized innovators in the period 
in question were chosen. This includes the firm that created the SuperTrust and SuperShares 
products which, while short-lived, were the immediate precursors to the launch of exchange 
traded funds in the United States.  
The majority of interviews were scheduled to occur before archive visits and extensive 
document analysis took place. There are a multitude of informal discussions that occur between 
innovators or regulators before official releases, proposed rules, and product applications are 
presented. The decision to place the interviews before extensive document analysis was to help 
illuminate these lesser-known processes that construct the decision-making of financial 
participants. For example, I aimed to determine the extent to which new financial technologies 
encouraged financial actors to experiment with their trading strategies, and in turn, how these 
new strategies impacted the relationship between regulatory and market networks. It was the goal 
to gain a deeper understanding of the events in question in order to most accurately represent the 
subtle yet pervasive relationships not accounted for in official documentation. 
In total, 36 interviews were conducted for this project. Of the 36, 21 were semi-structured 
oral interviews, 9 were electronic (e.g. formal online questionnaires; questions sent via email), 
and 6 were informal discussions with participants who did not wish to be recorded or attributed. 
Interviews lasted from 30 minutes to 3 hours, with the average length being 72 minutes.  
Care was taken to ensure there was diversity in participants’ areas of expertise. These areas 
of expertise were categorized as follows: Trading,78 financial technology, securities law, 
																																																						
78 Individuals with experience in institutional trading, specialist posts, program trading strategies, spreadsheet 
trading, index arbitrage, index derivatives (options and futures), and ETF trading were contacted.  
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indexing and modelling, product development,79 and exchange operations.80 The majority of 
participants had professional experience in the 1980s and 1990s, and all could be included in two 
or more of the expertise categories. Of those who had career experiences dating back to the 
1970s, the lack of specificity surrounding daily events was problematic. Of the individuals who 
spoke to their experience in the 1970s, all were still in their early career stages so general, non-
technical information was often provided. Because of the general nature of these interviews, a 
greater reliance on document analysis was needed to bolster the oral histories from the 1970s. 
 
Document collection  
	
The document analysis component of this project was used to investigate how the decision-
making processes of rule makers was intertwined with that of the innovators. The analysis 
focuses primarily on formal documents, speeches, and reports by the American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX), and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Most of the documents pertinent to this project 
reside in the NYSE Rulemaking Archives (covering the years 1996-2015), NYSE Historical 
Records Collection (covering the years 1792-2014), the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA) in Maryland, and the SEC Historical Society Archives (covering the 
years 1792-2015). Some of these documents are digitally archived and may be accessed without 
																																																						
79 Individuals who worked on the development of the following products were consulted: Philadelphia Sector index 
options (SECTORs), Cash Index Participation Units (CIPs), Equity Index Participation Units (EIPs), the Americus 
Trust, Toronto Index Participation Units (TIPs), the SuperTrust, Morgan Stanley’s World Equity Benchmark Shares 
(WEBs), Deutsche Bank’s CountryBaskets, State Street’s SPDR ETF suite, iShares’ ETFs suite (formerly of 
Barclays Global Investors), Dow Diamonds ETF, PowerShares QQQ, and Standard & Poor’s Dow Jones index 
concepts.  
80 Experts in exchange operations include former specialists, exchange executives and board members, and members 
who led exchange committees on modernization, technology, and development.  
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special request. Others, such as the NYSE-commissioned Katzenboch Report on the 1987 crisis, 
are physically archived so appointments were made to pull the records. To obtain SEC 
documents not available in the archives - particularly, communications between the SEC, PHLX, 
and AMEX, which were of crucial importance to this project - eight Freedom of Access to 
Information Requests81 were filed. Knowledge of these documents came from interviews with 
individuals who referenced their existence. For any SEC rulemaking documents or releases not 
available in online archives, the SEC Publication Office was contacted and asked to provide 
copies. 
The document analysis was extended to cover data relating to the construction and design of 
ETFs. For example, the design of ETFs relies heavily on arbitrage mechanisms to keep the price 
of an ETF tied to its corresponding index.82 There have been sociological papers on arbitrage as 
a financial mechanism, but none in the social sciences that discuss it as a technical apparatus 
related specifically to ETF products.83 To offer a contribution in this area, individuals involved 
with institutional trading desks and known arbitrageurs with the AMEX and PHLX were 
contacted, interviewed, and asked to supply any relevant documents in their personal archives to 
support the research. This process greatly assisted in finding documents that relate to the 
technical systems that developed alongside ETFs and precursory products. Documents relating to 
																																																						
81 These Freedom of Information Act requests (FoIA) took over seven months to be approved by the SEC 
Information Officer due to backlogs. Once my requests were accepted, files were transferred from the SEC to the 
National Archives in Maryland, where they continue to remain uncatalogued. As a result, some records of interest 
are yet to be located by myself, NARA archivists, or SEC staff, though their existence has been confirmed.  
82Arbitrage is the act of simultaneously buying and selling similar assets in different markets or in different forms to 
profit from discrepancies in prices. For example, if Market X is quoting Stock A for $10, and Market Y is quoting 
the same Stock A for $8, you could purchase Stock A in Y while simultaneously selling Stock A in X, yielding a $2 
profit from the price differential.  
83 Refer to Hardie & MacKenzie (2012), Beunza et al (2006) and MacKenzie (2003) for literature on the sociology 
of arbitrage.  
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the technical development of ETF mechanisms were used to analyse to what extent socio-
technical elements were influential for the emergence of the ETF.   
As mentioned previously, the features of official reports represent exceptionally narrow 
interpretations of the processes under question. Before a rule or amendment is drafted into 
legislation by regulatory bodies, there are numerous informal phases such as consultations, 
mediations, and even pilot projects with interested parties. By the time that a decision is reported 
in an official document, it has reached a ‘final’ stage of implementation. In order to address this 
issue and provide a more holistic understanding of the decision making processes involved prior 
to official confirmation, the document analysis will also cover speeches by members of the 
exchanges and regulatory committees (available through the NYSE archives), letters 
interchanged between their offices (available through the SEC Historical Society Digital 
Archives), and trade publications that work independently from these institutional regimes (most 
of which are available in online databases).  
Supplementary documentation to support the interview data took numerous forms. The 
majority of ETFs in the United States are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
which was heavily amended in 1975.84 ETFs that invest in futures of commodities or currencies 
are regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) under the Commodity 
Exchange Act. ETFs that invest in physical commodities and currencies are regulated by the 
SEC under the Securities Act of 1933. The history of these pieces of legislation - including 
amendment proposals, call for comments, proposed rules, and final rules - from the 1970s 
onward were surveyed. In addition, applications, regulatory precedents, regulator commentary, 
																																																						
84 The sweeping amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are popularly known as the Securities Reform 
Act of 1975. 
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SEC hearings, and amended applications for products that foreshadowed the ETF structure were 
analysed from physical archives, online databases, and interviewees’ personal records. For 
example, an ETF precedent - the Americus Trust - is discussed in Chapter Six. As part of the 
interview research, I was invited to speak with an individual who was heavily involved in 
approving the Americus Trust within the SEC. Recall data from this participant was compared 
with SEC records and the Federal Register to confirm dates, product structure, and its use as a 
precedent for ETF-style products such as the SuperTrust (Chapter Six). As some early products 
had as many as five amended applications85 and multiple hearings before the SEC before 
receiving regulatory approval, the legal teams on both the regulatory and applicant sides were 
contacted.  
Marketing material was also beneficial to this research as many of the early products had 
begun circulating concept brochures to their target audience well before the product was 
launched. By tracing the marketing history from concept brochures to formal advertisements, the 
qualification process of the product was further illuminated. In addition, marketing materials 
from the late 1970s to early 1990s show a direct shift in target audience for basket products from 
sophisticated institutional clientele to the retail investment advisor community. Analysing the 
progress in the documented history of the ETF and its precursory products was a crucial 
supplement to participant accounts of early product development. The documents chosen for 
analysis were also a vital triangulation mechanism that linked recalled history with formal 
documented history and product development and marketing. 
Throughout the process of data collection, recall data from the oral interviews was recorded 
and transcribed in full. Any electronic questionnaires that were received were collected and 
																																																						
85 Leland O’Brien and Rubinstein’s (LOR) SuperTrust product and Deutsche Bank’s Country Baskets product each 
submitted five amended applications before the SEC before approval was granted. 	
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organized in the same manner as the oral data. As the period of interest dates as far back as 1970, 
it was imperative to be aware that subjects may have been incorrectly describing events and 
relationships. As a form of best practice, recall data from interviews was triangulated with 
documented events and recollections from other individuals not in direct relation with one 
another. This often took the form of supplementing participant accounts of common trading 
strategies that occurred in various exchanges with documented evidence such as exchange 
reports and trade publications. To provide an example: Interviewees from the PHLX mentioned 
that they held meetings with executives from the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) about the 
PHLX’s failed index participation unit project. As a form of best practice, executives from the 
TSE were later contacted to corroborate the events. Materials were then accessed at the physical 
TSE archives that described how product developers at the TSE used the PHLX products as 
inspiration for Canadian ETFs.86 These events were then analysed to determine whether or not 
information saturation was achieved.  
In summary, a mixed qualitative method was chosen for this project because it encouraged a 
strong exploratory narrative. Leads found in primary document analysis uncovered individuals 
who were considered innovators in their field, prompting an initial list for interview requests. 
The results of the first round of interviews led to previously under-explored documents and still 
other relevant individuals. I am confident that this mixed-methods ‘snowballing’ process 
permitted the conceptual schemata of the project to be fulfilled because of the method’s ability to 
uncover multi-layered processes of innovation.     
 
																																																						
86 The original application for the TIPs and the ensuing communications from the relevant regulator, the Ontario 
Securities Commission, were provided by the Toronto Stock Exchange archive staff at my request. The documents 
reference the PHLX Cash Index Participation Units, though none discuss the actual meeting between the Toronto 
Stock Exchange and the PHLX. Refer to Chapter Five for a discussion.  
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Data organization and analysis   
	
Interview transcripts were entered into a web-based qualitative data program and relevant 
passages coded. Once the coding process was complete, popularly recurring themes and events 
were isolated and examined in detail. For example, each interviewee identified as an innovator 
was asked where their inspiration for an ETF or a precursory product came from. The collected 
responses were quite similar no matter the product or piece of technology in question: Inspiration 
for ETF-related innovation was most often attributed to institutional trading strategies, the 
transition to fee-based and discount investment, competition for niche products, and new 
technologies. Responses such as these were collected, coded under a heading such as ‘innovation 
impetus’, and used to organize the upcoming chapters thematically. Other coding categories that 
were useful in organizing the data were those relating to the interview participants themselves. 
Categories such as areas of expertise (e.g. options, specialist/trading, regulation, securities law, 
automation, indexing, marketing, retail), product experience (e.g. CIPs, TIPs, SPDR, WEBS, 
CountryBaskets), and institutional associations (e.g. SEC, NYSE, AMEX, PHLX, BGI) ensured 
that interview data was not weighted to prioritize the innovator or regulatory experience, but to 
provide - as best possible - an equal weighted representation of industry experience across 
decades.  
 It is important to note that the following chapters are not organized in strict chronological 
order. As this project examines the extent to which the development of the ETF may be 
considered an agencement, relationships are one of the most important subjects of analysis. Thus, 
chapters have been organized around the transformative relationships of the period in question, 
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such as the relationship between new financial technologies and trading strategies, and how such 












































Constructing a socio-technical environment 
Introduction  
 
The ETF did not emerge ex nihilo, but was rather created through a unique combination of 
socio-technical processes including - though not limited to - technological innovation, theoretical 
developments, repositioning of the regulatory apparatus, and the human beings that underpin all 
of these entities. Specifically, this chapter will analyse how the introduction of computing 
technology enabled market participants to develop new ways of participating in the financial 
markets, establishing an environment felicitous to ETF-style creations. As technology developed 
and markets expanded in the 1970s and 1980s, traditional stock picking and exchange floor 
trading partially gave way to the trading of equities baskets and futures and options on entire 
indices: because of technological developments, actors were able to group stocks and derivatives 
into a basket and trade its entire contents simultaneously for the first time. With the popularity of 
such strategies exploding into the 1970s, regulators began to frame the markets in a manner 
which encouraged technological solutions over the gentleman’s agreements of the decades prior, 
primarily through regulatory overhauls such as the 1975 Securities Exchange Act amendments. 
In these reforms, the SEC legitimized electronic communications networks,87 intra-agency 
systemization, and encouraged the use of trading technology as a means to add efficiency and 
liquidity to the markets.  
																																																						
87 Electronic communication networks are commonly referred to as ECNs in financial literature. 
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Analysing this historical transition will demonstrate how the rise of technology reconstructed 
financial agency from human-centric to socio-technical, or, a unique form of agency realized by 
humans in participation with electronic devices. This chapter will demonstrate that as the 
financial marketplace was becoming technologically equipped, financial activity was drastically 
redefined. New socio-technical relationships between traders and technology created, for the first 
time, new trading strategies that provided the foundation necessary for the emergence of the first 
formally defined basket products. The resulting products became crucial precedents to the ETF. 
The first section of this chapter will discuss the early attempts at block trading and how the 
introduction of the NYSE’s Designated Order Turnaround (DOT) system affected this strategy. 
Second, the influence of DOT on basket trading and, later, index mutual funds, will be detailed. 
Third, the launch of index derivatives and program trading (specifically, index arbitrage and 
portfolio insurance) will be examined. Last, the relationships between these developments and 
the SEC will be analysed to demonstrate how technological solutions were becoming 
institutionalized into the regulatory framework, creating the infrastructure necessary for the 




The emergence of block trading  
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In the 1960s, brokers and asset managers were stock pickers,88 carefully choosing 
individually stocks to buy and sell based on the belief that they could identify mispriced 
securities and exploit them for a profit. Simply stated, brokers would search for ‘winners’: 
underpriced corporate stocks, purchasing shares and selling them off when the price increased to 
a fair value or above. Foundational to this method of investing was the belief that skilled brokers 
could ‘beat the market’ and achieve above-average returns for their clients based on their skills 
in identifying mispriced securities.  
During this time, a large-scale trade was referred to as a ‘block’. A typical block trade would 
consist of a buy or sell order for one stock and average between the thousands and hundreds of 
thousands of shares. Before electronic trading technologies were introduced, a client’s broker 
would typically have to work over a period of days or weeks, depending on the size of the block, 
to execute a client’s block trade in its entirety. This process was lengthy, labour intensive, and 
costly for both the broker and client as the price of the security would fluctuate with the market, 
leaving them exposed to risk until the trade was completed. There was also the chance that 
brokers could inadvertently drive up the price of the stock by their own trading activity, costing 
their clients more than anticipated.  
In this period, there was no automated trading technology to facilitate the movement of a 
block. For example, if a client requested to purchase 50,000 shares of stock XYZ with their local 
broker, the broker’s office would send the trade request to their firm’s booth at the AMEX 
through telephone or teletype. The firm’s booth clerk at the AMEX would then relay the trade 
information to the broker on the floor of the exchange by using hand signals or writing the trade 
on a trade slip. If the order was written instead of signed by hand, the paper would then be sent 
																																																						
88 The act of ‘stock picking’ also includes choosing amongst various mutual fund managers based on the manager’s 
stock picking track record. For common strategies employed during this time, refer to Barber et al (2001).  
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by conveyer belt to the trading floor where the floor broker would receive it. The floor broker 
would gesture back to the firm’s clerk that the order was received and bring the order to the 
specialist post that handles the XYZ stock. The specialist would time-stamp the order and place 
it in their rack of open orders until the trade could be executed. Again, this process could take 
days depending on the size of the order and liquidity of the stock: if XYZ is being thinly traded, 
50,000 shares may not be able to be purchased at once, leading to several transactions over 
several hours or days. When each trade is executed by the specialist, the specialist’s clerk 
confirms the trade with the firm’s clerk by delivering a confirmation slip via the AMEX’s 
pneumatic tubing system. Simultaneously, the AMEX data clerk would enter the relevant trade 
details so that the sale will show up on the ticker and reflect the most recent price of XYZ.89 
Through the 1970s, markets expanded and blocks grew significantly90 as institutions began 
entering the market and investing substantial capital: institutional stock ownership in NYSE-
listed stocks grew from $11.1 billion USD in 1949 to over $721 billion USD in 1973 (NYSE 
Fact Book 1974, 52). To trade these increasingly large blocks quickly and attract more 
institutional clients,91 brokers began using their firm’s capital to take the opposite side of the 
trade to immediately execute the block: 
  
																																																						
89 This process does not include the back-office operations. Operations included the buy-side and sell-side brokers 
comparing their records of the transaction. Each would stamp their respective copies of the trade, exchange the stock 
certificate for a cheque, and record the change in ownership of the stock. If the stock changes ownership several 
times in a trading day, a clearinghouse would be tasked with identifying and transferring ownership from the first 
seller of the day to the last buyer of the day. All trades occurring between the originating seller and terminal buyer 
are cancelled out by the clearinghouse. See Weiss (1993, 69-72) for a detailed description of this process. 
90 Block trades greater than 10,000 shares increased from 6.9% of the AMEX’s average daily volume in 1970 to  
34% in 1985 (American Stock Exchange Fact Book 1991.). Similarly, blocks increased from 3.1% of the NYSE’s 
average daily volume in 1965 to 29.2% in 1979. (NYSE Historical Fact Book 1965-2003).  
91 ‘Institutional investors’ may include private pension plans, investment companies (e.g. mutual funds), insurance 
companies, private trust funds, foundations, and educational endowments. For a complete list of institutional 
investors by type, refer to the Federal Reserve Bulletin (October 1974) or SEC Institutional Investor Study (1971).   
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If you wanted to really sell stock…you wanted to trade with an investment 
bank because they would buy stock using their capital whereas, unless an order 
is on the other side…there’s no trade (Interview 16).  
 
For example: if a mutual fund manager placed an order to purchase 50,000 shares of XYZ, their 
broker would sell them 50,000 shares immediately at a predetermined price. In this scenario, the 
broker would assume the risk of having to later buy the 50,000 shares of XYZ they sold to the 
mutual fund manager.92  
For the largest blocks, brokers would sometimes take days to buy enough stock to cover their 
short sale93 to the mutual fund manager, risking market fluctuations that would impact the share 
price. If the price of XYZ were to increase from the price negotiated with their client, the broker 
would have to absorb the loss. This strategy benefitted the institutional clientele who were 
guaranteed a set price whether or not the broker drove up the price by introducing the trade to the 
market. However, despite the advantages of brokers acting as dealers - taking both buy and sell 
positions on behalf of their institutional clients - block trading remained expensive and time 
consuming into the early 1970s. Notably, as blocks steadily increased in size and frequency, the 
ability of specialists to quickly make markets was compromised. 
Specialists were charged with orchestrating all trades in their given market. As such, 
specialists were most often occupied with facilitating small, frequent trades of a few hundred 
shares or less. While these trades were typically easy to execute, the influx of large blocks to the 
specialist post stressed their ability to focus on both the small, repetitive trades and the 
																																																						
92 The examples using XYZ stock are adapted from a case study analysed in Miller et al (1986, 95-97).  
93 A short sale is the sale of a stock by a seller who does not own the stock. In this case, the broker does not own the 
stock they sell to their client at the time of the transaction. If stock prices fall from the price the broker negotiated 
with their client, the broker will be able to repurchase the stock at a lower price at a later date, realizing a profit. The 
opposite is true if prices rise.  
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movement of large blocks that required more concentration.94 If the market they were trading in 
did not have adequate depth - if it did not have enough buyers and sellers to absorb the trade - the 
introduction of a large block had the potential to severely disrupt prices (Kraus and Stoll 1972; 
Litzenberger et al 2012). The SEC Institutional Investor Study (1971) confirmed that the 
introduction of a block trade almost always resulted in large and unstable price swings, requiring 
extra care to facilitate the movement of blocks. As a result, blocks began being introduced 
throughout an extended period of time instead of all at once: as imbalances often occurred at 
market opening from the outstanding trades the day before, specialists would often delay the 
opening of a stock to broadly disseminate any remaining imbalances or blocks (Stoll 1988).  
However, the simple presence of the broker would alert floor traders to the fact that there was a 
block trade even before the activity appeared on the tape: “Familiarity with the trading 
techniques of specialists or floor brokers…facilitates the trading activities of the floor 
trader…Evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that floor trading accelerates price 
movements that would otherwise have taken place more slowly” (Smidt 1985, 78 in reference to 
the Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the SEC 1963).  
 
Technological solutions to block inefficiencies: NYSE and AMEX 
 
To address the issues that came with block trading, the NYSE and AMEX - both having a 
substantial amount of their business in the 1970s flowing from institutional clientele - began 
developing technologies that would automate the process to make block trading faster, easier, 
and less risky to all involved parties.   
																																																						
94 Large blocks “…required more care to avoid disrupting the market and causing wide price swings” (Miller et al 
1989, 82). 
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The NYSE launched the first electronic delivery service - the Designated Order Turnaround 
(DOT) system - in 1976.95 DOT was used to transmit orders from brokerage firms to the 
designated specialist on either the AMEX or NYSE trading floor. Originally, DOT was used to 
group dozens of small orders of a particular stock - typically orders of 100 shares or less - into 
larger batches so the specialist did not have to oversee as many transactions. This freed up the 
specialist’s time to concentrate on moving the institutional blocks that often took longer to 
execute and required more skill in reading the market.   
The use of DOT immediately increased the speed of trading on the NYSE. ‘Turnaround time’ 
is a common unit of measure that is calculated by the exchange to measure performance of 
specialists: time begins when the specialist receives an order and ends when they send a report of 
execution. With the advent of DOT, turnaround times dropped from several minutes to a NYSE-
mandated standard of two minutes, further dropping to 0-15 seconds by 1992.96 The NYSE 
allowed the DOT system to handle increasingly large trades due to its early success in lowering 
turnaround times. The largest trade that DOT was permitted to handle in 1977 was 500 shares; in 
1988, this number rose to 99,999 shares (NYSE Working Paper 93-01).97 
During this period, the AMEX was also developing trading technology to assist specialists in 
increasing their trading capacity by automating trade transmission and reporting between the 
exchange and brokerage firms. In February 1976, the AMEX allocated $55,000 USD to develop 
a Post Execution Reporting (PER) system. PER, like DOT, came online in March 1977 and 
enabled trades to be sent from a member firm’s local office directly to the relevant AMEX 
																																																						
95 Refer to Keith and Grody’s (1988) piece for a substantial overview of the NYSE’s automation projects during this 
time. 
96 The NYSE-set standard turnaround time was lowered from two minutes to 60 seconds on April 1, 1993 (NYSE 
Constitution and Rules 1992, Rule 103A).  
97 This data refers to limit orders, which that must be executed at a specific price or better. DOT was permitted to 
handle market orders of up to 299 shares in 1977, growing to 30,099 shares in 1988. A market order is an order that 
is filled upon entry on the trading floor as there are no price restrictions.  
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specialist on the trading floor. For example: if a client of a brokerage firm’s office in Florida 
placed an order to buy 100 shares of XYZ at the market price, the stockbroker would write out 
the order and give it to their teletypist who would then enter it into the firm’s computer. The 
firm’s head office would receive the trade almost immediately. The firm’s head office computer 
system98 would then automatically compare the trade request with a list of security symbols and 
see that XYZ is traded on the AMEX and is of an appropriate size to be sent through PER.99 
When PER received the trade, the system automatically printed the order at the specialist’s post, 
bypassing the need for trades to be received by teletype or telephone, signalled to the floor 
broker, walked to the specialist, and sent back to the firm’s booth for confirmation. 
Confirmations were sent electronically from the exchange back to the firm’s local office.  
The introduction of PER was considered a success and the AMEX quickly permitted larger 
trades to be submitted electronically. PER was originally introduced with the ability to facilitate 
orders of 100 shares or less; in the same year, its capacity was expanded to handle market orders 
of 200 shares and limit orders of up to 400 shares (Bruchey 1991, 81). However, issues still 
remained that hampered the ability of specialists to move large blocks of stock: the “biggest 
problem will be communication between floor brokers and booth clerks - we’re working on 
various systems of moving paper and voice communication between these two” (AMEX 
Automation and Facilities Planning Report, quoted in Bruchey 1991, 82). To remedy these 
issues, AMEX brought two more electronic trading technologies online: the Open Automated 
Reports System (OARS) in February 1979, and the AMEX Options Switch (AMOS) in February 
																																																						
98 The computer system that handles the routing of orders between member firms and exchanges is the Central 
Messaging Switch (CMS), which was developed and used by both the NYSE and AMEX. The CMS forwards all 
orders to the relevant exchange.  
99 For a detailed description of this computing process and the hardware/software innovated for this purpose, refer to 
Weiss (1993, 134-144).  
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1979.100 OARS processed all market orders that arrived outside of trading hours, matched them 
electronically, and calculated the imbalances in buy and sell orders for each AMEX stock. OARs 
was launched with the ability to handle trades of up to 200 shares and was almost immediately 
expanded to facilitate trades of up to 500 shares. AMOS was similar to PER in that it was 
designed to automatically route limit orders for options trades between member firm local offices 
and the specialist trading post.101  
As with the DOT system, PER, OARS, and AMOS greatly improved the ability of specialists 
and floor brokers to absorb the extra volume flowing from the entrance of institutions and their 
block trades into the marketplace. The amalgamation of trades and automatic order matching 
freed specialists to focus on the difficult task of moving blocks instead of becoming distracted by 
the small and routine orders that made up most of their day. As a former specialist and former 
Governor of the NYSE states: 
 
Brokers ran around the floor with fists full of orders. SuperDOT eliminated 
much of the execution risk…[trading technologies] saved on both execution 
costs and transaction costs (Interview 2). 
 
However, there still remained issue-specific risk attached to block trading: the isolated exposure 
to one company made the investor susceptible to company-specific risks such as surprise 
announcements, takeovers, or other unanticipated events.  
 
																																																						
100 AMOS was approved for development in December 1977 but was not functional until 1979. 
101 The NYSE and AMEX were not the only two exchanges to pioneer electronic trading technologies. The 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX) launched a similar system called the Philadelphia Automated Communication 
Execution (PACE) system in 1976, which will be discussed in Chapter Five. The Midwest Stock Exchange launched 
MAX in 1981, and the Cincinnati Stock Exchange launched NSTS in 1978.  Refer to Domowitz (1990, 170) for a 
complete list of regional automated systems.  
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Placing blocks in baskets 
 
Increasingly, brokerage firms were transmitting orders from their desks to the exchange floor 
through computer systems. With a push of a button, a portfolio manager could replace an entire 
portfolio by automatically sending orders to the various specialists or odd lot dealers102 that 
handled the stocks: if a change in economic outlook required the substitution of ten different 
corporate stocks handled by five different specialists, the computer program would automatically 
route the orders to the relevant specialist post and wait to receive electronic confirmation within 
minutes. While individual investors were still most likely to buy or sell stocks one at a time in 
blocks, institutional clients wanted to trade entire portfolios or groups of stocks at once if market 
circumstances changed (Miller et al 1991, 82). This shift from block trading to portfolio-based 
trading was known as ‘basket trading’.  
With the advent of technology that automated trading processes - making it faster and less 
expensive to place large trades - brokers began gathering stocks with similar characteristics into 
groups with the assumption that the stocks would behave similarly under various market 
conditions. These groupings of stocks - referred to as ‘baskets’ - could be combined with others 
to construct portfolios that would be diverse enough to avoid company-specific risk or to target a 
specific investment goal. For example, an investment manager might wish to construct a well 
diversified portfolio of stocks for a client. Using this strategy, the investment manager would 
create a basket of stocks that performs best in bear markets (Basket A) and a basket of stocks that 
performs best in bull markets (Basket B). With the push of a button, the investment manager may 
place an order to buy or sell all of the constituent stocks in A or B depending on the market 
																																																						
102 Odd lot dealers are brokers who will gather all of the odd lot orders of securities from outstanding orders and 
combine them into round lots. They will then execute trades in round lots.  
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outlook: if markets are trending up, they may initiate a basket trade to increase the weight of 
Basket B relative to A, or purchase a new basket, Basket C, to introduce new qualities into the 
client’s portfolio.  
Brokers used new computer software to assist them in calculating optimal portfolios: by 
inputting return parameters, investment goals, and volatility forecasts into systems such as the 
AAT, a Lotus 1-2-3 based portfolio optimizing package, brokers were presented with optimal 
basket portfolios.103 These basket trading technologies began to emerge in the early 1970s and 
grew out of the early automation and institutionalization of block trading that required the 
movement of multiple, large lots of stock. Beginning with the technology that enabled baskets to 
be constructed, and ending with technology that helped construct portfolios based on baskets 
themselves, traditional stock selection strategies transitioned to portfolio-based strategies that 
were conditional on the integration of computational ability with human judgement. In other 
words, this period of time in the markets was characterized by a shift in agency from 
predominantly human-centric to socio-technical: the introduction of trading technology not only 
equipped individuals with new strategic abilities, but shaped their desires to use such abilities by 
providing improved methods to manage risk, cost, execution, and speed.   
 
Indexing and program trading   
 
Index mutual funds and the first program trade 
 
																																																						
103 AAT - Asset Allocation Tools - was the name of the software developed by William Sharpe. This program 
incorporated Modern Portfolio Theory and statistical analysis to create what were calculated to be optimal portfolios 
for any given scenario. This will be discussed further in Chapter Six.  
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The growing interest in portfolio-based strategies transitioned into index-based strategies as 
research about active versus passive management performances proliferated.104 With the 
introduction of index mutual funds in the mid 1970s,105 the interest in index-based portfolios was 
growing. Brokers were increasingly asked to execute hundreds of block trades at once in order to 
replicate an index. Trades of this nature were called ‘program trades’. Program trades were 
defined by the NYSE as “…any trade involving 15 or more stocks with an aggregate value in 
excess of $1 million [USD]” (Kaufman 2011). The AMEX expanded on this definition to include 
the stipulation that stocks had to be worth at least $1 USD per share (AMEX Fact Book 1991). 
All program trades being routed through the DOT system - later, the upgraded SuperDOT system 
- were sent through dedicated lines identified by unique mnemonics so the specialist could easily 
recognize the trade as a program.106  
The fact that brokers began placing themselves on both sides of block trading in the late 
1960s was crucial in bringing about program trading. As index funds were becoming 
increasingly popular, and the performance of index funds is measured from their date of 
inception on how accurately they replicate an index, index fund managers needed a way to 
guarantee a purchase of an entire index in one day. Brokers - oral histories have suggested that 
Salomon Brothers may have been the first - began guaranteeing index fund managers that their 
fund would own the entire index at the closing prices of their inception date. The broker’s 
																																																						
104 This transition from active to passive management, while facilitated by technology, was largely rooted in 
theoretical and empirical observations. These will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six. 
105 The first index-based mutual fund was the Vanguard Index Trust (ticker: VFINX). This fund is comprised of the 
S&P 500 index constituents and was launched on August 31, 1976.  
106 The identifying information for these trades was catalogued in the NYSE’s System Order Database (SOD). 
Under the ACCTYP field was the type of trade the specialist was dealing with: program trade, index arbitrage, 
principal, etc. Under NYSE Rule 115, specialists were not able to disclose any information on orders except to 
exchange officials. 
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promise to the index fund manager to purchase all of the index constituents simultaneously was 
the first program trade (Miller et al 1991, 98) and likely occurred in the mid-1970s:  
 
It was around 1973, or 1974…when index funds began to call us up and read 
us a list of stocks - 200, 500, 1,000 of them - so we let them log on to our 
computer, and it would print away. And when it didn’t come out fast enough, 
[Salomon Brothers’ block desk manager] would start yelling: “Where’s the 
damn program? We’ve got a program today!”’ (Glynn & Hansell interview for 
Institutional Investor 1988, 5; quoted in Miller et al, 1991).  
 
The broker’s promise to their institutional clients to facilitate a program trade was subject to 
the same risks as their promise to their client to facilitate a block trade. Notably, both scenarios 
meant that the broker was forced to later buy the stock(s) they shorted to their client, leaving 
them open to the risk that prices might rise before they had the chance to settle their accounts. 
However, program trades covered hundreds of stocks at once and were thus subject to less risk 
from price fluctuations than one stock alone, making program trading more attractive than 
trading blocks. In addition, brokerage houses were able to charge large commissions on each 
trade constituting the program: 
 
When I was a stock broker at Merrill Lynch, we charged high commissions. 
Everyone charged high commissions. You couldn’t go anywhere…Basically, 
we were colluded together, charging the exact same thing so there was no 
benefit for you to go elsewhere (Interview 9).107  
 
As the pioneer of an early electronic trading platform confirms:   
 
There was a symbiotic relationship between the market makers at the 
investment banks and the fund managers to keep trading commissions and 
trading going from one to the other at high levels (Interview 16).  
 
																																																						
107 Commission rates and their link to ETF development will be discussed in Chapter Eight.  
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Without brokers being able to act as dealers for their clients, program trades would not be 
feasible due to the time, cost, and risk associated with facilitating each one of these trades 
individually. With brokers acting as dealers for their institutional clients, institutions received the 
benefit of guaranteed execution and brokerage firms received the benefit of substantially 
increased order flows and commissions.  
 
Index derivatives and refinements in program trading 
 
Into the 1980s, there was a sharp increase in the trading of large blocks and equity baskets as 
trading technologies made inexpensive, fast trades more accessible. While the entrance of 
institutions’ block and basket trading was injecting steady capital into the markets, the liquidity 
of the stock markets was being negatively affected: that is, with the rapid introduction of large 
equity basket and block trades, there were often insufficient counter trades to absorb the blocks 
and baskets efficiently (Interview 6). In addition, investors were looking for a strategy to hedge 
their equity baskets so as to offset any potential risk they were exposed to in the cash market. As 
a result, index derivatives were approved for trading in 1982 and found rapid success. In 
response to these new products and the technology that underpinned them, two new trading 
techniques developed: index arbitrage and portfolio insurance.108  
The first index derivative was a future launched on the Kansas City Futures Exchange in 
1982 that was based on the Value Line Index. Soon after followed the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME) with a future on the S&P 500 index which quickly became the heaviest traded 
																																																						
108 Refer to the NYSE-commissioned report by Nicholas deB. Katzenbach (1987) for a detailed description of all the 
program trading strategies that were known to have been employed prior to 1988. These include - but are not limited 
to - duration averaging, dynamic hedging, portfolio insurance, and index arbitrage.   
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contract on the exchange (Miller et al 1991, 101). In 1983, the first index option was launched on 
the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE) and was based on the S&P 100 index, quickly 
followed by the AMEX’s option on the Major Market Index.109 Futures on the Major Market 
Index (MMI) were also launched in 1983 and the MMI became the first index with both futures 
and options contracts.110   
These derivative products were made possible by new computing technology that enabled the 
rapid calculation of data. As a former exchange executive who oversaw the development of 
index options states:   
 
Computers were used to calculate indexes and disseminate quotes and last-sale 
information as data-feeds to vendors…Computers supported all our calculation 
and dissemination of our information to the world (Interview 13).  
 
Electronic technologies increased the number of indices available to the derivative exchanges as 
well. As an index provider attests:  
 
As different trading venues have become more electronic…more systematized, 
it does grant a slightly easier access to the calculations of indices. There’s no 
question that as marketplaces become more electronic, they generate more 
trading data…which allows us to capture more and calculate more (Interview 
18).  
 
The introduction and explosive popularity of index options and futures led to new and novel uses 
of program trading techniques, one of which was index arbitrage.111 Put simply, arbitrage is the 
																																																						
109 The rise in index-based derivatives was not without conflict. In 1983, Dow Jones sued the Chicago Board of 
Trade to stop its issuance of index futures products using the Dow Jones’ name. The lawsuit stated that Dow Jones 
did not want to be associated with futures “…partly out of fear that the investing public may associate Dow Jones 
with the highly speculative futures market” (The Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Company, 
Inc., 1983).  
110 For an illustration of how these index derivatives are calculated, refer to Miller et al (1991, 101-105).  
111 Arbitrage was greatly influenced by finance theory (MacKenzie 2001; 2003; MacKenzie and Millo 2003). The 
relationship between theory and practice will be explored in Chapter Six.   
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simultaneous purchase and sale of similar assets: it is a practice where traders will “…attempt to 
take advantage of spreads that periodically develop between equities,112 futures, and options 
markets by buying in the lowest-priced market and selling in the highest-priced market” (U.S. 
General Accounting Office Report on Financial Markets 1988, 4). For example, if the stocks in 
the S&P 500 index were trading at a discount relative to the S&P 500 futures contract on the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), an arbitrageur would purchase the constituent stocks on 
the NYSE whilst selling the futures contract, knowing that the prices in both markets would 
converge at the futures contract expiration.113 In fact, arbitrage was the primary mechanism 
through which equity derivatives stayed linked to the underlying market.114  
Into the mid-1980s, options and futures based on indices were attracting more volume and 
the arbitrage practice grew with help from computing systems: 
 
If you look at it, the index options products were exploding. I mean…lots of 
mainly institutional traders were trading them and they were just getting bigger 
and bigger. Computers were also necessary because of the calculations and the 
rapid computation of prices…obviously, you didn’t want to have to do it 
manually (Interview 13).  
 
Brokerages such as Miller Tabak Hirsch + Co. coordinated the use of technology and highly 
experienced floor brokers in order to simultaneously trade the stocks in the Major Market Index 
alongside the Major Market Index options. As a former employee of Miller Tabak Hirsch + Co. 
states in their book: 
 
																																																						
112 The term “equities” may be used interchangeably with “stocks” and “shares”.   
113 Index arbitrage was also implemented if the price of stocks was higher than their corresponding futures contract. 
However, restrictions on the short selling of stocks - Securities Exchange Act ‘Uptick’ Rule 19a - made this position 
risky. See also Carlson (2007).  
114 Arbitrage reduces discrepancies between futures and cash markets by increasing prices in the market where 
purchases are made and decreasing prices in the market where products are sold.  
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[The firm’s traders] used the DOT system…for the smaller stocks, bypassing 
the floor brokers and going directly to the specialist themselves. As most 
NYSE floor brokers had never before been involved in a program, it was 
extremely important to find brokers with the right frame of mind to be able to 
quickly delegate a group of stocks to the proper posts (Miller et al 1991, 105).  
 
With the advent of index derivatives and increasing coordination between trading floors and 
trading technologies, firms were able to easily monitor options, futures, and cash market levels 
and exploit arbitrage opportunities across them.  
The technology involved in index arbitrage was vitally important to its emergence and the 
institutions it attracted. Generally, a successful arbitrage trade requires recognizing the 
environments in which discrepancies between similar markets arise. For example, volatility is 
known to create arbitrage opportunities as it causes similar markets to move independently from 
one another rather quickly and with a large increase in volume. Next, index arbitrage required an 
identifiable trigger point: that is, a point where the divergence between the assets would make a 
trade profitable.115 Last, arbitrageurs required the ability to identify discrepancies and execute 
trades between the prices in derivative and cash markets within seconds, as prices tend to 
normalize extremely quickly.   
To successfully execute a program trade of this nature, index arbitrageurs used computer 
systems that were programmed to track prices in stock and futures markets and alert traders 
when a profitable arbitrage opportunity arose. Once an index arbitrage opportunity was 
identified, member firms of the NYSE would use the newly upgraded SuperDOT system116 to 
exploit the price divergence:  
																																																						
115 Transaction costs were also factored in to the price divergence to discern trade profitability.		
116 Regional specialists used the Intermarket Trading System to conduct index arbitrage: “The ITS became a means 
that regional specialists could arbitrage the primary market” (Interview 4). The ITS was the original software that 
linked eight member exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, PHLX, Boston, Cincinnati, Chicago, Pacific, and the NASD OTC) 
so that participants could see the bid/ask prices at all venues and seek the best price at other exchanges for eligible 
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Prior to [DOT/SuperDOT], baskets of stocks were traded by having pre-printed 
tickets at the stock booth at the NYSE and sent out to the pits as corresponding 
index trades were made or at expiration. As a result, indexes like the Value 
Line 1500 were usually traded using optimized baskets. By using the 
SuperDOT, traders were able to execute strategies quicker and more efficiently 
(Interview 4). 
 
 ‘Portfolio insurance’ was a second technique that emerged from program trading technology 
and index derivatives. Portfolio insurance limited downside risk in bear markets while protecting 
gains if stock prices rose, guaranteeing a minimum price of an investment.117 During falling 
markets, investors were urged to decrease the weight of stocks relative to cash in their portfolios 
in order to limit losses; during rising markets, the weight of stocks in the portfolio was increased 
to capture the most gain.  
Most portfolio insurers traded in index futures and not the stock market for three reasons. 
First, insurers could buy and sell stock index futures much more inexpensively than they would 
be able to purchase the hundreds of stocks that underlie the index. Second, many of the 
institutions that provided portfolio insurance were not authorized to trade stocks on behalf of 
their client accounts, making futures markets their only option (Brady Report 1988, 7). Third, 
trading futures meant that portfolio insurers could be protected from losses on stock prices 
without actually owning the physical stocks. Using futures - typically a more liquid market - 
insurers could freely place large buy and sell orders without worrying about the liquidity 
crunches that the stock markets could be subject to.  
																																																						
listed securities. The ITS was legislated in 1975 and became active in 1978. See Clary (2003) and Lee (1993) for a 
detailed account of this system’s development. 
117 Portfolio insurance will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters Five and Six. There are many forms of portfolio 
insurance, such as buying put options or dynamic hedging. These are discussed in detail in the Report of the 
Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms - commonly referred to as ‘The Brady Report’ (1988).  
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 With early program trading, computers were able to facilitate and increase the speed of 
human decision making by alerting brokers to trading opportunities and allowing them to put a 
program into effect within seconds. Portfolio insurance made use of computer models to 
calculate the optimal stock-to-cash ratios at various market prices: for example, the typical 
portfolio insurance model suggested that for every 10% decline in the market, client portfolios 
should sell upwards of 20% of stock (Brady Report 1988, 29).  
 When the market hit a predetermined level, the broker would initiate the portfolio insurance 
strategy: “You push a button and bam, there it goes! There’s absolutely no regard for values, just 
strategy” (Interview in Auerbach & Hayes 1986, 121).118 However, these models were not run 
continuously because the transaction costs involved with the continual re-optimization of client 
portfolios would be expensive, even in the futures market. Thus, the models were run at the 
broker’s discretion - either periodically or during large market fluctuations - and the broker 
would use the results to make the rebalancing trades in large batches (Garcia 1987; Carlson 
2007).   
 
Traders and technology: Socio-technical extensions to agency 
 
The introduction of electronic technologies to the financial markets throughout the 1970s and 
1980s occurred rapidly and greatly transformed participants’ desires for particular strategies and 
the manner in which trading was done. A glance at the historical introduction of electronic 
technologies that made trading faster with less execution risk saw traders experiment with 
																																																						
118 This is echoed in the Brady Report that describes how portfolio insurers bought and sold “without primary regard 
to price” (1988, 41).  
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moving increasingly large volumes and types of stocks simultaneously. The ability to move large 
blocks with increased speed led to grouping these blocks into baskets, and trading all of the 
basket’s constituents with the push of a button. As the popularity of basket trading surged, 
portfolio modelling software was introduced which made basket construction user-friendly and 
the monitoring and rebalancing of client portfolios easier. As technologies such as the DOT 
improved the ability of specialists to facilitate the movement of large institutional trades, more 
institutions became attracted to the market and requests to trade the constituents of entire indices 
began crossing trading desks. Experiments into program trading around indices required an 
increased reliance on computers to monitor prices, calculate index levels, and notify brokers to 
any substantial changes that could be an opportunity for profit.   
As discussed, there were three primary strategies that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s from 
the experimentation with trading technologies: block trading, basket trading, and program 
trading. The shift from block to basket trading was made possible by technological solutions that 
reduced execution risk and increased the efficiency of traders to monitor market activity and 
execute increasingly large volumes of stock without disrupting prices. Basket trading eventually 
grew into trading thousands of stocks simultaneously, and when combined with the growing 
prominence of modern portfolio theory,119 the first index mutual fund was created. With the 
advent of index derivatives, experiments into program trading flourished - requiring computer 
software to monitor prices and alert traders to price discrepancies within seconds - and products 
such as portfolio insurance cascaded into the market.   
The transition from manual (human-to-human) trading to computer-assisted trading 
drastically changed the types of trades that could be made (from basic block trading to index 
																																																						
119 The impact of finance theory on ETF-era developments will be discussed in Chapter Six.   
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arbitrage) and the products that were available (index mutual funds, portfolio insurance, and 
portfolio optimizing software). With the introduction of trading technology, increasingly large 
and diversified stock trades began occurring and the desire to conduct such trades increased as 
technology became more integrated in the market. Throughout the 1960s to 1980s, a shift from 
individual stock picking to portfolio-based solutions began occurring as technology enabled new 
strategies which, in turn, inspired new products such as the index mutual fund.  
Perhaps most notable in this transition is how trading technology was integrated into the 
market structure and began shifting the process of trading from human-based agency to socio-
technical agency. Once computers were introduced to enhance the trading process, strategies 
emerged that were constructed around computing capabilities. In addition, the cognitive process 
involved with trading became increasingly reliant on computing technologies that, for example, 
calculated second-by-second arbitrage opportunities for program traders, or the optimal stock-to-
cash ratios given real-time market levels for portfolio insurers. The more stocks within an index, 
the less likely it was that human calculations could keep pace with price fluctuations - without 
computing technology to monitor market levels, and automated systems to trade thousands of 
stocks with the push of a button, program trading would not be possible.  
It is crucial to note, however, that this does not mean that human agency was being replaced 
with technology, nor does it mean that human beings simply used technology to assist them 
when convenient. The historical transition from human to socio-technical trading is unique in 
that human beings and their technologies were co-constitutive in the development of the 
financial strategies and products discussed above. Without the DOT system, for example, 
ordering thousands of trades at once would be impossible, just as without a trader’s expert 
capability to read the markets and decide the exact time to deploy a trading strategy, trading 
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technology would be useless. Traders and their technologies gradually entered a relationship 
where each extended the capabilities of the other, introducing a new form of socio-technical 
agency that enabled new basket-style products to flourish. It was not just the traders’ use of 
technology that extended their agency, but the fusion of human decision making with 
technological capability that produced new abilities and ways of thinking about the market. 
Certainly, it remained the trader’s prerogative in the 1980s to make the ultimate decision as 
to whether or not to initiate a trade: the rapid embedding of technological solutions in financial 
markets does not necessitate technological determinism. Throughout the automatizing process in 
the 1970s and 1980s, financial markets began reflecting socio-technical forms of agency: 
computer systems were developed by traders who, in turn, used such systems to create strategies 
and products that were reliant on the early computing infrastructure. As a result, humans and 
their technical devices began acting as one market participant so that a ‘financial actor’ was 
redefined from a purely human decision maker to a socio-technical one: the socio-technical 
agencement that occurred was irreducible back to its constituting elements. It was this shift, in 
addition to regulatory reframing - discussed below - which greatly transformed the marketplace 




The confrontation with automation  
 
From the 1930s to the 1970s, the regulatory culture within the American financial system 
experienced relatively little restructuring. In response to the debilitating 1929 market crash that 
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unearthed massive manipulations and fraud,120 congress established the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) as part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(3)) in order 
to provide governance over securities transactions and exchanges and rehabilitate the financial 
markets in the eyes of the investing public. Resulting from the 1929 crash, a lengthy depression 
that saw industrial production decrease by over fifty percent (Bruchey 1991, 24) gripped the 
American markets. However, the post-war optimism of the 1950s saw a recovery of the 
American financial system and skepticism over the regulatory authority of the SEC was 
expressed by some of America’s largest corporate managers.121 In response to this skepticism, 
the SEC focused on maintaining the status quo and institutionalizing itself by gaining the 
continued support of Congress, forcing little regulatory intervention until the 1970s. 
The first major regulatory actions that the SEC took in this period were in regards to new 
trading technologies. While the transition to technological solutions appeared to occur relatively 
unimpeded, the SEC had been struggling to find ways to assess and incorporate these 
developments into their regulatory frameworks as early as 1969. As a former attorney with the 
SEC recalls:  
All of a sudden, these products were coming about…and we had to start 
thinking about the current reality of life as opposed to what it was in 1940. 
Most of the statutes in the ‘30s and ‘40s - you came up with a statutory scheme 
and that was more or less it. (Interview 22).  
 
																																																						
120 Such as the fraud by companies such as Kreuger & Toll Inc,, who created a pyramid scheme to gain a monopoly 
of the match market; McKesson & Robbins Inc., who fabricated financial statements; and Richard Whitney’s 
embezzlement scheme. Refer to the U.S. Senate Resolution No. 84 (and later, No. 56) that created the Pecora 
Commission. This Commission was tasked with investigating the fraud that precipitated the 1929 crash. Available 
online through the U.S. Senate online library: 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/Pecora.htm#Outcome  
121 For a detailed discussion on the institutionalization of the SEC and the corporate skepticism of the SEC in the 
decades prior, refer to Teed (2013), Bealing et al (1996), and Merino (2003).  
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Instinet was proposed to the SEC in 1969 as an electronic system that would enable institutions 
to trade blocks directly with one another through computer linkages. As Instinet would facilitate 
anonymous institution-to-institution trading, there was no need for traditional exchange 
participants such as brokers or specialists: institutions would simply enter their offers, 
acceptances, or counter offers, and the block trades would be cleared through the Bank of New 
York (SEC Memorandum on Instinet and Exchange Registration, 1983; Instinet Press Release 
1983).  
As the first system of its kind, Instinet challenged the legal definition of an exchange - a 
definition that had remained unchanged since the 1934 Securities Exchange Act was drafted:  
 
Any organization, association, or group of persons, whether incorporated or 
unincorporated, which constitutes, maintains, or provides a marketplace or 
facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for 
otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions commonly 
performed by an exchange (Securities Exchange Act Section 3(a)(1)).122  
 
Specifically, the SEC attorneys within the Division of Trading and Markets were apprehensive to 
categorize Instinet as an exchange because it was not clear that Instinet was a facility that 
performed the common activities of an exchange (SEC Division of Trading and Markets Memo 
1969). Specifically, Instinet was for-profit, unlike the exchanges of the time. In addition, the 
purpose of Instinet was to automate the block trading process that brokers would traditionally 
use: just as firms would typically canvas potential clients to arrange block trades, Instinet would 
utilize computers so institutions could automatically trade blocks anonymously without going 
																																																						
122 Refer to Lee (1998) for an exceptional overview of how we are to understand what an exchange is and how this 
concept has developed over time.  
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through a traditional exchange. Because of this, legal teams argued that Instinet fit better within 
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act definition of a broker:  
 
The term “brokers” means any person engaged in the business of effecting 
transactions in securities for the accounts of others (Section 4(a)).  
 
After deliberations over which definition was most appropriate, Instinet was registered with the 
SEC as a broker-dealer (Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8661, 1969),123 though many 
uncertainties remained. As discussed in an inter-agency memo: “…it is unclear how many 
[subscribers] have access to Instinet trading facilities...Two new [Instinet] services may be either 
operating or in the works…The size of orders subject to the guarantee is not certain…” (SEC 
Memorandum on Instinet and Exchange Registration 1983). The degree of uncertainty 
surrounding new automating technologies was overcome by developing a new rule that would 
require any further automated trading platforms to register as an exchange, which would allow 
increased regulatory oversight than would be possible if they were registered as a broker-dealer: 
“Allowing private development of these systems subject to minimal and irrelevant regulation as 
a broker-dealer appears inappropriate” (Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14674, 1978; SEC 
Memorandum on Instinet and Exchange Regulation 1983).124  
This new rule125 required any new automated systems to be registered and monitored by the 
SEC as exchanges, giving the SEC enhanced surveillance over their activities (Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 8661, 1969). As a result, electronic platforms such as PACE, 
																																																						
123 See also the SEC Division of Trading and Markets Memo (1969). The Division of Trading and Markets was the 
first to protest Instinet’s registration as an exchange due to the resemblance of its purpose to that of a broker-dealer.  
124 Specifically, the Market Surveillance staff of the SEC “maintains a continuous watch of transactions on the stock 
and options exchanges and reviews reports of large block transactions…it also monitors financial news tickers, 
financial publications and statistical services” of registered exchanges (43rd Annual Report of the SEC 1977, 168).  
125 SEC Rule 15c2-10 was proposed to be written into the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
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SCORE, and MAX - while strikingly similar to Instinet - were regulated as exchanges instead of 
broker-dealers. This, however, did not abate the regulatory confusion over how integrate new 
technologies into the existing legacy frameworks: “Why are these exchanges? ...I can’t offer any 
easy answers” (SEC Memorandum on The Regulation of Instinet 1983).  
This provisional rule stood until the 1975 Securities Exchange Act amendments were passed 
and exemptions to the definition of an exchange for automated platforms were introduced so that 
many innovative automated trading technologies could apply with the SEC for a no-action letter 
(Securities Exchange Act §240.3(a)(1)). Alongside the exemptions, the SEC outlined simple 
standards for new automated systems, indicating the preferred characteristics of the platforms 
they were likely to approve.126 The inclusion of exemptions to the definition and minimum 
standards in 1975 was one of the earliest attempts by the SEC to be more flexible in its approach 
to governing technological-based solutions in the market. As a former SEC attorney tasked with 
granting exemptive relief to these innovations explains:  
 
Without broad exemptive policy…[regulation] starts becoming very creaky and 
very anti-innovative. It eventually causes both competition to come to a halt 
and to have the true interests of investors to have modern products available to 
them in a modern way defeated. So for us, in part, [granting exemptions] was 
implementing the way the Act was designed to be (Interview 22).  
 
As a result of the amendments, entities that had problematic negotiations with the SEC over their 
introduction of automated technologies were finally granted exchange status for their systems: 
platforms such as the Cincinnati Stock Exchange’s National Securities Trading System (NSTS) 
came online in June 1978 after years of struggle over definitions and applicability of rules 
																																																						
126 Automated systems must be “A) non-discriminatory in admitting order entry subscribers; B) Of no burden on 
competition; C) Consistent with the National Market System; and D) in the public interest and consistent with the 
best interest of investors” (Securities Exchange Act, Rule 11Ac1-3).	
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regarding exchanges and broker-dealers. Without the SEC providing exemptions to their 
historical definitions, the earliest automated trading platforms that were so crucial in assisting 
basket and program trading strategies to proliferate may have been registered as broker-dealers, 
impacting their ability to introduce new technologies for exchange-style trading.  
 
The 1975 Securities Exchange Act amendments 
 
The amendments of 1975 were the starting point of a heightened focus on the adoption of 
innovative technologies: the legislators who voted in favour of the amendments - notably, the 
specifications relating to the National Market System and automated trading platforms - 
understood that they were voting in favour of “…a system in which the nation’s securities 
markets would be linked by the maximum use of computers and communications technology... 
[Congress] merely wished to encourage the acceleration of a process already well under way by 
having the SEC remove impediments to its further development” (Bruchey 1991, 63).   
The regulations to encourage innovation consisted primarily in removing barriers to entry for 
new products, strategies, and technologies. For example, the mandate for a National Market 
System127 resulted in the development of the Intermarket Order Routing System, whose platform 
consisted in a national market where participants could see the bid/ask prices at seven 
exchanges128 for eligible securities. While the intermarket system could not guarantee traders the 
best price, exchanges attracted volume by guaranteeing trade execution (Lee 1993), enhancing 
																																																						
127 The National Market System was an agreement to establish an electronic link between exchanges that enabled 
participants to see the bid/ask prices across all venues. For detailed information on the development of the National 
Market System, refer to Clary (2003), Exchange Act Release No. 14661 (43 FR 17419), Exchange Act Release No. 
15058 (43 FR 36732), and Mendelson (1979).  
128 The American, Boston, Cincinnati, Chicago, New York, Pacific, and Philadelphia stock exchanges were the 
original participants.  
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the efficiency of markets through competition just as the SEC originally intended. This 
competition was further enhanced through regulatory changes in 1978 that sought to include 
OTC markets in the intermarket linkage (SEC statement, supra note 5, at 4358, 1978).  
Moreover, 1975 legislation paved the way for unlisted markets such as the Island ECN and 
NASDAQ to launch their independent trading systems for rule 19c-3 securities.129 In 1980, SEC 
took the final step to remove off-board trading restrictions for newly listed securities (Rule 19c-3 
Adoption Release, supra note 17 at 49-53), allowing firms in NYSE and AMEX to make over-
the-counter markets130 in eligible securities. These developments were consistent with the SEC’s 
regulatory purpose: “…not to force structural change but instead provide a regulatory 
environment in which alternative systems may be implemented and used where market forces 
prefer them over traditional means” (SEC Commissioner Ketchum, 1989).   
The regulatory shift to encourage the adoption of technological innovation inspired new 
products and strategies such as index futures in 1982. When the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
was approved to launch the S&P 500 index futures in 1982, a practice that became known as 
‘exchange futures for physicals’ developed where investors exchanged stock positions for 
positions in index futures, hedging their portfolios and creating new arbitrage strategies. The 
SEC’s encouragement of index trading contributed, in part, to high volumes of trade that created 
a derivative equity market with enough liquidity to accommodate institutional investors and their 
new program trading strategies: “…because index futures and index options create greater 
liquidity, institutions can trade billions of dollars of synthetic equities at a lower cost, and with 
																																																						
129 An example of the off-board platform was the NASDAQ-developed Computer Assisted Execution System 
(CAES), an automated execution system for NASD inter-dealers. NASDAQ routed firms’ orders for listed securities 
through CAES to receive automatic executions against third market makers. In 1979, SEC only permitted the trading 
of stocks listed after April 26, 1979 - referred to as Rule 19c-3 securities.  
130 Over-the-counter (OTC) markets are markets where the trading of stocks, currencies, or commodities happens 
directly between two participants instead of over a centralized exchange.  
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greater efficiency, than institutions can trade in the underlying stock market”131 (Kerr & Maguire 
1988, 997).    
The shift in regulatory outlook that began occurring in the 1970s was perhaps best 
summarized by one of the SEC’s commissioners:  
 
Beware of luddites…Their response to the markets’ problems would involve 
turning back the hands of time and freezing our markets in a 1950-ish 
environment…The future lies in innovation: in innovations that adapt markets 




Procedural and theoretical reformations  
 
Concomitant with the 1975 Securities Act amendments was a sweeping internal 
reorganization at the SEC. This reorganization incorporated new technological and cognitive 
approaches to regulation and assisted in reframing the regulatory focus on technological-based 
solutions to market issues. 
Prior to the technological turn in the 1970s, the SEC offices were paper based and struggling 
to keep pace with their bureaucratic workload. Described as a “procedural mess”, SEC division 
offices were known to have “piles, piles of paper, five feet high all over the place” containing 
files with applications that had been waiting over a year to be reviewed (Interview 22). As an 
innovator’s private counsel states:   
 
[The SEC] can delay consideration for a very long time even before getting to 
formal proceedings. I’ve dealt with things that were, quote-unquote, ‘in 
																																																						
131 In 1988, the combined markets for index futures and index options traded approximately $25 billion per day. 
Stocks traded on the NYSE amount to an average $8 billion per day (Kerr & Maguire, 1988).  
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discussion’ for three plus years. Lots of people will give up when faced with 
those types of delays (Interview 29).  
 
Of the files with applications that had been started, there was no organized system to look up 
precedents or applicable statutes. This resulted in disorganization, slow processing times, and a 
staff that relied on using no-action letters to regulate instead of exemptive orders.132 Prior to the 
1980s, it was not unusual for a file, on average, to take three months to be issued a no-action 
letter from the point it was picked up by a staff attorney, though often this process was much 
longer. No-action positions were almost always taken in respect to files that would typically need 
exemptive relief because it was faster to find a relatable precedent than bring a file to the (very 
reluctant) Commission and ask for a full hearing - a requirement for any exemptive order. As a 
former SEC attorney explains: 
Originally all exemptive orders…had to go through the SEC and have an actual 
hearing and you went to the Commission and the Commission voted…Mind 
you, they didn’t really want to hear it. You have a group of five folks who are 
very, very busy and who do not want to be involved in administerial stuff 
(Interview 22).  
 
Because of this, innovators that should have been applying for exemptive relief were applying 
for no-action letters and “seeing how much they could get away with” (Interview 22) instead of 
forcing regulatory intervention through exemptive orders.133  
In response to the growing political role of the SEC, top management was changed and 
began to introduce new systems and ways of theorizing the role of the regulatory apparatus in the 
																																																						
132 No action letters are generated by the SEC in response to a proposed plan of action that has been submitted by a 
regulated member. No action letters state that the SEC will not take legal action against the member if they decide to 
continue with their proposed plan. Exemptive relief is required when a regulated member must be exempted from 
SEC rules. This often occurs for new products that do not fit the current definitions outlined in SEC legislation.    
133 This point is of particular importance to The SuperTrust development and application process, which will be 
discussed in Chapter Six.   
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US markets: “It was like…housekeeping 101” (Interview 22). Within the SEC, the introduction 
of computing systems impacted internal organization and decision making:  
 
When I came back to the SEC in ’87, there were two computers in the 
investment management division. One of them was in [an executive’s] office, 
and she didn’t know how to use it…If that was ’87, by ’92 everybody in my 
division had a computer, and I prohibited them from giving their secretaries 
things to type longhand (Smythe interview 2011).  
 
Specifically, computers were used to create databases so staff attorneys could see a product’s 
initial date of filing, response letters, applicable precedents, and other related information. This 
led to the streamlining of processes - specifically for new product applications - and was crucial 
to hastening the innovative process surrounding basket and derivative instruments. As a 
securities attorney states:  
 
The biggest development [in ETF history] has been the development of the 
streamlining of the processes... and clearing up what products the SEC will and 
won’t approve is something that’s been very important to the industry 
(Interview 29). 
 
This process streamlining occurred in tandem with a gradual change in perception about the role 
of the regulatory apparatus in the American markets:  
 
You see, the SEC was changing. The whole nature of communications was 
changing…It was so blindingly apparent that this whole notion that you were 
going to sit there like some apparatus and control information was being 
blasted to shit by reality (Interview 22).  
 
Faced with internal challenges over how to govern the rapidly changing structure of the 
financial markets, the SEC began relaxing its approach from a stamp-based paper process to an 
ideas-focused process (Interviews 22, 29). The SEC directors also began encouraging their 
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division staff to be more flexible and think outside their rule-based processes to find solutions to 
institutionalized problems - specifically, how to account for and integrate technological solutions 
in the regulatory framework.134 Internally, computing technologies made the approval processes 
faster and more efficient, albeit only after a steep learning curve (Smythe interview 2011). 
Computing technologies increased attorneys’ capacity to review files and spend more of their 
time theorizing about the impact of exemptive orders instead of churning out as many no-action 
letters as possible (Interview 22). Gradually, regulatory thinking shifted and traditional beliefs 
that the SEC could have centralized control relented. In its place, greater writ was passed to 
various divisions of the SEC and managers promoted critical thinking instead of strict adherence 
to rules. While this strategy would assist the SEC in navigating one of the most prolific eras of 
financial innovation in recent history, it also caused conflict with other regulators and within its 
own Commission. These conflicts will be discussed in Chapters Five and Six.  
The shift in internal processes towards standardization and streamlining occurred alongside a 
conceptual shift in the role of regulation from that of a paper-pushing process to a forward-
thinking, solution focused process. Mirroring this shift was the increased flexibility the SEC 
granted to technological innovators through the 1975 Securities Act Amendments, where their 
desires for particular technological characteristics were formally expressed. Internal 
streamlining, focusing on solutions to inefficiencies, and flexibility in rule interpretation were 
integral to repositioning the SEC as a regulator that embraced and encouraged technological 
innovation.  
Culminating with the Securities Act Amendments of 1975, the SEC successfully positioned 
itself as a regulator that encouraged innovative practices in efforts to enhance fair competition, 
																																																						
134 This process was not without conflict. For a detailed overview of the conflict between the various SEC divisions 
and how this impacted product development, refer to Chapter Six.   
	 107	
technological innovation, and new product strategies. Alongside these developments, the AMEX 
created the New Product Development division, headed up by Nathan Most and Steven Bloom, 
and the NYSE quickly followed suit by appointing a head of Product Development and Strategy. 
This was the start of a new regulatory era for the American exchanges that led to the most 
explosive new product growth and technological innovation in decades, successfully - albeit 
gradually - shifting the markets away from legacy arrangements to competitive relationships and 
innovative product designs. In short, this era of regulatory repositioning began to frame the 
markets technologically, further encouraging the socio-technical transformation of products that 
were efficiently able to increase liquidity, trading size, and transparency - key characteristics of 






















“If you aren’t the biggest, you have to be different, and we were the best at 
different”: Regulatory conflict, financial crisis, and the first ETF135 
 
 
Chapter Five will analyse the regulatory climate in the United States between the 1970s and 
1990s. Particular focus will be paid to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and their handling of the October 19, 1987 
market crisis (also known as Black Monday). Of primary analysis will be the ongoing disputes 
between the SEC and CFTC and how the sustained conflict affected the development of the first 
ETF product concept.  
This chapter will begin with a brief overview of the market crash on October 19, 1987 before 
moving on to discuss the regulatory climate that existed between the SEC and CFTC and how 
each regulator reacted to the crisis. Next, it will be demonstrated that the first ETF in the world, 
the Philadelphia Stock Exchange’s Cash Index Participation Unit (CIPs), was a result of two 
factors: first, the socio-technical environment created by the rise of computing technology in the 
decade prior, and second, the response of regulators to the 1987 crisis. The regulatory treatment 
of the CIPs innovation - such as the SEC-CFTC lawsuit and subsequent delisting of the CIPs - 
will be discussed for its role in establishing an important precedent for basket product developers 
moving forward. The concluding analysis will explain how innovators and regulators 
participated in constructing the first formal definition of an exchange-traded product. This 
analysis will challenge traditional conceptualizations of innovators and regulators as competing 
bodies and instead demonstrate how they were co-implicated in the ETF’s agencement. 
																																																						
135 A former Executive Vice President at the Philadelphia Stock Exchange explains how the exchange remained 
competitive against giants such as the NYSE. (Interview 6).  
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The 1987 Financial Crisis  
 
October 19, 1987136   
	
From 1982 until the crash at the end of 1987, stock markets in the United States were 
performing strongly, with their growth largely attributed to the flood of international137 and 
institutional investors into the market that increased buying pressure (Katzenbach 1987). 
However, markets rallied so strongly up to 1987 that analysts began commenting that stock 
prices were dangerously overvalued and were no longer at sustainable levels (Anders and Garcia 
1987; Carlson 2007). Between January and August 1987, for example, the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (DJIA), an index of the 30 largest stocks trading on the NYSE and NASDAQ, increased 
by 44 percent, igniting concerns over a market bubble.138  
Prior to the fall in October, institutional investors employed portfolio insurance strategies in 
order to guarantee a minimum value for their portfolios.139 In 1987, the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange reported that 93% of the trading in their S&P 500 index futures were done by 
institutions, accounting for the vast majority of S&P 500 index futures volumes on the exchange 
(Market Reform Hearings 1989, 105; Benson 1991, 1195). 
																																																						
136 The events that unfolded in October of 1987 have been covered in depth by innumerable sources in popular 
media, academia, and private industry, so only pertinent details will be discussed in this project. For an excellent 
synthesis of the full events in October 1987, refer to the Brady Commission (1988), Shiller (1989), and the Federal 
Reserve Board’s Finance and Economics Discussion Series on the 1987 crisis (Carlson 2007).  
137 Refer to the US Commerce Department’s historical figures on foreign investment levels for detailed data on the 
early 1980s influx of foreign investment into the US markets, available at: www.commerce.gov/economicindicators.  
138 Asset bubbles are “an economic development in which the price of a class of…assets (such as houses or 
securities) rises to a level that appears to be unsustainable and well above the assets’ value as determined by 
economic fundamentals. Bubbles typically occur when investors purchase assets with the expectation of short-term 
gains because of rapidly rising prices” (Congressional Budget Office 2012, 2).   
139 Portfolio insurance will be discussed in detail later in this chapter as well as in Chapter Six.  
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The events that precipitated the drastic fall on Monday, October 19 began in early October 
when popular media began commenting on the unsustainably high performance of the financial 
markets. Concurrently, the federal government announced there was a substantial trade deficit, 
which devalued the US dollar and increased interest rates, causing markets to begin large scale 
sell-offs beginning on October 14. As stated in a testimony presented to the U.S. Senate Banking 
Committee, the Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, stated:  
  
The bull market of 1987 had brought stock prices to levels which stretched to 
incredulity…Something had to snap. If it didn’t happen in October, it would 
have happened soon thereafter (1988).  
 
 
  On October 16, the DJIA dropped 4.6% (108.35 points), incurring the largest one-day loss 
in its history, while the US Treasury Secretary stated he was considering de-valuing the US 
dollar in order to alleviate the larger-than-expected trade deficit. Between Wednesday, October 
14 and Friday, October 16, index arbitrageurs became more active, moving from 6.2% to 13.4% 
of total selling volume on the NYSE (CFTC Final Report 1988, 38).  
When markets opened on Monday, October 19, the Dow crashed by 22.6% (508 points). 
There were reports of traders racing one another to the trading floors to sell their stocks as news 
of market crashes in Asia began to surface in the early hours in New York: “There was so much 
psychological togetherness…It was a little like a theatre where someone yells ‘Fire!’” (Andrew 
Grove interview, in Bernhardt and Eckblad 2013). As institutions using portfolio insurance 
strategies represented a substantial portion of the markets, their programmes hastened the speed 
at which the October 19 crash occurred: “An initial price decline started a vicious circle by 
causing portfolio insurers to sell, causing further price declines, causing portfolio insurers to sell 
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again, and so on” (GAO Crash Report 1988, 42; Shiller 1988).140 For example, when the NYSE 
opened on Monday, October 19, the S&P 500 futures contract was 21 points below the value of 
the S&P 500 Index, attracting arbitrageurs who accounted for over 60% of the total volume 
traded on the NYSE that day (Benson 1991, 1202; SEC Report 1988, 2-36; CME Committee of 
Inquiry 1987, 18-29). As stock prices fell from the incoming arbitrage trades, portfolio insurance 
programs began triggering sales, which further decoupled the S&P index futures and cash 
market.141 The Chicago Mercantile Exchange reported that upwards of 45% of its total volume 
on Monday, October 19 was constituted by program selling (Brady Commission 1988, Section 
III-19), while the NYSE reported over 60% of its total volume was a result of program selling 
(SEC Report 1988, 2-39). In response to the increased selling pressure being experienced on the 
NYSE, portfolio insurance programs repeatedly prompted sales in both the futures and stock 
markets, escalating the crash.  
As discussed in Chapter Four, portfolio insurance guarantees a minimum value of a portfolio, 
often through the use of index futures or options. If markets fall, portfolio insurance programs 
will suggest that the weight of stocks be decreased by selling a pre-determined percentage of the 
portfolio: if stock prices drop, institutional investors will sell their stocks and purchase index 
futures, though some institutions preferred to shift their stock investments to bonds (SEC Report 
1988, 1-2). In periods when the market falls rapidly, portfolio insurance strategies have been 
argued to exacerbate the downward trend as they will flood the market will orders to sell, often 
without the demand to fill them (SEC Report 1987, xiii).142  
																																																						
140 Cascade theory explains this effect, though there have been doubts that October 19, 1987 was a true cascade. For 
a discussion of cascade theory, refer to Benson (1991, 1198-1200).  
141 Refer to Appendix A for a breakdown of the average basis error between the underlying and futures markets in 
October 1987.  
142 In opposition to this claim, empirical studies were conducted that demonstrate how program trades, manual 
trades, and arbitrage trades have near-identical affects on price movement (see Hasbrouck 1996). Other studies 
suggested that the contagion of fear amongst investors impacted price movements more substantially than program 
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As sell orders began to flood the market, technical systems became overwhelmed; brokers 
stopped answering the phones, and liquidity crunches meant that specialists could not execute 
their orders. In addition, capital restrictions meant that specialists could no longer take offsetting 
positions to stabilize their markets: specialists were heavy buyers of stock early on Monday, 
October 19 as they attempted to regain control of their designated stocks. However, as conditions 
worsened and systems became overwhelmed, specialists had to abandon their defensive positions 
as their purchases could not keep up with the pace of the crash and the incoming flood of sell 
orders (SEC Report 1988, 4-8). For example, one institution in particular sent a total of $1.1 
billion USD in block trades to the floor of the NYSE on October 19, overwhelming the ability of 
the specialists to adequately make markets in those designated securities (Carlson 2007, 9).  
Technical systems were also unable to process the sheer number of trades being sent through 
in these conditions. On the NYSE, for example, trade confirmations were being sent over one 
hour late (Brady Commission 1988, III-21), leaving investors uncertain as to whether or not their 
orders had been filled. Eventually, the NYSE had to shut down its DOT system (Chapter Four) in 
hopes of abating the downward price spiral being sustained by program trades. The NYSE 
continued to prevent index arbitrageurs from using the DOT system until markets opened on 
Wednesday, October 21.  
In hindsight and in reaction to multiple reports on the events of 1987, the NYSE has admitted 
that closing the DOT system on October 19 may have contributed to the crisis as the DOT was a 
crucial mechanism for arbitrageurs to trade. Without DOT, arbitrageurs were unable to exploit 
the difference between the futures and stock markets, which led to a further decoupling of prices 
and restricted liquidity. Typically, as portfolio insurance providers push prices down in the 
																																																						
trades, despite the fact that over 33% of institutional traders blamed program trading for the crisis (Shiller 1987, 11-
12).  
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futures market through their repeated sales, index arbitrageurs would exploit the opportunity to 
buy discounted futures and sell their stocks. Arbitrage would typically help lessen the severity of 
the crash because exploiting price differentials between the stock market and the futures market 
(e.g. selling the higher priced index and buying the lower priced index) would bring the two 
divergent prices closer together and stabilize them at close levels. However, the NYSE’s refusal 
to allow arbitrageurs to trade on the DOT system ended up exacerbating the crisis.143   
The events of October 1987 set the stage for lengthy reports from the futures and stock 
market regulators as they sought to address not only their own misunderstandings, but the 
growing public alarm over the use of complex program trading strategies. As a former NYSE 
specialist explains:  
 
I was on the NYSE floor for the 1987 crash and not only did the regulators not 
understand portfolio insurance, the people that bought insurance and the firms 
that sold it did not understand it (Interview 4).   
 
Due to the misunderstandings surrounding the complexities of popular program trading 
strategies, the majority of reports analysing the 1987 crisis focused on the futures markets and 
index-based trading. Looking at the environment prior to the crash, it is clear to see why: since 
stock index futures were introduced in 1982, the daily trading volume in S&P 500 index futures 
grew to over two times the average daily dollar volume of trading on the NYSE (SEC Final 
Report 1988, 3-17). As discussed in previous chapters, this rise in futures trading resulted in part 
from the entrance of institutions into the market which, by the time of the 1987 crisis, were 
responsible for 80% of the total trading volume on the NYSE, 50% of which were block and 
																																																						
143 Refer to the Brady Commission (1988, III: 22-26), SEC Report (1988), and Carlson’s Federal Reserve Report on 
1987 (2007, 10-11) for further details on the decoupling of prices between the futures and cash markets on October 
19.  
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program trades using indexed assets (Edwards 1988, 236). As the influx of institutions created 
substantial pressure on the stock markets, most institutions transferred their buying and selling to 
the futures markets which was less expensive and offered greater liquidity. This transfer of 
institutional funds to futures markets, in turn, drove up arbitrage strategies between futures and 
cash markets and proliferated the use of futures products and strategies leading up to October 
1987. 
 
Regulatory conflict and crisis responses  
	
SEC-CFTC jurisdictional disputes 
	
Understanding the regulatory climate prior and in response to the market break of October 
19, 1987 is crucial to understanding the development of the first ETF, the Philadelphia Stock 
Exchange’s (PHLX) Cash Index Participation Units (CIPs). Central to the development of this 
product were the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), both of which were heavily involved in proposing solutions in the 
wake of October 19. The major regulatory conflict in the decades leading up to the launch of 
ETFs were the SEC-CFTC territorial disputes that were ignited by innovations in index 
derivative trading. These disputes make visible the problems markets had in dealing with 
innovative product design on their own, and illustrates the extent to which regulatory processes 
encouraged the qualification of the first formally defined, publicly traded index basket products. 
Beginning the late 1970s, institutional traders pioneered program trading, index options, and 
EFP (exchange of futures for physicals) to capture broad markets and hedge their portfolios. 
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During this time, regulation for options and futures was divided between, respectively, the SEC 
and CFTC. As previously discussed in Chapter Four, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
was established by an act of Congress in 1934 as a response to the 1929 market crash144 and had 
exclusive jurisdiction over options and securities that traded on registered exchanges and the 
over-the-counter markets. The role of SEC regulation is to guarantee full disclosure on securities 
products in order to allow investors to make their own decisions regarding value (Work of the 
SEC, 1986):  
 
The whole shtick of the SEC is that people should be allowed to pay what they 
want. If somebody wants to buy a Lexus instead of a Toyota…that should be 
your privilege, as long as you know what you are paying (Smythe interview 
2011, 27).  
 
The SEC held authority over securities and options on securities, reasoning that “…a call 
option on a security is a ‘right to purchase’ a security, and both put and call options on securities 
are considered instruments ‘commonly known as securities’” (§5,6,10,15,19, and 23 of SEC Act 
of 1934). In 1974, the US Congress offered to give the SEC authority over the entire futures 
industry. The SEC declined, and Congress created the CFTC to oversee futures trading in the 
United States.  
The CFTC was founded when Congress passed the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
Act in 1974. The CFTC “…retained exclusive jurisdiction over futures and options contracts on 
both commodities and currencies…and was permitted to sanction futures on securities indexes 
and options on futures indexes” (Kramer 2004, 437). The CFTC was created in order to replace 
its regulatory predecessor, the Commodity Exchange Authority, who had less authority and 
independence than the CFTC as it was an agency operating within the US Department of 
																																																						
144 Refer to the U.S. Government Accountability Office Staff Study (1934).  
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Agriculture.145 At the time of its founding, the CFTC brought the trading of all futures contracts 
related to commodities under its jurisdiction, including futures contracts on financial 
instruments146 and options on commodities. Unlike the SEC, whose purpose is to monitor the full 
disclosure of securities products, the role of the CFTC is to analyse futures contracts to ascertain 
whether they have a valid economic purpose.147 In 1978, the Futures Trading Act was legislated 
by Congress and required the CFTC to maintain extensive communication between itself and the 
SEC:  
 
The Commission shall maintain communications with…the Securities and 
Exchange Commission for the purpose of keeping such agencies informed of 
Commission activities that relate to the responsibilities of those agencies, for 
the purpose of seeking the views of those agencies on such activities, and for 
considering the relationships between the volume and nature of investment and 
trading in…securities and financial instruments under the jurisdiction of such 
agencies (S.2391, 92 Stat. 866, 1978).  
 
Beginning in the late 1970s, trading strategies where market participants would trade in 
futures and stock markets interchangeably began to flourish while jurisdictional authority for 
these instruments remained divided between the SEC and CFTC. Developments relating to index 
trading in the stock and commodities markets and the approval of options and futures trading on 
such indices problematically blurred the boundaries of regulatory authority: new strategies had 
																																																						
145 The authority for the regulation of the trading of futures was officially transferred from the Commodity Exchange 
Authority to the CFTC on April 21, 1975. The history of the trading and regulation of futures pre-CFTC is 
particularly complex, dating back to 1848 with the creation of The Chicago Board of Trade. Pre-CFTC history will 
not be discussed in this project. For a detailed timeline on the regulation of futures prior to 1974, refer to 
www.cftc.gov/about/HistoryoftheCFTC.  
146 The first futures contract on financial instruments was the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 90-day U.S. Treasury 
Bill. This was approved for trading by the CFTC on November 26, 1975. However, the first futures contract on a 
foreign-currency financial instrument was introduced by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in 1972 before the CFTC 
was founded.  
147 The CFTC was founded with a special division that reviews newly proposed futures contracts - the Division of 
Economic Analysis - in order to judge the value of proposed contracts. The SEC has no such division, as it does not 
examine the economic viability of securities products. Refer to Benson (1991, 6-7) for a detailed discussion.   
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options being used to achieve the same results as futures, making the divisions of authority 
unclear and highly problematic for the regulation of index innovations. For example, the 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange’s proposal to begin trading index options was received favourably 
by the CFTC but was ultimately rejected by the SEC because options were only permissible on 
securities - indexes represented a grey area. At the same time, the CFTC legislated the index 
arbitrage practice called EFP (exchange of futures for physicals) to be permissible in futures 
markets, causing divergent regulatory cultures and unclear boundaries for what constituted 
legitimate and illegitimate index activity.  
While the SEC would typically have jurisdiction over the trading of stocks and stock indices, 
the introduction of futures on indices - and further still, options on the futures of stock indices - 
were subject to exclusive CFTC oversight. As a result, multiple conflicts ensued between the 
SEC and CFTC over their relative jurisdictions into the 1980s despite the legislative ruling that 
the CFTC was “not [to] supersede or limit the jurisdiction” of the SEC “…unless such 
transactions involve the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade” (CFTC 
Act amendments 1974, Section 201).  
Enhanced SEC-CFTC communication was integral in the years leading up to 1987, for new 
trading strategies emerging from basket trading and the proliferation of futures and options 
contracts led to products that were not easily confined into either the SEC or the CFTC 
jurisdiction. Questions over the suitability of existing legislation for these new products and the 
boundaries between the SEC and CFTC began increasing tensions between the two regulators. 
The SEC, in an attempt to prevent the CFTC from gaining jurisdiction over stock options, 
proposed amendments to the Securities Exchange Act that would give the SEC exclusive 
jurisdiction over any transaction involving a security. However, in September 1981, the CFTC 
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approved the trading of options on futures contracts. As a result, options - products traditionally 
under the jurisdiction of the SEC - were now subject to CFTC authority if they were tied to 
futures. Furthermore, in 1982, the CFTC approved the trading of futures on stock indexes148 and 
in 1983 expanded its jurisdiction by approving options on stock index futures.  
SEC-CFTC conflicts occurred over the emergence of innovative products that involved either 
an element of futurity on stocks or options on futures. Of particular prominence were the 
regulatory disputes over the trading of government instruments such as Treasury bills and 
GNMA forwards, which were heard in multiple courts between the late-1970s to 1980s.149 For 
example, the SEC and CFTC conflicted over the trading of futures on securities - Treasury bills, 
in particular (847 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1988)). While Treasury bills are considered securities and 
thus governed by the SEC, futures are to be exclusively regulated by the CFTC,150 leading to 
confusion as to what institution ought to have authority over Treasury bill futures. Using the 
definition of a commodity in the 1974 CFTC Act, the courts decided that Treasury bills, whilst 
securities, fell under CFTC jurisdiction because Treasury bill contracts were being traded on a 
designated futures exchange:151  
 
Regulation by the Commission of transactions in the specific financial 
instruments…which generally are between banks and other institutional 
																																																						
148 The first futures contract on a stock index - The Value Line Index Average traded on the Kansas City Board of 
Trade (KBOT) - was approved by the CFTC on February 16, 1982.  
149 Regulatory disputes over GNMA (Government National Mortgage Association) products include: Abrams v. 
Oppenheimer Govt. Securities Inc. (1984), Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. SEC (1982). Regulatory disputes 
over Treasury bill authority includes: Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Conaway (1981), Fisher v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds (1981), and W. Floyd Messer, Sr., Individually, Plaintiff-appellant, v. E.f. Hutton & Co. (1988).  
150 “[t]he Commission’s jurisdiction over futures contract markets or other exchanges is exclusive and includes the 
regulation of commodity accounts, commodity trading agreements, and commodity options” (CFTC Act 
amendments 1974, Section 201). However, this section also includes the stipulation that CFTC oversight is not to 
“supersede or limit the jurisdiction” of the SEC.   
151 During this time, futures were trading on thirteen exchanges, of which the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) 
and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) were the most prominent. Treasure bill futures were traded on the CBOT. 
Some futures exchanges were subsidiaries of stock exchanges, meaning they were subject to joint SEC-CFTC 
jurisdiction, which further escalated regulatory conflict.  
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participants, is unnecessary, unless executed on a formally organized futures 
exchange (CFTC Act 1974, at 5859, emphasis added).   
 
The CFTC was also supported by the Commodities Exchange Act, which defined a commodity, 
in part, as: 
 
…all other goods and articles…and all services, rights, and interests in which 
contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in (7 U.S.C. §2, 
1988).  
 
Following this definition, anything could become a commodity by having a futures contract 
placed on it - commodities no longer were defined as traditional agricultural products (7 U.S.C. 
§2 Supra note 17, 1988).152 By having futures contracts on Treasury-bills, and trading those 
contracts on a designated futures exchange (the CBOT), Treasury bills became commodities 
under CFTC legislation.    
SEC-CFTC disputes continued and a jurisdictional agreement, the Shad-Johnson Accord, 
was passed into law as a joint effort of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1982 and the Futures 
Trading Act of 1982. Under this accord, the CFTC was granted exclusive jurisdiction over any 
futures contracts, including futures on stocks, stock indices, commodities, and options on futures. 
The SEC maintained exclusive jurisdiction over securities and options (on securities, certificates 
of deposit, stock indices, and foreign currency) and was granted a consulting role in the approval 
of stock index futures contracts. Under the Shad-Johnson Accord, the CFTC could not legislate 
on new stock index futures contracts unless the SEC was in full support.153   
																																																						
152 The only exception to this definition was for onions, which were regulated separately under Section 13-1 of the 
Commodity Exchange Act.   
153 The SEC had their own criteria governing their willingness to consult and approve on futures contracts on stock 
indices. Lindsey (1997) provided SEC testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives on this issue.  
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Despite official legislation and joint studies154 that depicted the SEC and CFTC being on 
cooperative terms, disputes continued as the SEC tried (and failed) to extend its powers by 
merging with the CFTC and, later, petitioning for jurisdiction over all securities-related financial 
products155 and the trading of stock index futures.156 As SEC Chairman Ruder testified at the 
Financial Market hearings, “[n]either as a matter of regulatory efficiency nor as a matter of 
public confidence does it make sense to maintain separate authority over the stock index futures 
and the stock markets” (Brady Report 1988, vi). Disputes were so common that Congress was 
presented with a bill to merge the SEC and CFTC into one agency in hopes to end the conflicts 
that were thought to be impeding the innovation of hybrid financial products.157  
These differences in regulatory approach would be emphasized in the response of each the 
SEC and CFTC to the 1987 market break, eventually coming to a head with the introduction of a 
new product, Cash Index Participation Units (CIPs), from the Philadelphia Stock Exchange 
(PHLX) in 1989. In what follows, exchange-sponsored reports, SEC reports, and CFTC reports 
on the 1987 break will be analysed and points of divergence analysed. The following reports 
were selected as they were the most influential in shaping the regulatory response to the 1987 
market crash, creating the infrastructure necessary for the CIPs to emerge.158 
 
																																																						
154 Refer to the Federal Reserve Board, CFTC, and SEC Joint Study (1984) for an example of joint discussions on 
the development and regulation of stock index derivatives.    
155 See Schick (1988) for a discussion of the benefits of the SEC campaign for extended jurisdiction.  
156 Refer to the Financial Market Regulatory Reform: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications 
and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (1987-1988) for testimony against granting the SEC 
authority over index futures. Refer to: The SEC, Treasury, Greenspan motion for testimony in favour of granting the 
SEC authority over index futures (22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 13 at 459, 1990).		
157 A bill (H.R. 4477) was introduced on April 6, 1990 by Dan Glickman (D-Kan.) and Dennis Eckard (D-Ohio) to 
merge the SEC and CFTC into a single agency called the Markets and Trading Commission. It was not successful.  
158 Of the many reports written by exchanges and government bodies, the most widely discussed are the Brady 
Commission, the CFTC Final Report, the SEC Report from the Division of Market Regulation, the General 
Accounting Office report, the NYSE Report by Nicholas Katzenbach, and the CME Report. Of these, only the 
NYSE Report, SEC Report, and Brady Commission make recommendations for changes in policy.   
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SEC responses to the 1987 crisis  
	
The responses of the SEC to the 1987 are numerous and include both oral addresses and 
official studies. Most prominent of these studies was a report published in February 1988 by the 
Commission’s Division of Market Regulation entitled The October 1987 Market Break. In it, the 
Division reconstructed the stock, options, and futures trading environment as it existed in 
October 1987, analysed how the trading in October impacted market facilities and participants, 
offered suggestions for how to solve problems in market systems, and constructed methods to 
reform markets moving forward. An overwhelming theme of this study, and studies from the 
futures markets regulators such as the CFTC and CME, is the close attention paid to derivative 
index strategies. The results of these studies, whilst largely in agreement with one another, 
diverge quite strongly in their opinions of how other market regulators handled the crisis.  
The SEC Division report did not assert that index-based trading and hedging strategies were 
the source of the crash in October 1987, but suggested they were responsible for hastening the 
speed at which the crash occurred:  
 
…futures trading, and strategies involving the use of futures, were not the ‘sole 
cause’ of the so-called market break. Nevertheless, the existence of futures on 
stock indexes and the use of the various strategies involving ‘program trading’ 
(i.e. index arbitrage, index substitution and portfolio insurance) were a 
significant factory in accelerating and exacerbating the decline (1988, 3-11).  
 
Interestingly, the Division’s report went one step beyond clearing the product of responsibility 
for the crash, concluding that index-based trading was beneficial to the efficient functioning and 
liquidity of markets: “The Commission believes that in normal times the derivative index 
markets perform an important economic function. They provide a means by which institutions 
	 122	
may adjust their portfolios quickly and efficiently” (Ruder 1987, 17), and suggested that market 
reforms focus on expanding the capacity of index futures markets and basket trading strategies as 
a means to increase liquidity. As SEC Commissioner Ruder stated, “Given the increased role 
played by stock index futures in our linked markets, block trading of the futures market would 
provide valuable added capacity” (1988a, 10) and “…index trading is a beneficial force” (1987, 
17).  
However, the Division exercised caution in advocating index products. While index-related 
trading was not shown to directly cause the 1987 crash, they suggested that index trading was 
instrumental in the rapid transmission of investor reactions to stock prices, which “…may have 
condensed the time period in which the decline occurred” (Ruder 1987, 13). This statement was 
supported by the Brady Commission159 as well as previous SEC studies done on other volatile 
days in 1987 - notably, January 23 and September 11 and 12.160 These earlier studies, in addition 
to the October 19 report, brought the SEC to the conclusion that index trading dramatically 
increased the speed at which investor reactions and sentiments could be translated into market 
prices, exacerbating market declines such as was seen in 1987. As a result of the link between 
volatility and index-based strategies, the Division’s report on October 19 suggested reforms that 
would reduce volatility and volume during periods of market crisis. In order to lessen the impact 
of index and program trading on volatility, the Commission looked for ways to increase the 
capacity of financial markets and concluded that trading technologies ought to be supported and 
encouraged by all financial regulators.  
																																																						
159 The Brady Commission discussed how institutional selling in futures markets (specifically, portfolio insurance 
sales) and index arbitrage accelerated the decline as they accounted for 40% of the total S&P futures volume on 
October 19. This introduced substantial downward pressure on prices.  
160 Refer to the Division of Market Regulation’s Report on the Role of Index Related Trading in the Market Decline 
on September 11 and 12, 1986 (March 1987). The SEC Report on the events of January 23, 1986 were presented in 
confidence to the Congressional Oversight Committee and were never made public (SEC Final Report 1988, 
footnote 28).  
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Ultimately, the Division concluded that basket trading and index-based trading strategies 
were not the source of the 1987 market break, nor were they detrimental to the efficient 
functioning of markets in normal periods. However, the SEC leaders argued that vigilance was 
needed in governing the development of complex index-based strategies,161 which they 
suggested increased volatility in times of crisis. Crucially, however, they concluded that such 
concerns could be largely alleviated by developing adequate technological infrastructure. In 
short, index-based trading strategies were overwhelmingly argued to be in the best interest of the 
American markets. Thus, the SEC leadership routinely maintained that they would actively avoid 
any situation that would limit the use of such strategies and products (Ruder 1987, 17; 1988a; 
1988b).  
Throughout the 1987 report, discussions of automation and trading were intimately linked, as 
popular trading strategies were conditional on technologies that were quickly becoming 
foundational to market infrastructure. The Division’s analysis showing the positive effects of 
index-based trading on liquidity and market functioning also implicated the automated 
technologies which made such strategies possible: in advocating for the increased use of block 
trading in index futures markets, the Division dually advocated for the advancement of 
computing and telecommunication infrastructure that would be able to absorb the increased 
capacity that these trades would bring. In the wake of the 1987 crisis, the Division concluded that 
automation was a positive and necessary force in the financial markets and began to incorporate 
this position in their public rhetoric. Indicative of the sentiment towards technology at the time, 
SEC Chairman Ruder publicly remarked that the “automation of quotation, routing, execution, 
																																																						
161 The SEC expressed concerns that the growing complexity of index-related products and strategies were a 
challenge to govern. Specifically, SEC Chairman Ruder warned that while hedging strategies using futures and 
options were beneficial, they also increase the possibility of manipulation (1987, 17-18).  
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clearance, and settlement systems is inevitable” (1988a, 13), and that the Division of Market 
Regulation fully supported technological development that would expand the capacity of markets 
to handle increased block trades: “…our job is to assure that the markets enhance the capacities 
of their automation facilities so that markets do not falter due to lack of physical capacity” 
(Ruder 1988a, 7). In reaction to the 1987 market break, the SEC confirmed that all exchanges 
with automatic order routing and execution systems would be required to increase the number of 
trades their systems can handle in case of unexpected volume surges.162  
However, the support for increased automation from the SEC was not without concern. As 
discussed in the Division’s 1987 report, a reliance on automation puts a market system at risk if 
there were to be a technological blip or breakdown. As the report noted, the liquidity crunch 
experienced by institutions trading in the futures markets on October 19 required them to transfer 
their trading to the stock market, leading to volumes that quickly overwhelmed the capacity of 
specialists and technological systems. Indeed, the subsequent shut down of the DOT system by 
the NYSE was found by numerous studies to further exacerbate this crisis. In order to address the 
risks of increased technological reliance, the study proposed that markets increase their 
coordination. Enhanced inter-market coordination between, for example, the futures markets and 
stock markets, would provide a more stable environment that could absorb heavy increases in 
volatility and order flow volume in times of crisis such as those that happened in October 1987.  
Ultimately, the authors of the 1987 SEC study suggested that successful market reform could 
be achieved by expanding market capacity by improving the capacity of automated systems and 
																																																						
162 The SEC requested that the following automated systems to be upgraded in response to the October 1987 crisis: 
the American Stock Exchange’s PER system, Cincinnati Stock Exchange’s NSTS, Midwest Stock Exchange’s 
MAX, Pacific Stock Exchange’s SCOREX, Philadelphia Stock Exchange’s PACE, and the National Association for 
Securities Dealers’ SOES.  
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increasing coordination amongst markets.163 To implement their suggestions, SEC leadership 
began to widely promote the concept of basket trading and began incorporating a rhetoric 
emphasizing baskets and indexes into the majority of their public addresses throughout the 
following years. This approach was echoed by institutions such as the CFTC and NYSE after 
their studies were published. 
 
CFTC responses to the 1987 crisis 
	
In examining the aftermath of the events of October 1987, the CFTC final report164 took a 
similar stance to the SEC in claiming that the crash was not caused by index derivatives: 
“October 19 was not initiated by trading in index products nor did it principally emanate from 
such trading” (CFTC Final Report, 1988, 81), and “A detailed examination of the trading 
data…does not provide empirical support for the theory that hedging in the futures market 
[portfolio insurance] and index arbitrage activities interacted to cause a technical downward 
price spiral of stock prices” (CFTC Final Report 1988, 137).  
Despite taking similar positions on the magnitude of index strategies and program trading 
that occurred in the crisis, the reports generated by the securities and futures industries 
maintained a combative rhetoric that echoed their historical struggles for authority. As SEC 
Commissioner Grundfest acknowledged in a statement, “New York has been busy pointing its 
finger at Chicago, and Chicago has been busily pointing its finger at New York” (1988, 25). 
																																																						
163 Examples of increased coordination amongst markets post-1987 were the expansion to the National Market 
System’s intermarket trading system, which electronically linked eight stock markets across the United States (refer 
to Lee (1993) for discussion), and the increase in SEC-CFTC joint initiatives to combat volatility. These SEC-CFTC 
initiatives were constructed with input from the Federal Reserve Board beginning in February 1988.  
164 The CFTC released an interim report on stock index futures on November 9, 1987, a follow-up report on January 
8, 1988, and a final report on February 1, 1988. Moving forward, only the final report will be referenced.  
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However, it was not just the NYSE that was involved in finger pointing. The SEC report itself 
stated that “…the existence of futures on stock indexes…were a significant factor in accelerating 
and exacerbating the decline” (SEC Final Report 1988, 11), hinting that the CFTC was in part to 
blame. The CFTC (and to a lesser extent, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange165) took a defensive 
stance in regards to their regulatory regime and purpose, arguing that their surveillance methods 
for futures markets were adequate and that futures trading could not have been the sole cause for 
the crash. In addition, the CFTC argued that SEC surveillance was falling short: “Improving data 
collection capabilities in other markets, particularly regarding stock market trades…would 
greatly expedite any subsequent studies of markets” (CFTC Final Report 1988, 9).  
In rebuttal, the SEC testified that the CFTC’s regulatory regime and systems of trading were 
to blame for the crisis: “[T]he Commission is recommending that the CFTC and futures markets 
make express, strengthen if necessary, and effectively enforce” various prohibitions and “the 
Commission…recommends that block trading procedures similar to those used in the stock 
markets be considered as a means of increasing the futures markets capacity” (SEC Testimony 3 
Feb 1988, 4-5).166 In these disputes, the role of the products and strategies was not the issue; 
rather, the role of regulators in governing index-based derivatives and program trading strategies 
came to the forefront of discussions. 
Due in part to the ongoing conflict between the SEC and CFTC, the Katzenbach Study 
(commissioned by the NYSE) and the Brady Report both recommended merging the SEC and 
CFTC. As was stated in the Brady Commission, “…failure of the [primary and derivative 
market] segments to perform as one market contributed to the violence of the market break in 
October 1987…”, and, at the very least, the SEC and CFTC should “…differently divide the 
																																																						
165 The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) commissioned a report by Miller, Hawke, and Scholes (1988).   
166 For additional detail, refer to the U.S. General Accounting Office report (1988).    
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responsibilities they now share over the cash and futures markets for securities” (1987, 59). The 
Katzenbach Study recommended that “interrelationships among exchanges need to be dealt with 
either by regulatory agencies or by agreements between the exchanges that are approved by 
regulatory authorities”, and that exchanges ought to develop coordinated contingency plans in 
the case of future emergencies (Edwards 1988, 239-240; Katzenbach 1987). Other analysts 
agreed that coordination between markets was the only way to move forward, stating that “an 
essential first step is to open a constructive dialogue between stock and futures exchanges on all 
aspects of trading and operations” (Edwards 1988, 249). 
 
Proposed solutions to market inefficiencies  
	
 In all of the studies commissioned concerning October 1987, two weaknesses were 
identified: shortcomings in the efficiency and capacity of computer systems, and issues relating 
to intermarket (specifically, SEC-CFTC) coordination. In all studies, recommendations were 
made that would encourage baskets of stocks that would trade as a single unit, believing such a 
product would solve the issues surrounding high-leverage, ill-defined hedging and arbitrage 
practices of the time. Perhaps most illustrative of the sentiment of these commissions was what 
Joseph Grundfest, SEC Commissioner, told a CATO Institute Policy Forum on 20 July, 1988:  
 
Suppose you want to buy or sell a basket of stocks in today’s equity market. As 
a practical matter, the basket would be broken down into a series of, say 400, 
individual securities transactions on the floor of the exchange and, if someone 
wanted to buy the exactly the same basket that you had just sold, he would also 
have to engage in 400 transactions on the floor of the exchange. If we operated 
our used Volkswagon [sic] markets according to the same plan, VW sellers 
would drive their autos onto dealers lots where the cars would be stripped 
down to fenders, doors, and engine blocks, and when a buyer walked onto the 
lot the dealer would reassemble the VW piece by piece…If that doesn’t seem 
	 128	
like a particularly wise way to buy and sell VWs, I suggest that it may also not 
be the wisest way of buying or selling market baskets of equities. 
 
As a result of the events of October 19 and the research commissioned thereafter, basket 
trading was heralded by regulators as a solution to the problems markets faced: poor liquidity, 
high leverage, poorly understood strategies, and waning public confidence in the transparency 
and security of markets. As a result of these beliefs, strong statements from legislators and policy 
analysts arose: “we know now that it often makes perfect logical sense to trade portfolios as 
portfolios (or baskets) and not as individual securities” (Grundfest 1988, 13); “…we believe the 
concept of basket trading deserves the Commission’s…attention” (Report by the SEC Division 
of Market Regulation 1988, 3-17); “market systems must take full advantage of the benefits that 
derivative markets offer” (Edwards 1988, 249); and  “…the development of market basket 
trading might help address [market concerns]…while the merits of any particular design of a 
basket trading system remain to be tested, I continue to believe that experimentation in this area 
is desirable” (Ketchum, 16 June 1989). With the regulatory rhetoric quickly incorporating 
terminology relating to the positive characteristics of baskets and index-style derivative products, 
movements to appropriately define and legislate basket products at the SEC began alongside 
experiments in product development at the PHLX. 
 
The PHLX and the first ETF product concept   
	
History   
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Founded in 1790 in a coffee shop, the PHLX is the first and the oldest stock exchange in the 
United States, dating back to when the centre of American commerce and the Presidential house 
resided in Philadelphia. The completion of the Erie Canal, which made it faster for ships to reach 
New York than Philadelphia, changed the course of development as commerce and financial 
organization began to materialize in New York, culminating with the creation of the NYSE a few 
years after the Philadelphia exchange was founded. The NYSE quickly eclipsed the size and 
volume of stocks traded on the PHLX by the early 1800s. Later, in the 1970s, the Chicago Board 
of Options Exchange (CBOE) became the primary market for a new product called standardized 
options, resigning the PHLX to a competitor for the options marketplace and actively searching 
for new products to improve its dwindling market share.167  
Beginning in the 1970s, financial markets were undergoing one of the most innovative 
periods in history, characterized by intense competition amongst exchanges for a share in the 
rapidly expanding markets.168 As a former exchange Vice President summarized:  
 
It was an exciting time to be involved in what I would consider to be an 
incredibly innovative period for the markets in the United States…Certainly 
there were collaborations in the US among competitive exchanges on 
regulatory matters, rules and regulations, market structure issues…but 
seriously competitive on the product side and the technology development side. 
(Interview 6).  
 
In order to maintain its competitiveness, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange focused on 
differentiating itself from the much larger NYSE, AMEX, and regional exchanges through 
																																																						
167 During this time, the AMEX, CBOE, NYSE, PHLX, and the Pacific Stock Exchange (PSE) were the only 
exchanges that traded options and index options. U.S. treasury securities were only traded on the CBOE, and foreign 
currency options traded only on the PHLX. As discussed, all options trading is regulated by the SEC. 
168 Refer to Appendix D for the distribution of NYSE stock trades amongst U.S. exchanges between 1976 and 1992.  
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pioneering niche financial products that relied on innovative technological and organizational 
infrastructure. As a former SEC and PHLX executive recalls:  
 
It was hyper competitive! Everyone was trying to gain market share and trade 
new products, and for an exchange like the Philadelphia, it was their lifeblood. 
If they could not innovate and trade new products and figure out how to stay 
alive, they would go under. Only a few exchanges had survived [from the early 






Perhaps the most notable system developed by the PHLX was the proprietary technology 
called the Philadelphia Automated Communication Execution system (PACE). PACE would 
allow a broker-dealer firm to send small orders - typically under 1,000 shares - from their 
computers directly to the PHLX, who would guarantee automated trade execution and 
confirmation reports. In addition, PHLX guaranteed that broker-dealers who submitted orders 
through PACE would receive the national best bid and offer price,169 incentivizing the routing of 
small stock orders to PHLX instead of the stock’s primary market. Philadelphia systems were 
innovative for their time, and the advent of PACE preceded many other exchange systems. The 
subsequent systems - such as BEACON and MAC - escalated the trend of drawing order flows 
away from a stock’s primary market (typically, the NYSE): 
 
The New York Stock Exchange lost its power to have a monopoly over all 
order flow - and certainly over small orders - as all smaller orders were going 
off the NYSE…And that was all due to computers and our communication 
technology. (Interview 13).  
																																																						
169 The National Best Bid and Offer (most commonly referred to as the ‘NBBO’) is the best price available for a 
security’s buy and sell orders. As per SEC rules, brokers are required to fill client orders at the NBBO.  
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The advent of PACE allowed Philadelphia to differentiate itself from the larger NYSE and 
regional exchanges by providing a service previously unavailable to the broker-dealer 
community - automatic trade executions that were guaranteed to have the fastest turn-around 
time and lowest cost in the country:  
 
You have to have a better mouse trap to get better order flow otherwise there’s 
a huge inertia to the status quo. People don’t like to reroute order flow if 
they’re comfortable sending it to [the primary market]. That way you always 
have to look better and cheaper (Interview 13).  
 
The PACE system, it will be shown, was a crucial development that allowed the PHLX to re-
establish itself as a pioneer of the US financial markets and provided the infrastructure necessary 
for PHLX to launch some of the country’s most innovative products.  
 
Organizational infrastructure  
	
Structurally, the PHLX operated with three trading floors and its own depository and clearing 
corporations. One of the trading floors was solely dedicated to the trading of stocks using a rule 
called Unlisted Trading Privileges (UTP).170 In the original Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
exchanges were free to list any security already trading on another exchange without applying 
for permission. In 1936, restrictions were imposed so that any exchange wishing to trade a 
security listed on another exchange would have to apply for formal privileges to do so from the 
SEC. This process, on average, took between 45 and 60 trading days to approve (Hall 2004, 
1132). This legislative ruling intended to provide a competitive advantage to the primary 
																																																						
170 The history of UTP legislation and its impact on ETF development will be discussed in detail in Chapter Eight.   
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exchange over any exchanges that choose to subsequently list the security in question.171 Simply 
stated, it was legislated that a security may not trade on any exchange other than its primary 
exchange, unless a secondary exchange formally applied for UTP (15 U.S.C. § 78l(a)). If a 
secondary exchange wished to exercise UTP for a security, they were required to submit a formal 
application with the SEC with the understanding that they may compete for order flow with the 
primary exchange, but would not be party to the benefit of listing fees.172  
By exercising UTP, the PHLX was able to list every stock that was traded on the NYSE and 
the AMEX in the 1980s. For example, the primary listing for IBM was in New York on the 
NYSE, but UTP allowed the PHLX to offer trading on IBM in Philadelphia as well. When asked 
how this was possible, a former PHLX department head commented: 
  
With the use of technology. We built, through telecommunications, 
connectivity with the member firms around the country into their data centres. 
So we were one of the first exchanges to do that and you were able to reach our 
floor via the PACE system and send your order down there which made it more 
efficient, more cost effective, and, back then, what we called speedy executions 
of 20 seconds, 30 seconds (Interview 6).  
 
The development of the PACE system and UTP legislation allowed the Philadelphia exchange to 
draw order flow away from the primary exchanges (NYSE and AMEX) and attract a clientele 
through the low fees and the quick, guaranteed executions that PACE offered:  
 
It’s like any other story in any other industry. [The NYSE and AMEX] were 
the biggest - they really felt like they didn’t have to do anything to keep their 
market share. So we were quicker and faster. They were like the big ocean liner 
and we were like the speed boat (Interview 6).  
																																																						
171 “It is during these few weeks…that expectations are set about the competitiveness of the various markets for that 
security’s trading, and will thus influence where orders for that security will be traded in the future” (Ketchum 
Congressional Testimony, supra note 26).		
172 Examples of listing fees include one-time application fees and recurrent fees - such as an annual sustaining fee - 
that the exchange would charge a corporation to list stock.  
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As PHLX also owned its own depository and clearing corporations, the exchange had all of the 
services required to trade ‘in-house’, enabling them to offer competitive pricing even against the 
much larger NYSE. While PHLX was not privy to receiving listing fees on the stocks they traded 
using UTP, they were receiving fees from the use of their infrastructure and attracting a large 
clientele that were vocal throughout the development of many of PHLX’s proprietary products. 
These proprietary products allowed the PHLX to become a primary market for options and 
index-based products, eventually leading to the creation of the first ETF product called the Cash 
Index Participation Unit (CIP) im 1989. 
 
Niche innovation  
	
  As discussed previously, index-based strategies in the options and futures markets were 
growing exponentially in the 1980s as technological capabilities enhanced the speed at which 
traders could access the market and conduct program trades. The popularity of index strategies 
combined with the growing community choosing to trade at the PHLX over larger exchanges 
created a unique environment at the Exchange that fostered innovation:  
 
We were housed in a building where you had people from all walks of life that 
came to a trading floor to commit capital to the markets on a daily basis in a 
multitude of different products. It was a splendid place for the incubation of 
ideas…If you were paying attention to your members, it was easy to pick up 
ideas (Interview 6).  
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, listed options were traded as monopoly products on the US exchanges: 
that is, there existed an allocation system that each exchange had to abide by. As the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange (CBOE) was the largest options exchange in the country, it often was 
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able to select the most popular stocks to place their options on. As a former PHLX executive 
explains:  
Everyone picked their own [options] like a football draft. But obviously the 
CBOE had the advanced darts so they picked all the good ones - their market 
share stemmed from their monopoly trading of all the big names like IBM, 
General Motors, and Exxon… (Interview 13).  
 
As the PHLX could not compete with the big names being traded on other options exchanges 
such as the CBOE, it became imperative to differentiate itself through niche offerings. The 
PHLX team was paying close attention to the increased volumes relating to index options and 
strategies relying on index-based trading. While options on broad market indices such as the 
S&P 500 were incredibly popular, the market was lacking more specific indices that would allow 
investors to express their outlook on particular sectors. In response to the popularity of broad 
indexing and the increasingly visible inability to target specific areas of the market through 
indices, PHLX began offering options on up-and-coming stocks and used these options to 
develop custom indices. These indices were often called sub-indices for they represented a 
specific sector of a larger industry. For example, the PHLX created the semiconductor index 
(ticker symbol: SOX), which was a subsector of the technology industry, and custom sub-indices 
on utilities stocks (ticker symbol: UTY) and gold and silver mining stocks (ticker symbol: 
XAU). These niche products filled a previously neglected area of index-related trading by 
allowing investors to gain exposure to sub-sectors of the larger market:  
 
People wanted to get exposure. There was an obvious interest there. You could 
hedge it; you could get exposure to an industry in a much more efficient 
way…We believed in it so we supplied it and hoped there would be a demand. 
(Interview 6).  
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Creating a custom index also required the development of new technological infrastructure 
which would enable the rapid compilation of last-sale prices that comprised the index. Computer 
programs at the PHLX would be run constantly in order to calculate their indies and disseminate 
their quotes and last-sale information as a data feed to the Options Price Recording Authority 
(OPRA). As broad-based indices were licensed by the DOW and S&P and their data fed to the 
Consolidated Tape for dissemination to the public, PHLX’s narrow-based indices were licensed 
and data fed through to the OPRA for dissemination to the options trading community.  
The new index options - named SECTORs - were a resounding success as volumes steadily 
grew into the late 1980s and investors began looking to the PHLX indices as benchmarks of 
industry performance.173 The advent of SECTORs raised the PHLX’s status in the international 
community once again and enabled the creation of another options product that was the first of 
its kind in the United States. Foreign currency options (FCOs) were successfully launched on the 
PHLX after having to apply for Congressional approval in the 1980s.174 Like SECTORs, PHLX 
was able to use FCOs to further legitimate itself as a niche product innovator and grow its 
reputation on the international stage. The launch of FCOs at the PHLX allowed the exchange to 
gain a monopoly over all listed foreign currencies and currency in the 1980s and expand beyond 
their geographical borders with the use of technological infrastructure: 
International banks and corporations were able to access our trading floor to 
hedge their multi-currency risk and they did that either telephonically through 
floor brokers or by putting people on the trading floor…We had an office in 
London and in Tokyo that would market and educate in those parts of the 
world (Interview 6).  
																																																						
173 Most of the PHLX SECTORs indices are still in use today as industry benchmarks.  
174 U.S. Congress passed the Futures Trading Act of 1986 (Pub. L. No. 99-641) that discussed foreign currency 
instruments under Title I (sections 2, 3, and 4). While Congress extended foreign currency option rulemaking to the 
CFTC, Congress was involved through floor debate and various committee reports (132 Congress Rec. 13,587-87; 
H. Rep. No. 624, 99th Cong., 2nd session.) These documents have been reprinted in the U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News 6005, 6060-62 (1986). Refer to Glisson (1987) for an exceptional review of the legislative history of foreign 
currency derivatives trading in the United States.  
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The success of the PHLX’s proprietary products, made possible through regulatory legislation 
such as UTP and technological infrastructure such as the PACE system, “created a lot of buzz 
and created the competitive juices to create new products such as the first ETF, which some 
consider the Cash Index Participations, CIPs, to be” (Interview 13). 
 
Cash Index Participation Units (CIPs)  
	
The inspiration for CIPs originated in 1985 when exchange executives began noticing the 
problems their members were encountering when trying to hedge PHLX’s SECTOR index 
options. As PHLX was one of the leading national options exchanges in the United States, staff 
members were attentive to the needs of their members when it came to hedging: just as with 
portfolio insurance, traders that buy or sell in the futures and options markets will also protect 
(hedge) themselves from downside loss by making offsetting trades in the stocks that underlie 
the futures or options. For example, if an individual was trading options on IBM, they would also 
be trading the underlying IBM stock in order to hedge themselves against unexpected 
fluctuations in its valuation. While hedging is not problematic when trading individual stock 
options, it becomes much more complicated when entire indices are involved. Especially, PHLX 
executives noted, when the indices were made up of smaller, less liquid stocks such as the ones 
that comprised their SECTORs index options:   
 
How do you hedge SECTOR index options? If you’re a market maker or 
specialist you can obviously buy the underlying stocks. But oh my god, that’s 
so inefficient and you’re scrambling around. So we needed to create an 
underlying for an index option. We thought, ‘there has to be some sort of 
instrument that could trade simply, like a stock’ (Interview 13).  
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Of course, mutual funds that replicated indices had been around since the 1970s and would 
enable a trader to hedge against index options. The PHLX executives could simply construct a 
mutual fund that tracked their custom indices to provide their SECTORs options a hedge.  
However, the crisis in 1987 demonstrated the dangers of being invested in instruments such as 
mutual funds that could not be traded throughout the day.175 As a product developer at the PHLX 
recounts:  
 
What if I was an investor and I woke up with a bad feeling on the morning of 
October 19? If I have a mutual fund, I have to wait all day and redeem at the 
end of day and lose 22.5%. And why get out with a 22.5% loss? That’s my life 
savings. We witnessed people’s retirement savings get wiped out in one trading 
day. That’s what the market crash of ’87 pointed out - people were trapped 
with their mutual funds. (Interview 13).  
 
As early as 1985, the PHLX team noted how their clients were missing an efficient way to 
hedge the SECTOR index options and discussions began about how to create a product that 
could give investors access to the underlying stocks in the indices. The crisis in 1987 reignited 
more urgent discussions at the PHLX over how to provide a more efficient and liquid hedge for 
institutional traders while also providing an investment product that was safer than mutual 
funds176 for the average individual. As a result of discussions within the board of the PHLX and 
with the PHLX members, the PHLX team realized that the market was missing a critical product: 
a product that would allow access to a basket of stocks, like a mutual fund, but could be traded 
easily throughout the day, like a stock.  
																																																						
175 Mutual funds are priced at the close of market every day, meaning that all buy and sell orders occur once daily at 
market close. Thus, a mutual fund is an instrument meant for long-term investment - not intraday trading - as 
investors are unable to buy and sell continuously throughout the day. For a more detailed discussion on the variances 
between mutual funds and ETFs, refer to Chapter Eight.  
176 ‘Safe’, in this sense, refers to the ability of investors to easily enter and exit their positions in the product.  
	 138	
The solution, for PHLX, lied in a product they called Cash Index Participation Units (CIPs). 
CIPs were developed in order to mimic all aspects of holding a portfolio of stocks: one CIP unit 
would act as a basket to hold a variety of securities, giving investors exposure to hundreds of 
stocks (and their imputed dividends177) with a single purchase. CIPs were unique in that they 
could be traded intraday just like a stock, erasing the risk that existed in mutual funds of 
becoming ‘trapped’. Moreover, gaining exposure to an entire index with one purchase benefitted 
institutional traders that were looking for more efficient ways in which hedge index options in 
the stock market.   
However, the CIPs basket did not contain physical stocks because the PHLX team did not 
want to struggle with purchasing the underlying components of the index, holding the stocks, and 
then converting the stocks into tradeable CIP units. Instead, the CIP product used futures to 
replicate the movements of physical stocks:  
 
When you say, ‘we had a market sell off and we’re down 20 on the S&P’, it’s a 
number and people are fixated on trading this number up or down. Our CIP 
product is based on the number. Ultimately, you don’t need real stocks to 
underlie it (Interview 13).  
 
By having imputed dividends calculated alongside the index valuation, investors holding CIPs 
would achieve the exact same result with CIPs as they would if they took the time to buy and sell 
each underlying stock individually.178  
																																																						
177 Investors in CIPs would receive dividends proportional to the dividends that would accrue if they were holding 
the phsyical stocks in the index. The dividend was paid by those with a short interest in the CIP, who had to provide 
150% initial margin to guarantee their payments. Refer to (Shiller 1993) for further details on the CIP construction.  
178 CIPs have a zero net supply, meaning that for every long position there exists an offsetting short. While CIP 
owners may tender their contract for cash daily at 99.5% of the equivalent cash-index value, they may also cash out 
at 100% of the cash-index value on the four yearly dates that correspond with the futures and options expiration 
cycle (the third Fridays of March, June, September, and December). On these dates, every CIP unit will be cashed 
out for 1/10th the value of the underlying index. For an example of the relationship between CIPs and their 
underlying index pricing in equilibrium, refer to Kupiec (1990, 181-183).  
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As the first portfolio-in-a-share product in the US, the PHLX entered into multi-year 
negotiations with the SEC and Federal Reserve as to how CIPs should be defined and treated: 
 
Think about it. You have a clean piece of paper. What is this product? It’s 
neither fish nor foul. It’s neither derivative or underlying. It’s not stock or 
options. It’s something in the middle…everything was brand new (Interview 
13).  
 
The main goal of the PHLX team was to have the CIPs treated identically to stocks, meaning 
that the product had to receive the same margin treatment, trading rules, and exchange reporting 
requirements as stocks179 even though the CIP would be issued by the Options Clearing 
Corporation - the industry standard in the issuance and guarantee of standardized options in the 
United States.180 Moreover, the PHLX had to obtain licenses from the owners of the S&P 500 
and Dow Jones indices, as they were the most popular indices in the United States and would be 
the indices that the first CIP products would track.181 Problematically, however, Standard & 
Poor’s had already granted exclusive licenses to the CBOE for their S&P 500 index option 
product and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange for their S&P 500 index future contract. After 
threatening to sue the CIPs’ developers, Standard and Poor’s underwent a series of negotiations 
with the PHLX, asking the PHLX counsel to demonstrate how their product would be tangibly 
different from both an index option and index future (Interviews 1, 13, 27, 6). Unlike index 
options, the CIPs would have an expirationless contract, and unlike index futures, the CIPs were 
																																																						
179 The PHLX team had to meet with the Federal Reserve as it was the body that controlled margin treatment of 
investment products. CIPs developers were able to convince regulators that CIPs behaved identical to a stock, 
securing the 50% margin treatment typically afforded to stocks. A 50% margin treatment means that if an investor 
purchases $100 worth of CIPs, they are eligible to borrow an additional $50 for investment.  
180 “We based the CIP on the fact that we would use the OCC as issuer and guarantor. That was innovative too, 
because it went beyond the OCC’s comfort zone in listed options and brought them into a new product area” 
(Interview 13).  
181 PHLX developers agreed that the best strategy would be to launch CIPs on the most widely recognized index in 
the U.S., the S&P 500. Once this product was launched, developers hoped to have CIPs on sub-indices to hedge 
their SECTORs products. 
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structured to be traded like a stock and would be regulated as a stock by the SEC. After being 
satisfied that the CIP was an instrument “totally and completely unique” (Interview 15) to 
anything that existed on the market, the S&P granted the PHLX a license for the use of the S&P 
500 index on July 21, 1988.182  
The CIP is significant to the history of the ETF for two primary reasons. First, CIPs were the 
first formally defined and marketed product to emerge from the variety of program trading and 
derivative strategies in use in the stock market. While portfolio insurance was also a product that 
developed from program trading strategies, CIPs were the first publicly available product 
marketed to the average investor and institutional trader alike.183 Moreover, the emergence of 
CIPs was the first portfolio-in-a-share product. As many in the industry have recognized, CIPs 
were “the first shot across the bow” (Interview 1) towards public acceptance of basket products 
and the proliferation of such products around the world.  
Second, the approval of CIPs is significant for it was the first time that the SEC was required 
to formally define what, exactly, an exchange-traded product was. Prior to 1987, the SEC did not 
define basket and program trading as products, but as activities: program trading helped to 
constitute the markets through its various incarnations and could not easily be disentangled from 
the broader market activity as a concrete artefact. While program trading was a term 
encompassing a variety of market activities, CIPs separated itself from broader market activities 
in order to develop a specific rule-set that became marketable to the investment community. As 
CIPs was the first of its kind, the SEC, Federal Reserve, and product innovators at the PHLX 
																																																						
182 Refer to correspondence between Kurt D. Steele, Senior VP of Standard and Poor’s, and William Uchimoto, VP 
of PHLX dated July 21, 1988 (documents provided by interviewee).  
183 The shift in marketing basket instruments from institutional clients to the average retail investor will be discussed 
in Chapters Seven and Eight.  
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spent several years constructing new rule-books and negotiating the qualities of the product 
itself. As a former PHLX counsel explains:  
There are a number of standards under Section 6 of The Exchange Act in 1934, 
which is the governing statute of the SEC, to review rule change filings by self-
regulatory organizations like the PHLX. We had to help the SEC justify that all 
their rules were met in our filings (Interview 13).  
 
As a result of lengthy deliberations that began as early as 1986, the SEC granted the PHLX 
approval to list two CIP products in March of 1988 - a CIP that tracked the S&P 500 constituents 
(ticker symbol: SNP), and a CIP that tracked the Dow constituents (ticker symbol: BIG).184 In 
1989, the PHLX CIPs - the first publicly available ‘portfolio in a share’ products - were launched 
on PHLX. Interestingly, within 24 hours of PHLX filing the initial product application, the 
AMEX filed an identical application, changing the product name from CIP to EIP (Equity Index 
Participation).185 Under examination, the EIP application was identical to the CIP application, 
right down to a typo in the original CIP paperwork. Once PHLX developers realized what had 
happened, PHLX attorneys scrambled to place a copyright on the CIPs. The SEC attorneys, 
however, refused to allow the copyright request as they deemed it to be anticompetitive 
behaviour. After heated deliberation with the SEC, the PHLX legal team was “hosed down” and 
told to “knock it off” (Interviews 13, 1).  
Two explanations have been given that account for the rapid transmission of the product 
concept from PHLX to AMEX: first, any applications with the SEC are immediately made 
public through the Federal Register and unable to be copyrighted by the innovating exchange; 
second, there was a story that an assistant at the PHLX mistakenly faxed the CIPs application to 
																																																						
184 At the time, Dow Jones was not licensing its index. Thus, the PHLX created the “Blue Chip CIP index” as a 
stand-in.  
185 The AMEX EIPs were based on the S&P 500 index and the AMEX Major Market Index. While they never 
launched, the Chicago Board Options Exchange applied for an identical product referred to as VIPs (Value of Index 
Participations) that replicated the S&P 100, S&P 500, CBOE 50, and CBOE 250 indices.  
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the AMEX instead of the SEC (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 2003, 33). In any case, 




The process to bring the CIPs to market took a series of negotiations between the PHLX and 
the SEC regarding terms and definitions.186 Perhaps most notably, the legislation of IPs came to 
represent the first time that basket products were formally defined in regulatory literature: 
 
An IP is a present interest in the current value of a portfolio of stocks, is of 
indefinite duration, and entitles holders to receive cash payments equivalent to 
a proportionate share of any regular cash dividends paid on the component 
stocks in the underlying stock portfolio” (SEC Annual Report 1989, 43-44).187 
 
To provide an example of rule construction: the exchanges applying to list IPs (CIPs, EIPs, and 
VIPs) all petitioned the SEC to permit two special rules for their basket products. The first rule 
permitting the exchange to execute orders of basket products based on size-precedence and not 
the traditional time precedence, and the other permitting the short sale of IP baskets on a 
downtick, freeing them from the traditional ‘uptick’ rule in options trading.188 In all cases, the 
products were required to demonstrate how they would contribute to the recovery and 
functioning of markets by mitigating the need for high leverage whilst remaining largely immune 
to liquidity crunches (Ruder 1989). Again, as the products were backed by much more liquid 
																																																						
186 AMEX filed rule changes with the SEC regarding the listing of IPS products under SR-Amex-88-10; 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange filed rule changes with SEC under SR-PHLX 87-07; Chicago Board Options 
Exchanged filed rule changes under SR-CBOE-88-09.  While all the IPs (EIPs, CIPs, and VIPs) are similar in 
structure, Kupiec (1990) provides an analysis of the subtle structural variations that did exist.  
187 See also: Securities Exchange Act Release No. 26709 (26 May 1989), and Kupiec (1990, table one) for full 
outline of characteristics.	
188 The uptick rule was implemented in 1938 and is governed under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Rule 10a-
1). The rule states that short sales are only allowed to be filled on an uptick.  
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futures, not physical stocks, investors could easily enter and exit their positions in CIPs. More so, 
as CIPs were traded on a stock exchange and not a futures exchange, the average investor would 
for the first time have affordable access to large market segments without the commitment of a 
mutual fund.  
 
Regulatory conflict and the CIPs delisting  
	
While the idea for a basket-style index product was being vetted by the PHLX as early as 
1985, the market crisis in 1987 provided an impetus for further development that - when 
combined with the regulatory prompting for new and efficient product concepts - made the Index 
Participation Unit more palatable than before. However, the regulatory bodies did not have rules 
for how to regulate such a product, resulting in multiple letters being exchanged between CFTC 
and SEC executives as to whether the basket products were securities (subject to SEC 
regulation), or futures (subject to CFTC regulation).189 Moreover, objections by the Investment 
Company Institute were raised as to whether CIPs should be considered an investment company 
- like mutual funds - or not.190 Specifically, the ICI official statement was that “…the ICI does 
not object to IPs but argues that either IPs or the Investment Company Act of 1940 will need to 
be changed before IPS can be legally traded” (ICI quoted in Kupiec 1990, 184), and the CFTC 
argued that “similar to a futures contract, an IP is a contract that provides for the delivery (or 
																																																						
189 See: Securities Exchange Act Release No. 26709 (11 April 1989); letter from Jean A. Webb, Secretary, CFTC to 
Jonathan G. Katz, secretary, SEC (29 April 1988).  
190 The Investment Company Institute argued that basket products should be considered an investment company in a 
letter from Matthew Fink, General Counsel of ICI, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (19 December 1988). Also 
refer to: ICI v. SEC, No. 89-3315 (15 May 1989). Investment companies are subject to different regulations than 
securities (see Chapter Six).  
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cash value) of some underlying instrument at a future date” (CFTC quoted in Kupiec 1990, 184), 
making the products inappropriate for a securities exchange.  
To reiterate, in 1989 the CFTC retained its jurisdiction over futures and options on 
commodities, futures on securities indexes, and options on futures indexes, while the SEC held 
jurisdiction over securities and options on securities. Because the CFTC retained their exclusive 
jurisdiction over commodities, where commodities were defined as any “…services, interests, or 
rights connected to the future delivery of goods” (CEA Section 201; Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission Act of 1974, No. 93-463), the PHLX was required to meet the approval of the 
CFTC as the CIPs were backed by futures.191 The PHLX did not do this. As a result, the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange and Investment Company Institute sued the SEC to prohibit the securities 
exchanges to issue, trade, and clear the CIPs’ basket fund structure, stating that basket shares 
were futures contracts and could not be traded on securities exchanges before meeting CFTC 
approval (Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC; 883F.2d 537, 7th Cir. 1989). Regulatory 
relations ultimately deteriorated:  
 
There was no dialogue between the SEC and CFTC. The CFTC and the futures 
exchanges simply sued the SEC for approving a futures contract (Interview 
14).  
 
In addition, large mutual fund companies such as Vanguard and Fidelity filed amicus to the 
lawsuit alongside the major U.S. futures exchanges. The then-president of the PHLX, Nicholas 
Giordano, summarized his frustrations with being caught in the middle of a regulatory turf-war 
in a public statement: “the CFTC should stick to what it is good at…like regulating pork bellies” 
(Giordano 1990).  
																																																						
191 As discussed, the short position of the CIPs was not backed by physical assets such as stocks, leading to the 
CFTC challenge that CIPs should be regulated as a futures contract.  
	 145	
The United States Courts of Appeals found that basket products were indeed within SEC’s 
definition of a security, though ultimately deferred to the CFTC’s argument that these products 
were also futures and ought to be under the jurisdiction of the CFTC’s Commodity Exchange 
Act (SEC Annual Report 1989, 69-70). After a failed appeals attempt, the courts concluded that 
the SEC “…had no jurisdictional basis to approve the trading of IP contracts on a national 
securities exchange” (SEC 1989 Annual Report, 44), and the products were liquidated by the 
SEC in 1989. As the former PHLX executives recount:  
 
I was there at the 7th Circuit192 when the SEC was sued by the CFTC and the 
board of trade at the Mercantile Exchange. It was just horrible…We got an 
arrow in our back (Interview 13);  
 
  The SEC did a horrible job at defending its turf” (Interview 6).  
 
Even though the futures exchanges won their arguments, most refused to list the CIPs as they did 
not want any competition that would overshadow their proprietary products: 
 
They didn’t want to see any ETF come to market. They saw us [the PHLX] as a 
threat…and they were right! (Interview 6). 
 
While the CFTC approached the PHLX executives with an offer to list the CIPs as a future, the 
PHLX refused as they believed that the CIPs were best suited to stock markets and the average 
mutual fund investor (Interviews 1, 14). To list CIPs in the futures market would defeat the 
original purpose of creating a stock-exchange product and would not serve the originally 
intended audience.  
 
																																																						
192 The 7th Circuit refers to the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, a Federal court overseeing the 




Despite the short lived success of the IPs, their development marks an important contribution 
to the qualification history of the ETF. First, the regulatory response to the 1987 market break 
was successful in promoting the development of CIPs, whose purpose was to enhance market 
liquidity and offer average investors alternatives to mutual funds. Second, and perhaps most 
importantly, the legislation of CIPs represents the first time that basket trading was formally 
defined in regulatory literature. Prior to IPs being listed, SEC regulators often referred to basket 
trading as a broad strategy within institutional program trading, refusing to define a particular 
structure for baskets while at the same time encouraging innovations relating to the basket 
concept. IPs represented the first time that regulators were forced to detangle one particular 
instantiation of basket trading from a variety of institutional practices to bring it into the formal 
regulatory structure (Callon 2006). In defining CIPs, regulators aided in attributing particular 
characteristics to the product that influenced the permissible structure and beneficial qualities of 
other index products moving forward.  
Interestingly, the first ETF attempt arose not out of an environment characterized by 
regulator-innovator conflict, but from regulator-regulator conflict - notably, the damaging SEC-
CFTC conflict that erupted throughout the 1980s. The SEC-CFTC conflict embodies the cat-and-
mouse imagery of the literature about regulatory capture, albeit with an important distinction. 
Instead of innovators attempting to capitalize on unintended side effects of policy and 
outmanoeuvre regulators, regulators were attempting to outmanoeuvre one another. This left the 
innovators of hybrid products - products such as the CIP that were structured using devices from 
both SEC and CFTC jurisdictions - at the mercy of the courts as the SEC and CFTC routinely 
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attempted to halt any competition between their respective markets and gain territory over one 
another. 
The element that sustained conflict between regulators was also the element that enabled a 
collaborative relationship between the SEC and PHLX. As discussed previously in this chapter, 
basket and program trading encompassed a wide range of activities, none of which were 
concretely defined or regulated, due to both regulatory misunderstanding and the fast pace at 
which these strategies originated and transformed. The lack of clear definitions over emerging 
strategies created ambiguity over the effects and role of such strategies. Lack of clear 
jurisdictional authority of both the SEC and CFTC further ignited tensions between regulators as 
each attempted to control and expand their respective markets. It was these tensions that further 
encouraged the SEC and innovators to work closely with one another to develop products that 
would fit within the SEC jurisdiction.  
The preliminary encouragement of basket products by the SEC in 1987 and sustained 
guidance from the SEC to CIPs product developers assisted the PHLX in creating the first 
formally defined basket product. However, the social and material infrastructure required for 
collaboration between innovators and regulators began developing as far back as the 1970s when 
both innovators and regulators began incorporating technology into their organizational 
structures. The socio-technical fusion of market participants and technological devices oriented 
both regulators and innovators towards exploiting the desirable characteristics that socio-
technical agencement made possible: enhancements to liquidity, greater efficiency, and lower 
fees were some of the most popularly discussed characteristics, and as discussed in Chapter Four, 
many were legislated into the 1975 market reforms. The market crash in 1987 brought about 
suggestive rhetoric by the SEC leadership, who released numerous statements speaking about the 
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lines of experimentation the agency would encourage moving forward. Again, the product 
characteristics the SEC heralded as a solution to the 1987 crisis echoed the characteristics that 
socio-technical agencements made possible in the decade prior. As a result, basket products 
began being developed across numerous exchanges of which came the first ETF product, the 
PHLX CIPs.  
Simultaneously, the sustained conflict over the jurisdiction of hybrid financial strategies 
further encouraged the SEC to collaborate with innovators to develop formal products that would 
fit within their regulatory framework. The SEC was able to develop a strong collaborative 
relationship with product innovators working to develop stock and options offerings, going as far 
as issuing a public release in support of the development of the PHLX CIPs. As two former 
product developers attest:  
 
It was a more collaborative relationship [between the SEC and basket product 
innovators]…there were many positive comments by regulators and some 
positive work by everyone to make a better product that would benefit the 
investors as well as liquidity providers (Interview 31); 
 
  …the key regulators were skeptical yet helpful (Interview 7).   
 
Skepticism from the SEC came from its primary purpose, which was to protect investors and 
assist in fostering a safe and transparent market environment (Smythe interview 2011). The 
aftermath of the 1987 crisis reaffirmed the necessity of thoroughly reviewing applications, 
meaning most misunderstandings between basket product innovators and the SEC were resolved 
through hearings in front of the SEC Commissioners so all divisions could participate (Interview 
7).  
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This collaborative relationship was able to assist the developers of index participation 
products in getting informal regulatory guidance throughout the development process, which 
contributed to the structuring of the first ETF-style product:  
 
Regulators tried to make investing in these products more like common stocks. 
Originally, the regulators were very keen…for the products to provide 
diversification and liquidity.  (Interview 31). 
 
The informal regulatory guidance provided by the SEC assisted in attributing qualities to CIPs, 
demonstrating an integrated regulator-innovator purpose: both parties placed investor protection 
and market stability (through enhanced liquidity and efficiency) as their primary inspirations for 




The PHLX found success with niche products such as their SECTORs and found a way to 
extend such offerings while also providing a desired product that was not available in both the 
institutional and retail markets. The failure of the CIPs project was caused by a breakdown in 
relations between regulators: while the SEC ultimately failed to protect the CIPs innovation, the 
relationship it developed with the PHLX set an important precedent for the next round of 
pioneers, the TIPs and SuperTrust developers, who both referenced the PHLX and SEC 
precedents in their product applications.193 
As discussed, the market shift in 1975 saw the SEC become a facilitator to particular forms 
of technological innovation and experimentation in the financial markets. With a renewed focus 
																																																						
193 The TIPs and SuperTrust will be discussed in Chapters Six and Seven.  
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on stabilizing markets after October 19, 1987, the SEC encouraged basket products that would 
enhance the liquidity, efficiency, and transparency of markets using technological solutions. As a 
result, basket trading was first promoted by the SEC as a means to add liquidity to markets in the 
wake of the 1987 crash, though no formal definitions at the time existed. In 1989, Index 
Participation Units were launched by the PHLX (alongside similar products from the AMEX and 
the CBOE) and were approved by the SEC as products that embodied post-1987 objectives: CIPs 
were basket products that were developed in a manner that would encourage liquidity, rely on 
technical advancements in trading technology, and enhance the efficiency of trading for large 
institutional investors. As a result, the first formal definition of what a basket product constituted 
and its rules of trade were drafted into legislation,194 concretely defining a basket product for the 
first time in history and demonstrating how regulators were important mediators between socio-















194 Refer to rule changes PHLX filed with the SEC (SR-PHLX 87-07). 
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Chapter Six 
Don’t put all your eggs in one basket 
 
Chapter Six will examine the role that financial theory and regulation played in the 
construction of early ETF products such as Leland O’Brien and Rubinstein’s SuperTrust. This 
chapter will begin with an overview of relevant financial theories. Next, an analysis of the 
epistemic shift that occurred amongst financial practitioners will be analysed as this shift 
transitioned portfolio construction strategies from traditional stock picking to index-based 
investing. The role of theory will be analysed for its role in influencing the way in which market 
participants though about, spoke about, and participated in the markets. Following this analysis, 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 will be briefly summarized as it relates to ETF legislation. 
This chapter will conclude with a case study on the SuperTrust product. The SuperTrust 
represents an important moment in ETF history for two reasons: first, the product was adopted 
directly from the financial theory of decades prior, even quoting theory as a precedent in its 
applications, and second, the SuperTrust the first exchange-traded product to receive exemptions 
from the 1940 Act regulations. As these exemptions form the basis of ETF legitimacy in the 
markets today, the negotiation process will be examined as a form of regulatory agencement. 
Interestingly, a key part of the negotiation process between innovators and regulators came down 
to attributes of financial theory and how theoretical constructs may be used to act in the best 
interest of investors.  
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Transitioning theory to practice  
	
The purpose of this section is to describe how the active-to-passive shift in the financial 
markets occurred and the effects this shift had on the market environment. First, an overview of 
‘active’ and ‘passive’ investment strategies will be provided. Second, prominent financial 
theories on portfolio construction will be analysed in order to understand the extent to which 
they inspired market participants to change their investment strategies from active stock selection 
to passive index investment. Third, examples of the real-world changes inspired by these theories 
will be analysed as they relate to early ETF development. Specifically, the market environment 
that emerged from the active-to-passive shift will be addressed as an environment that made 
landmark ETF developments such as the SuperTrust possible. 
 
Active and passive portfolio construction   
	
While there are innumerable investment strategies one can employ to construct a portfolio, 
all may be categorized within the general boundaries of active or passive management. Active 
management, generally speaking, refers to the act of individual stock picking with the goal of 
beating the market return. If, for example, the market returns 1% on any given month, an active 
investor would attempt to construct a portfolio that will beat those returns by selecting stocks 
using either technical analysis, fundamental research, or a variety of other methods. If the market 
falls by 3%, an active investor may rebalance the mix of assets in their portfolio in aims of losing 
less than the market. In short, active investors argue that it is possible to achieve consistent 
above-market returns by utilising a variety of stock picking methods. This often involves 
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repeated buying and selling within the portfolio to achieve above market returns, behaviour often 
referred to as a ‘high friction’ strategy due to the constant repositioning of assets within the 
portfolio. As Roche defines it, active management is “…an asset allocation strategy with high 
relative frictions that attempts to ‘beat the market’ return on a risk adjusted basis” (2016, 10).  
The early mutual fund industry in the US is an excellent example of how active investment 
strategies are used in portfolio construction. Mutual funds, like ETFs, are basket instruments: 
purchasing one share of a mutual fund gives an investor representative access to all the assets the 
mutual fund invests in. A mutual fund is headed by a portfolio manager who employs a team to 
assist them in determining the best assets to add to the fund’s portfolio based on the fund’s goals. 
Most early mutual funds in the United States were based on ‘value’, ‘growth’, or a mix of value 
and growth strategies to achieve above market returns for their investors. For example, a fund 
that focuses on value investing will attempt to buy stocks ‘on sale’. In other words, managers 
will purchase stocks whose intrinsic worth (in their estimation) is more than their prevailing 
market price and sell them once they reach or surpass their intrinsic valuation. By buying and 
selling stocks based on their intrinsic values, value-based mutual fund managers attempt to beat 
the overall market returns. Alternatively, growth mutual funds have portfolio managers who 
invest in companies with above-average growth potential. The analysis of growth stocks does not 
rely as heavily on a company’s intrinsic valuation, opting instead to focus on future growth 
prospects. 
Prior to the rise in passive investment strategies, money managers in the United States 
attracted investment by advertising their returns in comparison to the general market.195 By 
																																																						
195 The majority of asset managers compared their performance to a benchmark index such as the S&P 500 or the 
Dow. These indices are still used as representative indicators for the overall economic health and financial 
performance in the United States.  
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advertising their experience and skill, asset managers developed a prestige in the markets. As a 
former pension fund manager recalls:  
 
Traditional active managers…would talk about their instinct and insight and 
knowledge of the markets. They’d have great stories to tell at cocktail parties 
about this stock or that stock. Indexing wasn’t glamorous…it required an 
education sell. (Interview 5). 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, traditional approaches to financial study advocated that active 
investing was most always preferable. In fact, it was not until the 1960s and the development of 
the theories discussed below that passive investment strategies were offered as an alternative. In 
general, passive investment managers do not believe that it is possible to consistently beat the 
market or achieve sustainable market beating returns. The reasons behind this outlook are related 
to the efficient market hypothesis, which will be discussed later in this section. Put simply, 
passive managers believe that any opportunity to profit from a stock based on deviations from its 
intrinsic value is slim as most price fluctuations in the market are random. It is important to note 
that passive investors do not deny that active investing may be able to beat the market in the 
short term; the passive thesis claims that achieving above market returns is unsustainable over 
the long term. Thus, passive investment strategists construct portfolios that mirror the overall 
market so that individual stock picking is not required: passive investing is “an asset allocation 
strategy with low relative frictions that attempts to take the market return on a risk-adjusted 
basis” (Roche 2016, 10). Passive portfolio construction is most popularly achieved through 
indexing: that is, replicating an index within an investment portfolio.  
Passive strategies, then, are synonymous with index strategies, as passive strategies aim to 
mirror the market’s performance. Early index investing, as discussed in Chapter Four, was most 
often achieved by individually purchasing the constituents of either the S&P 500 or Dow Jones 
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indices, for these were thought to be best representatives of the overall US market. By recreating 
a major market index in one’s portfolio, an investor was able to participate in the movement of 
the market without taking on the issue-specific risk196 that active stock picking often entailed. As 
a result, indexing (passive investing) also became known as a ‘buy and hold’ strategy as it 
provided investors with a portfolio that mirrored the market so no short-term changes are 
needed.197  
It is important to note the theoretical critique of the active-passive conceptualization of 
investment strategies. Notably, critics argue that any deviation away from investing in every 
single asset in the global market would constitute an active investment strategy, as decisions 
would have to be made about which stocks to include and exclude.198 Thus, a portfolio that is 
comprised of the S&P 500 constituents would be considered active investing as it excludes many 
other available assets around the world. However, due to the practical limitations of achieving 
the ‘market portfolio’ in its totality, this chapter refers to any portfolio that seeks to mimic 
market returns as a passive strategy. In addition, rhetoric amongst interview participants chosen 
for this project supports the active-passive strategies as described above: portfolios that replicate 
indices were always referred to as passive strategies, while active strategies were referred to as 
stock-picking strategies. The practical rhetoric amongst market participants has also been used 
by theoreticians: Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968), who published comparative studies on the 
returns of active and passive portfolio strategies, both use a popular index as a substitute for ‘the 
market’ in its entirety, further emphasising the ‘index as passive’ understanding. Thus, in what 
																																																						
196 As discussed in Chapter Four, issue-specific risk is the risk that applies to individual companies. If a portfolio is 
weighted heavily in one stock, or only holds a few stocks, the issue-specific risk is high.  
197 Passive portfolios mirror the market return minus any trading fees and expenses.  
198 For theoretical critiques of passive management strategies, refer to Walden (2015). At the aggregate (global) 
level, the Global Financial Asset Portfolio (GFAP) is a benchmark used for a theoretically optimal diversified 
portfolio, weighted by each asset’s market capitalization. Refer to Roche (2016) for a theoretical discussion of the 
GFAP and Doeswijk et al (2014) for empirical work on the GFAP. 
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follows, the practical - not theoretical - representation of active and passive strategies will be 
discussed.  
 
Portfolio Selection Theory 
	
A portfolio refers to a group of financial assets that are owned by an individual or institution. 
Any type of financial asset may be in an investor’s portfolio: individual stocks and bonds, cash 
equivalents, mutual funds, ETFs, or derivative instruments such as options or futures. Portfolio 
selection, then, refers to the methods used to select the most suitable assets to construct a 
particular client’s portfolio. Portfolio selection, generally, encompasses both theoretical and 
empirical strategies and often involves concepts such as investor behaviour, attitudes towards 
risk, expected utility, risk and reward, and diversification.  
Harry Markowitz developed his original portfolio selection theory in 1952.199 Markowitz’s 
theory focused primarily on concepts of risk, reward, diversification, and the relationship 
between various securities within a portfolio. Whereas the majority of ‘pre-Markowitz’ research 
on portfolio selection argued that diversification could completely eliminate risk within an 
investor’s portfolio,200 Markowitz was able to statistically demonstrate that while risk could 
certainly be reduced through proper diversification without changing expected returns, it could 
never be eliminated entirely. As he states, “The returns from securities are too inter-correlated. 
																																																						
199 Refer to Markowitz (1959) for an expansion to his 1952 paper and Markowitz (1999) for a history of theoretical 
and empirical developments relating to his original portfolio selection model. As this project is largely historical, 
recent critiques and developments relating to portfolio selection models will not be discussed. Instead, discussion 
will centre around Markowitz’s early work.  
200 A prominent theorist of this time was John B. Williams: “…there is no risk in buying a bond if its price is right. 
Given adequate diversification, gains on such purchases will offset losses, and a return at the pure interest rate will 
be obtained. Thus the net risk turns out to be nil” (Williams 1938, 67-69). Theorists working on portfolio selection 
models prior to the 1950s often used theories of expected value and dividend discount models to derive theoretical 
stock values. For an example of these theories in use, refer to Williams (1938, 55-75).  
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Diversification cannot eliminate all variance” (Markowitz 1952, 79). In the following years, 
William Sharpe was able to echo Markowitz’s findings: “…diversification enables the investor 
to escape all but the risk resulting from swings in economic activity - this type of risk remains 
even in efficient combinations” (Sharpe 1964, 441). For example, even if excellent 
diversification is achieved within a portfolio - large and small stocks from various industries, 
corporate and government bonds, et cetera - these assets all remain susceptible to systematic risk 
that pervades the entirety of financial markets (also known as ‘market risk’, as opposed to 
unsystematic risk201): “…since all other types [of risk] can be avoided by diversification, only 
the responsiveness of an asset’s rate of return to the level of economic activity is relevant in 
assessing its risk” (Sharpe 1964, 441-442). Markowitz argued that as risk cannot be completely 
eliminated, the task then becomes a question of how to most efficiently allocate assets within a 
portfolio to manage risk exposure.  
Markowitz began his theory of portfolio selection by demonstrating how the mean, standard 
deviation, and correlation of various assets determines the way they ought to be allocated within 
a portfolio.202 Perhaps most notably, Markowitz’s portfolio selection theory was able to quantify 
how assets ought to be allocated within a portfolio by measuring the amount of risk203 an 
investor was willing to accept to achieve a particular return.204 In other words, Markowitz’s 
theory was able to formalize the trade-off that exists between risk and reward: “There is a rate at 
which the investor can gain expected return by taking on variance, or reduce variance by giving 
																																																						
201 Unsystematic risk - also known as diversifiable risk - is decreased through diversification of portfolio assets 
(McClure 2010).  
202 The mean and standard deviation of assets were used to plot the relative return and risk of various portfolios.  
203 Risk is synonymous with volatility in Markowitz (1952). The higher the risk, the greater the fluctuations in value 
of an asset. Correlation measures the degree of co-movement of asset returns. If the correlation of assets is zero, they 
have identical risk.   
204 Markowitz (1952) developed a method called called mean-variance optimization to quantify the trade-off 
between risk and reward as it relates to portfolio selection.     
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up expected return” (Markowitz 1952, 79). Simply stated, investors will only increase their risk 
if there is an expected increase in reward.205 For example, investing in an emerging corporate 
stock carries a higher risk than investing in an established Fortune 500 company for a multitude 
of factors. The reason one may invest in the asset that carries a risk premium is because there is a 
higher expectation of reward: the investor may reasonably expect to have their profits grow with 
the emerging company, whereas the less-risky Fortune 500 corporation offers stability but little 
opportunity for explosive growth. Similarly, other low risk assets - such as government bonds - 
are held with the understanding that rewards will be low: their relative safety is paid for with 
substantially lower expectations for profit.  
This understanding about the trade-off between risk and reward was modeled into the 
concept of the efficient frontier (Markowitz 1952; 1959), also known as Markowitz optimization. 
That is, if optimal diversification is achieved, there will exist a portfolio that provides the lowest 
possible level of risk for every level of desired return: “for any level of risk, the efficient frontier 
identifies a point that is the highest returning portfolio in its risk class. By the same token, for 
any level of return, the frontier identifies the lower risk portfolio in that return class” 
(Goetzmann 1996, Chapter Two). As there are infinite points along the frontier, there is an 
optimal portfolio for every investor depending on their risk preference. These optimal portfolios, 
Markowitz noted, were always diversified portfolios. This result led him to the claim that 
seeking maximum returns for investment is unstable and unsuitable for investors: 
“Diversification is both observed and sensible; a rule of behavior which does not imply the 
superiority of diversification must be rejected” (Markowitz 1952, 77).   
																																																						
205 It is important to stress that there is only the expectation of reward, as profit from investment is never guaranteed.  
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 The realization that focusing on the expected values of stocks only, as traditional theorists 
advocated, would lead to the conclusion that an investor ought to place all of their money in a 
stock with the highest expected return (Williams 1938). Clearly, this strategy was not occurring 
in financial markets, as the vast majority of investors preferred diversification. Even traditional 
theorists such as Williams (1938) who advocated the use of expected value constructed 
diversified portfolios. More so, the concept of diversification was also relied upon as a remedy 
for poor investment performance. For example, in a letter to investors during the great 
depression, investment managers of the Alexander Fund explained that diversification was the 
only solution to the poor performance of the market:  
 
Your manager has often told you that human judgment in the selection is not 
worth much, and after forty years in the market we still believe that, aside from 
government bonds and a few others of low yield, the great safety in investment 
lies in diversified securities…Default in the earning power of gilt-edged 
investments proves pretty conclusively that the average financial advisor is a 
myth (Public Examination of The Alexander Fund, 1 February 1933, quoted in 
Report of the SEC on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies Part III 
1939, 2488).  
 
Thus, Markowitz was able to conclude that “The hypothesis (or maxim) that the investor does (or 
should) maximize discounted return must be rejected” (1952, 77) in favour of diversification.  
What is noteworthy about Markowitz’s work on portfolio selection was that it was able to 
capture the intuitive preferences of investors and translate them into explicit, consistent language 
about portfolio selection. Intuitively, the idea that high risk investments had the potential to 
reward investors with large rewards and low risk investments were safe but not lucrative was not 
new. Prior to the 1950s, the studies on the financial markets often indirectly described 
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Markowitz’s risk-reward trade-off by describing the risk-aversion characteristics of investors.206 
For example, given two similar assets with different risk profiles, an investor will likely select 
the asset with the lower level of risk. The same holds true when combining multiple assets with 
varying levels of risk: “Prices will adjust so that assets which are more responsive to 
changes…will have higher expected returns than those which are less responsive. This accords 
with common sense” (Sharpe 1964, 440). By creating the efficient frontier, Markowitz was able 
to formalize this relationship between risk and reward and provide the foundations for investors 
to statistically determine the portfolio that will grant them their preferred expected return with 
the lowest risk possible. Markowitz’s original work in 1952, and expansion on that work in 1959, 
represented the first time in financial theory where investor preferences for risk and reward could 
be formalized, quantified, and translated into ideal portfolios.   
The concept of diversification is another intuitive preference that Markowitz was able to 
formalize through his portfolio selection theory. Common adages such as ‘don’t put all your eggs 
in one basket’ have alluded to the importance of diversification as a risk-reduction strategy long 
before theoreticians applied it to the problem of portfolio selection. Just like the risk to eggs in a 
basket, an investor’s assets, if isolated to one investment, risk catastrophic loss. Thus, the best 
way to protect an investor’s investment is by using various carriers such as stocks, bonds, or 
cash-like instruments. However, as Markowitz described, not all diversification is created equal: 
those constructing portfolios must use the “‘right kind’ of diversification for the ‘right reason’” 
(Markowitz 1952, 89).  
The ‘right kind’ of diversification, for Markowitz, does not refer to the number of assets 
within a portfolio: “It is not enough to invest in many securities. It is necessary to avoid investing 
																																																						
206 Carl Menger (1871) discussed how investor preferences are ordered; Dewing (1953) discussed the psychological, 
not economic, motives of behaviour in the financial markets.  
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in securities with high covariances207 among themselves” (Markowitz 1952, 89). Consider a 
portfolio composed of 100 assets: if all of the assets were telecommunication companies, there 
would be a high covariance as firms within the same or similar industries exhibit similar 
reactions to economic and non-economic events. However, if the 100 assets were allocated 
across various industries, a lower covariance would result. To provide a simplistic example, if an 
investor had a heavy weighting of U.S. dollars in their portfolio, the ‘right kind’ of 
diversification would be to add an investment with a low covariance to the USD, such as gold. 
As the price of gold typically climbs when the value of the USD falls,208 an investor holding both 
of these assets will likely have one asset that gains value while the other falls, efficiently 
lowering their total risk profile.  
To reiterate, Markowitz’s concept of diversification is not based solely on the number of 
assets held, but how the assets are allocated: “We should diversify across industries because 
firms in different industries, especially industries with different economic characteristics, have 
lower covariances than firms within an industry” (Markowitz 1952, 89). To provide another 
example: in periods of recession, the stock prices of luxury retailers often falls while the stock 
prices of entertainment companies - specifically, movie theatres - increases. Examples such as 
this are innumerable and, as the efficient frontier demonstrates, endlessly customizable 
depending on an investor’s preferred expected return. If a high return is sought, higher-risk 
securities will be properly diversified to eliminate the systematic risk. If a lower return is 
acceptable, lower-risk securities will be chosen so that their systematic risk is reduced as well.   
																																																						
207 Covariance measures the tendency of two or more variables to move in the same direction. Statistically, 
covariance is the product of the assets’ standard deviations and correlation coefficient.  
208 Investors typically sell dollars and buy gold as the value of the dollar drops. This demand for gold pushes its 
price upwards as the dollar falls.  
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Again, Markowitz’s portfolio selection theory was able to take the intuitive concept of 
diversification and apply it to the problem of asset allocation to explain why diversification was 
almost always preferred. That result was that diversification - if done properly - is able to 
increase portfolio returns without increasing risk. This concept of ‘proper diversification’ was 
quantified through the efficient frontier and formalized as a definitional term: financial 
researchers were, for the first time, able to empirically test the concept of diversification and 
systematically present its impact on various portfolios. The empirical research that focused on 
assessing Markowitz’s optimization of diversification209 assisted in normalizing the concept of 
diversification within the marketplace so that when asset allocators began to speak about 
constructing ‘well diversified’ portfolios, they were referring to a standardized, measurable 
approach. The model of efficient portfolio selection could be used by traders to determine 
correlations of securities to an index, maximizing expected returns for set variances of return 
instead of focusing on orthodox methods which emphasized expected value alone. The 
standardization of the meaning of diversification was expanded on by Sharpe (1964) and Fama 
(1960), which will be discussed next.  
  
Capital Asset Pricing Model  
	
William Sharpe was greatly influenced by Markowitz’s work on portfolio theory and 
received Markowitz’s advice throughout the development of his PhD dissertation (Sharpe 1961), 
which involved elements of the now-infamous Capital Asset Pricing Model. In 1990, Markowitz 
																																																						
209 Refer to Cohen and Pogue (1967), Mao (197), and Grubel (1968) for examples of empirical work on portfolio 
theory.  
	 163	
and Sharpe were awarded The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of 
Alfred Nobel (the Nobel Prize) alongside Merton Miller for their pioneering work on portfolio 
theory and financial economics.210 While this section will focus solely on Sharpe’s work, it is 
necessary to mention that asset pricing theory (and, specifically, the CAPM), was a result of 
many independently working theorists such as Jack Treynor (1962; 1965), Jan Mossin (1966), 
John Lintner (1965a; 1965b), and Fischer Black, Michael Jensen, and Myron Scholes (1972). 
However, as Sharpe’s CAPM has arguably achieved the broadest public reach and has been most 
widely credited as a direct inspiration for index developments,211 it is his work that will be the 
subject of focus in this project.  
Sharpe’s development of the CAPM was the first time that mathematical models were used 
to determine asset prices under conditions of risk. Mathematical formalization of the theory 
created an empirically testable approach212 that departed from the dominant theory of the time:213 
“Although many useful insights can be obtained from the traditional models of investment under 
conditions of certainty, the pervasive influence of risk in financial transactions has forced those 
working in this area to adopt models of price behavior which are little more than assertions” 
(Sharpe 1964, 425).  
The CAPM is an extension of Markowitz’s original portfolio selection theory (1952; 1959) 
and uses many of its original concepts in its derivations. For example, Sharpe identifies the 
																																																						
210 Refer to MacKenzie (2006) for a sociological perspective on the historical emergence of financial economics.  
211 Sharpe’s theory has been credited by several of this project’s interviewees as a source of inspiration for ETF 
development. This will be discussed later in this chapter.  
212 The empirical validity of the CAPM was not without problem. As Sharpe himself noted, his model’s assumptions 
are “…highly restrictive and undoubtedly unrealistic” (1964, 434). Despite the unrealistic assumptions regarding 
investor behaviour and rational expectations, Sharpe’s work was able to formalize the theoretically optimal rate of 
return of assets.  
213 Prior to the CAPM, research from Gordon and Gangolli (1962), Hicks (1962), and Tobin (1958) assessed 
attitudes towards risk, but not decision making under risk conditions. Refer to Sharpe (1964, 427-428) for 
discussion.  
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correlation between assets and their expected rate of return as one of the primary elements of 
portfolio selection: “…the effect of an asset on an investor’s over-all investment opportunity 
curve depends not only on its expected rate of return and risk, but also on its correlations with 
the other available opportunities” (Sharpe 1964, 431). Using the concept of correlation, Sharpe 
was able to construct what he called the capital market line. This line represents how an investor 
using proper diversification can only achieve higher expected returns by raising their risk profile 
(1964, 425).  
Sharpe mathematically validated the intuitive understanding that individuals who purchase 
low risk assets are willing to accept low returns, and those who acquire aggressive assets will 
only do so if there is a reasonable expectation of high rewards. Thus, echoing Markowitz’s 
theory of portfolio optimisation, the ideal portfolio for any risk level will fall along the capital 
market line. Formalizing the complexities involved in Markowitz’s analysis of the trade-off 
between risk and reward, Sharpe was able to develop a simple mathematical model called beta 
(β). Beta measures an asset’s volatility – that is, its sensitivity of returns to market fluctuations. 
The higher an asset’s beta, the higher the expected returns. For example, a beta of 1.0 represents 
all of the assets in the market - the ‘market portfolio’. If an asset scores less than 1.0, it is less 
volatile than the market and does not react to market movements in a highly correlated manner. 
Any asset scoring over 1.0 is more volatile than the market, and has a higher degree of 
correlation between its movements and the market. If an asset has a beta of 1.5, the asset will 
experience approximately 50% more volatility than the market and will tend to move in the same 
direction: for every 1% gain in the market, stocks with a 1.5β will gain 1.50%; for every 1% fall 
in the market, these same stocks will lose 50% more than the market. Conversely, if a stock is 
measured at 0.5β, it is theoretically 50% less volatile than the market: For every 1% rise in the 
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market, 0.5β stocks will rise 0.5%. For every 1% fall in the market, 0.5β stocks will lose 50% 
less than the market.  
Beta provided, for the first time, a simple way to speak about the trade-off that exists 
between risk and return: >1.0β is more volatile than the market, and <1.0β is less volatile than 
the market. While this tradeoff was intuitively understood by market participants, beta was the 
first time the relationship became formalized so that investors could use a common measurement 
and frame of analysis when talking about risk and reward.214 As Sharpe himself stated, “the 
familiarity of the implications need not be considered a drawback. The provision of a logical 
framework for producing some of the major elements of traditional financial theory should be a 
useful contribution” (1964, 442).215  
Perhaps most importantly, however, Sharpe’s work determined that of all the possible 
investment combinations, the most efficient was always the market in its entirety: “Of all 
possibilities…one will dominate: that investment plan lying at the point of the original 
investment opportunity curve” (Sharpe 1964, 432). This investment plan, referred to as the 
market portfolio, is comprised of all of the assets in the market, weighted by their market 
capitalization. Consider a hypothetical market that is comprised of three assets: asset A, 
accounting for 20% of the total market; asset B, with 10%, and C, with 70%. The market 
portfolio in this scenario is a three asset portfolio with A accounting for 20% of the total 
portfolio weight, B with 10%, and C, the remaining 70%. This concept of the market portfolio 
																																																						
214 Beta is often equated as a measure of risk due to its measure of a stock’s price fluctuations in relation to the 
market. This, however has been critiqued because risk must also take into account a stock’s quality (e.g. the danger 
of a stock dropping in quality or future earning potential due to economic events). Refer to Graham (2006) for a 
discussion on this issue as it relates to portfolio selection. 
215 Beta and CAPM have been widely contested. It is not within the scope of this project to address the theoretical 
and empirical oppositions to these concepts as this project focuses on their integration in market parlance. As Fama 
and French have commented, “The attraction of CAPM is that it offers powerful and intuitively pleasing predictions 
to measure and the relation between expected return and risk. Unfortunately, the record of the model is poor” (2004, 
25).  
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has significant implications for both Eugene Fama’s efficient market hypothesis (EMH) and the 
development of index strategies, both of which will be discussed in the subsequent sections.  
 
Efficient Market Hypothesis  
	
 Eugene Fama extended the work previously done on random walk theory216 and the 
CAPM by developing something called the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). The EMH 
states that investors may choose among securities “…under the assumption that security prices at 
any time ‘fully reflect’ all available information” (Fama 1970, 383). Fama used the CAPM to 
determine whether or not an investment was able to yield excess risk-adjusted returns in relation 
to the market. The random walk model (Samuelson 1965) was also incorporated into Fama’s 
EMH to formalize the assumption that “successive price changes are independent…and 
identically distributed” (Fama 1970, 387). Fama assumed the validity of the assumptions built in 
to the CAPM and used the CAPM within his model to theoretically demonstrate that, because 
markets are efficient, any investor’s claim to be able to knowledgeably forecast stock movements 
based on historical patterns217 was “…nothing more than a pseudoscience” (MacKenzie 2006, 
76) that could be “…generated artificially by a suitable roulette wheel” (Roberts 1959, 4). As a 
former economist and mentor to individuals such as Warren Buffet and Irvine Kahn reflects:  
 
I could not comprehend how the management of money by institutions had 
degenerated from the standpoint of sound investment to this rate race of trying 
																																																						
216 Random walk theory, prior to 1965, argued that changes in stock prices were random and unpredictable events 
Refer to: Regnault (1863), Bachelier (1900), Working (1934), Kendall (1953), MacKenzie (2006, 37-69), and Fama 
(1970, 389-399). Paul Samuelson (1965) used statistical approaches to derive that it was the logarithms of stock 
prices that were random, not the stock prices themselves. This result meant that prices were log-normal in their 
random variances (representing the traditional bell curve shape).  
217 Forecasting stock prices based on historical movements is commonly referred to as chartism or technical 
analysis.  
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to get the highest possible return in the short period of time…They are 
promising performance on the upside and the downside that is not practical to 
achieve (Graham interview in Montier 2007, 434).  
 
The EMH implies that traditional stock picking based on either financial charts or company 
fundamentals is misguided because stock prices already reflect all available information, 
meaning future stock movements are not predictable. Fundamental analysis typically involves 
deriving the intrinsic value of a firm by studying balance sheets, cash flows, and credit ratings 
(amongst other factors). As the EMH demonstrates, stock picking using fundamental analysis 
was not required because the factors involved in corporate fundamentals were already 
incorporated into the stock price as the information became available. In other words, the EMH 
implies that a company’s intrinsic value can not differ from its market price because any change 
to intrinsic value would be immediately absorbed by the market and reflect a new market price 
for the stock. Thus, an investor who is constructing a portfolio by using research on individual 
company fundamentals has no better chance of achieving higher returns than an investor who 
chose random stocks of the same risk level.  
Statistically, the concept of efficient markets makes the selection of ‘winning’ stocks 
extremely difficult and unsustainable over time, no matter the investor’s skill. As a 
Congressional testifier on the US ETF industry states:  
 
Fundamental research doesn’t matter right now…nobody’s doing it because 
nobody is getting paid to do it. On one of the big down days about three weeks 
ago [February 2016], I happened to look up in the middle of the day and the 
Russell 2000, the S&P, and the Dow were all down exactly 3.33%. What that 
tells me is that…traders, because they don’t do the fundamental research, are 
using ETFs (Interview 8).  
 
ETFs may be used as a replacement for fundamental research as they avoid the stock picking 
problem: by using indices to gain exposure to a broad market, investors are able to mimic a 
	 168	
realistic market portfolio and participate in large market movements without having to identify 
‘winners’ or predict the future movement of individual stocks, concepts both theoretically 
challenged by Markowitz, Sharpe, and Fama. As concluded by Fama, the most efficient portfolio 
is one that is optimally diversified - the market portfolio. Thus, the best way to achieve the most 
efficient portfolio was to mimic the market and seek the market return.218  
 
Theoretical integration in the marketplace  
	
The theories of Markowitz, Sharpe, and Fama were instrumental in reorienting the cognitive 
framework of market participants away from stock picking towards index-based investments. 
Markowitz was able to formalize concepts such as diversification, covariance, and risk as they 
relate to portfolio construction. Sharpe was able to take Markowitz’s methods and develop the 
concept of beta, further formalizing the trade-off between risk and reward. His early 
development of the CAPM indicated that the optimal portfolio was the market portfolio with a 
beta of 1.0. By capturing the complex relationships between stocks within a portfolio in a simple 
framework of beta, Sharpe’s work became widely dispersed throughout the market and products 
advertising beta began emerging.219 Fama was able to build on Sharpe’s CAPM assumptions to 
theoretically demonstrate how active management strategies are unable to achieve market 
beating returns over the long term. Indeed, the empirical research that followed these theories 
																																																						
218 Matching the market return is a theoretical concept only. In reality, an investor who attempts to mirror the market 
return will always achieve slightly less, as transaction fees and taxes will reduce their return. For example: if the 
market returns 8.5% per year, an investor in the highest tax bracket, paying a 1% fee, will reduce their compound 
annual growth rate to 4.69%. Refer to Roche (2016, 8-12) for a discussion of how fees and taxes in the US result in 
a discrepancy between the market return and a market portfolio’s return. The impact of fees will be discussed in 
Chapter Eight.  
219 ETF providers now compete aggressively for the market share for ‘smart beta’ ETFs. For an excellent overview 
of the current field of competition for beta products, refer to Wigglesworth’s article for the Financial Times (2016), 
retrievable online: https://www.ft.com/content/f1d345ae-c913-11e5-be0b-b7ece4e953a0  
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verified how active managers will almost always underperform when compared against the 
aggregate market return. For example, Jensen demonstrated how, between 1945 and 1964, 89 of 
115 active mutual fund managers underperformed their benchmarks by an average of -14.6% 
(Jensen 1968; Fama 1970, 412).220  
As a result of theoretical developments, questions of how to invest in ‘the market’ came to 
the forefront of discussions amongst product innovators. These discussions became particularly 
prominent in the 1980s when technology was able to assist managers in trading hundreds and 
thousands of stocks with the push of a button. As a former pension fund manager states:  
 
There are many reasons why ETFs gained favour worldwide…the fact that 
indices had outperformed active managers over different time frames; you had 
financial theory - William Sharpe, with his iconic article that active managers, 
collectively, just cannot beat the index. I think a lot of people were attracted to 
that theory (Interview 5).  
 
Further illustrated by an executive of an index and data firm:  
 
Over time, the vast majority of active managers underperform their benchmark. 
The research bears that out. And it’s for a whole host of reasons. There’s the 
Sharpe theory there, there’s risk diversification…At the end of the day, all that 
really says is, ‘Why would I own an active manager when I buy the benchmark 
for a lot cheaper and in most cases, outperform the active manager?’. That 
thesis has really taken hold a great deal more in the marketplace (Interview 18).   
 
The pervasiveness of theory within the marketplace was clear: the majority of participants in the 
marketplace throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s were aware of Sharpe and Markowitz’s 
work on the benefits of proper diversification and Fama’s work that laid the theoretical 
groundwork for researchers to prove how active portfolios are much less likely to outperform 
																																																						
220 Current financial scholarship continues to asses the performance of active versus passive investment strategies. 
For recent studies, refer to Hung and Banerjee (2013), Banerjee and Hung (2011), Walden (2015), Fama and French 
(2010), Fortin and Michelson (2002), and Ewing and Malik (2000).   
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indices. The standardization and simplification of concepts about portfolio construction made it 
easy for the theoretical concepts to be integrated throughout the market, resulting in real world 
changes in portfolio construction. For example, the following portfolio manager inherited one of 
the largest pension funds in North America in the late 1980s. When asked to reflect on his 
investment philosophy, he stated:  
 
[The pension fund] was primarily invested in active strategies which, frankly, 
had not done well… I had become heavily involved in indexing directly at that 
time (Interview 5).  
 
The sentiment that passive indexing was superior to active portfolio management became widely 
adopted throughout the markets in the late 1980s and early 1990s as institutional basket 
strategies and index derivatives continued to grow in volume: 
 
The gospel of active versus passive has taken root more…the flows into 
passive have completely outpaced the flows into active. That’s why you see the 
active managers kind of on the ropes (Interview 18);  
 
The days of individual stock picking were kind of over (Interview 15).  
 
The Investment Company Act of 1940  
	
The development of theories on portfolio construction began to change the epistemic 
orientation of market participants to favour passive investing strategies.221 The popularity of 
																																																						
221 As will be discussed in Chapter Seven, the transition in popularity from active to passive strategies was not 
without conflict. Active managers of mutual funds still oversaw the majority of investments in the United States and 
had much deeper pockets to entice investors with. The conflict between active and passive portfolio managers will 
be discussed in Chapter Seven in the context of marketing strategies and how they related to the proliferation of ETF 
products.  
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these strategies, in turn, led to the creation of a product called the SuperTrust, which was granted 
one of the most important regulatory precedents in ETF history: The Investment Company of 
1940 Act exemptions. The purpose of the following section is to explain the founding principles 
and definitions of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the environment in which the first 
exemptions under the act for ETFs were negotiated. To accomplish this, a brief overview of the 
1940 Act and applicable definitions will be discussed. Next, the process to apply for exemptions 
from the Act will be described. This overview will set the foundation for the final section that 
analyses the negotiations that occurred between the SEC and the SuperTrust developers. These 
negotiations were crucial to the establishment of the ETF industry for the exemptions that were 
granted created a precedent that continues to act as the backbone of ETF legitimacy and 
regulation in the United States today. 
 
	
Are ETFs investment companies, or made by investment companies?  
	
After the market crash of 1929, the United States Congress tasked itself with repairing the 
public’s faith in the financial markets. Widespread fraud conducted by both investment advisors 
and investment companies was uncovered in the wake of 1929, prompting Congress to 
commission the SEC to study the then-unregulated investment company industry. After five 
years of research, the SEC study was published in 1938.222 In response to this report, Congress 
																																																						
222 This report was presented to Congress between 1938 and 1939 in four volumes under the title U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission Report on the Study of Investment Trusts and Investment Companies. Volume One concerns 
the origins and scope of the study and was submitted to Congress on June 10, 1938; Volume Two is comprised of 
eight chapters of statistical data analysis submitted on March 10, 1939; Volume Three discusses the economic 
significance of investment companies, submitted in August 7, 1939; Volume Four analyses the abuses of investment 
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passed the Investment Company Act of 1940223 that, for the first time, defined what an 
investment company is. The 1940 Act also provided a framework that outlined minimum levels 
of regulation that investment companies ought to be subject to in order to “mitigate and, so far as 
is feasible, to eliminate the conditions…which adversely affect the national public interest and 
the interest of investors” (1940 Act §1).  
Under the Act, an investment company is defined as “…an issuer which is or holds itself out 
as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, 
reinvesting or trading in ‘securities’” (1940 Act §3(a)(1)(A); SEC Investment Company 
Registration and Regulation Package). Any company operating within this definition is required 
to register with the SEC and and is obligated, under the 1940 Act, to disclose investment 
objectives, expenses, and risks, in addition to meeting minimum capital requirements and other 
company-specific provisions.224  
The Act defines three categories of investment companies: management companies, unit 
investment trusts, and face-amount certificate companies225. Of these, management companies 
and unit investment trusts are pertinent to the ETF. Management companies are structured 
similarly to corporations in that they have a board of directors that is responsible for overseeing 
the management of the corporation. These investment companies hire an investment advisor 
(also called a portfolio manager) to make decisions about the construction of the portfolio the 
																																																						
companies, submitted in June 26, 1939 (75th Congress House Documents No. 707; 76th Congress House Documents 
No. 70, 279, and 380; SEC Letter of Transmittal from Chairman Robert Healy, 17 August 1939).  
223 1940 Act legislation was first introduced to the US Senate on March 14, 1940 by Senator Robert F. Wagner of 
New York (S. 3580), and introduced to the House of Representatives on March 14, 1940 by Congressman Clarence 
F. Lea of California (H.R. 8935). The Act was eventually passed into law on August 22, 1940, to effective 
November 1, 1940 (Public Law No. 768, 76th Congress).  
224 Refer to the SEC Office of Investor Education and Advocacy for more information on specific requirements 
(SEC Investor Bulletin on ETFS, August 2012). These specifics are not immediately pertinent to this project.  
225 Refer to 1940 Act §2(a)(15), §3(a)(1)(B), and §4(1) for a definition and rules concerning face-amount certificate 
companies. These investment companies are not pertinent to the ETF.  
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investment company manages. The portfolios of investment companies are often constructed to 
beat a benchmark, so the investment advisor is permitted to make active trading decisions about 
the assets held within the portfolio. For example, a mutual fund that uses the S&P 500 index as a 
benchmark will attempt to profit more - and lose less - than the S&P 500. 
Investment management companies may be organized as either open or closed end funds. An 
open-end investment company is defined as “…a management company which is offering for 
sale or has outstanding any redeemable security of which it is the issuer” (1940 Act §5(a)(1), 25). 
Open-end funds are best represented by looking at a mutual fund: the mutual fund company hires 
an investment advisor to construct an investment portfolio, then issues shares and sells these 
shares of their portfolio to the public. Investors may redeem their shares at any time by selling 
them back to the mutual fund at net asset value.226 These companies do not place a limit on the 
number of securities they may issue - if there is demand, the company will continue to issue, sell, 
and redeem their shares in perpetuity.  
Alternatively, closed-end funds are defined as “…any management company other than an 
open-end company” (1940 Act §5(a)(2), 25). Closed-end funds are similar to open-end funds in 
every way except that their shares are only offered in a fixed amount and are not redeemable. 
Once a closed-end fund issues their pre-determined number of shares (typically through an initial 
public offering), investors can only buy and sell the shares on a stock exchange at market 
value.227  
																																																						
226 Net asset value (most commonly referred to as NAV) represents the price per share. It is calculated by taking the 
value of all of the securities in a fund’s portfolio and dividing them by the number of shares of the fund outstanding.    
227 Closed-end funds may be further subdivided into interval funds and business development companies under the 
1940 Act, but this distinction is not necessary for this project. Refer to 1940 Act §2(a)(46) and Rule 23c-3 or SEC 
Release No. IC-25258 (2001) for details.  
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A unit investment trust is the second kind of investment company relevant to ETF regulation. 
Defined by three qualities, a unit investment trust: “…(A) is organized under a trust indenture, 
contract of custodianship or agency, or similar instrument, (B) does not have a board of directors, 
and (C) issues only redeemable securities, each of which represents an undivided interest in a 
unit of specified securities…” (1940 Act §4(2), 24). Unit investment trusts offer a fixed 
portfolio, so these companies do not need an investment advisor to make decisions about what 
assets to trade within the fund. In other words, a unit investment trust portfolio is constructed at 
the trust’s inception and will hold the same assets in the same weightings throughout its life. 
While these trusts do not have a board of directors like open- and closed- end funds, they do 
appoint a trustee who is responsible for adjusting the portfolio to maintain its original 
composition.228 Akin to open-ended funds, unit investment trusts may issue an indefinite number 
of securities for sale which are traded over a stock exchange at market value.229 
 
The exemption process 
	
Currently, ETFs are considered investment companies and must register such as with the 
SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940.230 While ETFs are subject to many of the 
provisions under the 1940 Act, the ETF structure itself is only permitted by having several 
exemptions granted under the 1940 Act.  
																																																						
228 As dividends or capital gains accrue or if stocks split, the UIT portfolio may diverge from its initial weightings. 
Thus, a trustee is needed to provide oversight and maintain the original weightings of assets within the trust.   
229 Investors may also sell back their UIT units directly to the trust at NAV in blocks of 50,000 units at a time (this 
basket size is legislated by the 1940 Act). These blocks, if being sold back to the trust, are called redemption 
baskets. This is cost prohibitive for most investors as a redemption basket typically costs several millions of dollars 
or more. Thus, the most common trades for average investors in UITs occur on a stock exchange. See 1940 Act §4 
and §26 for UIT rules.  
230 As ETFs trade on stock exchanges, they are also required to register under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(commonly referred to as the Exchange Act). 
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Exemptions have always been permitted under the 1940 Act and requests for relief were not - 
and are not - rare. Under Section 6(c) of the Act, the SEC has the authority to grant exemptions 
that are “necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of 
investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions”.   
Between 1982 and 1985, the SEC Division of Investment Management231 received over 600 
exemption requests under the 1940 Act (SEC Release No. IC-14492 30 April 1985), leading a 
former SEC Director to describe the process as a “conga line” that “tied up lots of personnel” 
(Smythe Interview 2011). As she recalls, “If it was in the Investment Company Act, there was a 
line out the door of people seeking exemptive orders” (Smythe interview 2011). Reiterated by a 
former SEC Division Director:  
 
[The Division of Investment Management] was the graveyard where all 
repetitive issues that no one had quite figured out how to make into rules, or 
hadn’t quite gotten around to making a rule, went to die. You would have order 
after same order after same order and it could be incredibly boring…More or 
less you were just a processor, is a good way of putting it, but at the same time 
it was also the relief valve for innovation (Interview 22). 
 
A securities lawyer working in the 1980s confirms:   
 
The exemption for us at the SEC was big business. Big business. It seemed like 
you needed loads of exemptions to do a lot of the newer products (Interview 3).  
 
However, exemptions were not always smoothly passed down the administrative conga line 
despite the number of exemptions that were processed every year. If there were no precedents to 
refer to, receiving an exemption could be an arduous process. As the SEC reported in 1985:  
 
																																																						
231 The Division of Investment Management is the body that administers applications for exemptions under the 1940 
Act.  
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While the Commission has codified routinely granted exemptions into rules of 
general applicability wherever possible, the time saved thereby has been more 
than offset by the time spent processing the increased number of novel 
applications involving new and sophisticated financial products (Federal 
Register 8 May 1985, 19339). 
 
In fact, the first ETF product to be granted exemptions under the Act - the SuperTrust - took 
over three years of negotiations and six applications to the SEC. It was these negotiations that 
took place between the SEC and the SuperTrust developers that created one of the most 
important precedents in establishing the ETF industry, paving the way for the first modern ETF 
structure. In what follows, two themes of the SuperTrust will be discussed: first, the integration 
of theoretical attributes into the development of the SuperTrust, and second, the regulator-
innovator relationship and process of negotiations will be analysed as an example of regulatory 
agencement. 
  
SuperTrust: The mediation of innovation   
	
Inspiration for development  
	
The SuperTrust was created by the three individuals who founded the firm Leland O’Brien 
Rubinstein, Associates Incorporated (LOR). Hayne Leland and Mark Rubinstein were colleagues 
at the University of California, Berkeley and were noted for their work in financial engineering, 
particularly in the field of options theory. John O’Brien, who was already well known in the 
financial industry as a “genius financial product marketer” (Interview 3), began working with 
Leland and Rubinstein in the early 1980s to found LOR and market their first product. The first 
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product launched by LOR was portfolio insurance,232 whose primary inspiration arose from the 
rapid rise of institutional investors in the stock market and their need for a hedging vehicle that 
would protect them from downside loss.  
As discussed in Chapter Five, portfolio insurance was suspected of having exacerbated the 
1987 crisis and rapidly fell out of favour with public opinion and institutional traders, leaving 
LOR without a viable product. An individual familiar with LOR explains:   
 
The problem when the market break happened was that [portfolio insurance] 
didn’t work because you still had to sell something and there were no buyers. 
So that then put them on to feeling like they had a lot of egg on their face from 
having $60 billion dollars worth of portfolios covered by their portfolio 
insurance that didn’t work (Interview 3).  
 
An excellent analogy to LOR’s strategy was later published by Investment Dealers’ Digest: 
“Dynamic portfolio insurance said if the fire takes place at your house you could buy the 
insurance fast enough to cover the damage. But in 1987, every house was on fire” (Lux and 
Pressman 1992). LOR recognized that there needed to be a way to purchase insurance up front, 
or, in other words, before the fire started:  
 
They were really committed to trying to come up with a product that wouldn’t 
count on having to sell something or buy something at the moment of a market 
crash (Interview 3).  
 
 
A member of LOR recalls:  
 
																																																						
232 LOR’s portfolio insurance used dynamic replication, a concept that underlies option pricing theory, to 
manufacture puts in response to changing conditions in the stock market. Portfolio insurance was a marketed 
strategy that used computer models, not a financial product that could itself be traded. For a discussion on portfolio 
insurance, including its impact in the 1987 crash, refer to Chapters Four and Five.  
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…it appeared that LOR was again innovating and leading the way with the 
development of the SuperTrust…I believed that the new technologies would be 
beneficial to investors and the markets (Interview 7).  
 
By 1988, passive index strategies were being used with increasing frequency by both 
institutions and investment advisors on behalf of their clients. However, each index strategy in 
the market had its shortcomings. In the stock markets, participants could use two index 
strategies: physical stock baskets and index mutual funds. Index baskets could be actively traded 
on a stock-by-stock basis, but were extremely costly to construct as the institution would have to 
purchase every single stock constituting their desired index and individually monitor their price 
fluctuations.233 Index mutual funds solved the cost-inefficiency of index baskets but were tax-
inefficient and could not be traded throughout the day.234  
In the derivative markets, investors had two choices to implement index strategies: index 
options and index futures. Most index options were short-term contracts that made long-term 
positions difficult to implement and expensive if volatility occurred around the time of the 
contract rollover. For example, most index options in the late 1980s were short-term contracts of 
two years or less. While long-term index option contracts were launched on the CBOE in 1987, 
the market for them was fairly illiquid. Index futures had expiration dates to keep their prices in 
line with the index, but as discussed in Chapter Four, institutions did not like the extra costs 
associated with maintaining the separate trading and compliance accounts needed for 
participating in the futures market.  
																																																						
233 Refer to Chapter Four for a discussion about basket trading.   
234 For an explanation of how mutual funds are structured and taxed, refer to Chapter Eight. To discourage active 
trading, mutual fund companies implement high fees for early redemptions and charge penalties for excessive 
trading. ‘Excessive trading’ and the administered penalty is determined on a case-by-case basis. In addition, selling 
and then repurchasing the same mutual fund within 30 days is referred to as ‘washing’ or a ‘wash sale’, and has been 
outlawed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS Publication 550, 2015).  
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Clearly, one of the most beneficial attributes of index strategies in the stock market was their 
perpetual existence, and one of the most beneficial attributes of index derivatives was their low 
trading costs and ability to be frequently traded. The first attempt to blend the attributes of these 
two markets was the PHLX CIPs, which allowed the holder to control the maturity of the product 
or hold it in perpetuity (as discussed in Chapter Five). Mark Rubinstein acknowledged that while 
index participations “go part way” in hybridising the equity and derivative index markets, they 
were not able to provide a way for market participants to custom-tailor the blend of relatively 
low risk and relatively high risk portfolios (Rubinstein 1990, 19). Thus, development began on a 
new product that could combine the beneficial attributes of each market.  
Resulting from this realization was LOR’s SuperTrust. Designed to “…offer both individual 
and institutional investors the ability to participate broadly in the market and to manage risk and 
returns” (SuperTrust Concept Brochure 1988), the SuperTrust offered a group of securities that 
could be separated and recombined at the investor’s discretion. 
 
 
Figure 1. SuperTrust draft concept brochure I (1988).  




The SuperTrust was a group of a securities structured as both open-end mutual funds and unit 
investment trusts (UIT). The Capital Market Fund was an open-ended mutual fund235 that could 
be redeemed directly back to the mutual fund company. This mutual fund had a portfolio of 
stocks that mirrored the S&P 500 index and a portfolio of money market and cash investments. 
Investors of the Capital Market mutual fund had the option, for a ‘separation fee’, to divide the 
mutual fund into two UITs called the Index Trust SuperUnit, which was the mutual fund’s stock 
portfolio, and a Money Market Trust SuperUnit, which was the mutual fund’s interest bearing 
money market portfolio. Because SuperUnits were UITs, they could be traded independently on 
the AMEX236 or recombined and converted back into the Capital Market mutual fund.  
The purpose of the SuperUnits were to divide the mutual fund into two risk levels: the Index 
SuperUnit had more risk but more potential for profit because it held the S&P 500 stocks, while 
the Money Market SuperUnit was extremely stable but had little upside potential as interest 
payments on money market assets are very small. An investor could trade their SuperUnits on 
the AMEX to achieve their desired risk exposure: hypothetically, an investor could sell all of 
their Money Market SuperUnits and hold only the Index SuperUnits, vice versa, or any other 
combination of their choosing. In addition, an investor could elect to pay another fee and further 
divide their SuperUnits into four different types of baskets called SuperShares, which were 
tradable UITs that allowed further customization of risk and return levels. SuperShares could be 
																																																						
235 The Capital Market Fund was one mutual fund comprised of two series. These series were referred to as the 
Index Series (the S&P 500 index portfolio) and the Money Market Series (the cash equivalent portfolio) in concept 
brochures. Refer to Figure 2.  
236 Early SuperTrust documents stated that the NYSE would be the listing exchange for SuperUnits. However, LOR 
ultimately decided to list SuperUnits on the AMEX. Thus, the AMEX will be referenced throughout the SuperTrust 
discussions even though this may diverge from what is in early (pre-1990) LOR and SEC documents. The reason 
why the AMEX was most always chosen as the listing exchange for innovative basket products will be discussed in 
Chapter Eight. 
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recombined back into SuperUnits, just as SuperUnits could be recombined into the Capital 
Market Fund:237  
 
   
Figure 2. SuperTrust draft concept brochure II 1988)  
Source: Interviewee 
 
The Index SuperUnits could be divided into Appreciation SuperShares and Index Income 
SuperShares. Appreciation SuperShares received any capital appreciation from the Index 
SuperUnits. Appreciation SuperShares were the higher risk option as they only provided a payoff 
if the S&P 500 equities increased in value; if the value of equities fell, holders of Appreciation 
SuperShares would not receive anything. Appreciation SuperShares are the most similar to a call 
option. The Index Income SuperShares, alternatively, received all dividend payments and capital 
gains distributions from the Index SuperUnits. These were the lower risk option as investors in 
the Index Income SuperShares were guaranteed to receive dividend payments on the S&P 500 
stocks irrespective of whether the stocks increased or decreased in value. However, as the Index 
																																																						
237 The names of the four SuperShares changed throughout the development process. In what follows, the 
SuperShares will be referred to by the same names that are displayed in the marketing images.  
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Income SuperShares were only eligible for dividend payments, investors did not get rewarded if 
stocks increased in value. To summarize, Appreciation SuperShares were more volatile but 
offered more potential reward, while Index Income SuperShares were less volatile but offered 
less reward.   
The Money Market SuperUnits could be divided into Protection SuperShares and Money 
Market Income SuperShares. Protection SuperShares would appreciate, dollar for dollar, as the 
value of the S&P 500 index fell. Protection SuperShares were the higher risk option as holders 
would receive a payout if the S&P 500 index decreased in value, but would receive nothing if the 
value of the index increased. These SuperShares were most similar to collateralized puts - index 
options - in that they allowed investors to make a calculated bet on the value of the stock market 
falling.238 Recalling the Investment Dealers’ Digest article that described portfolio insurance as 
an insurance policy that could only be purchased once a house was on fire, the Protection 
SuperShares offered investors the ability “to purchase the insurance up front” (1992). As 
reiterated by LOR: “If…portfolio insurance strategies were implemented with Protection 
SuperShares, investors would not need to trade during periods of market turmoil” (Leland and 
Rubinstein 1989), correcting a major shortcoming of LOR’s portfolio insurance.  
The Money Market SuperUnits were also divisible into Money Market Income SuperShares, 
which received all of the interest payments from the Money Market SuperUnit. These 
SuperShares were the lower risk option as the interest payments came from the cash equivalents 
in the SuperUnit: Irrespective of the rise and fall in the value of the SuperUnit, the investor in the 
Money Market SuperShares would receive their interest payment. As the interest rates were tied 
to cash equivalents which represented extremely low risk, the interest payments were very low. 
																																																						
238 For detailed information on the construction of the collateralized option basket of the SuperTrust, refer to 
Harvard Business School case study 9-294-050 (Kyrillos, 1995, 7-8).  
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To summarize, Protection SuperShares were higher risk but offered protection from losses in the 
S&P 500 index equities, while Money Market SuperShares were extremely low risk but offered 
little reward.  
 
 
Figure 3. Simplified structure of the SuperTrust. Depiction is the author’s own. 
 
 
Theoretical applications in ETF structuring  
	
At the heart of the SuperTrust was the UIT structure, which was a passive product structure 
whose internal assets were not actively traded. The UIT structure allowed LOR to divide the 
mutual fund portfolio into its money market assets and the S&P 500 assets, and then trade these 
passive portfolios independently over a stock exchange. In addition, by allowing investors to 
further subdivide their SuperUnits into SuperShares, and then trade the SuperShares on the stock 
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exchange, investors were able to custom-tailor their risk levels based on expected return, a 
concept first formalized by Markowitz.  
As discussed, Markowitz was the first to demonstrate that while diversification could reduce 
risk, risk could never be completely eliminated. Thus, the only manner in which to manage risk 
is to make decisions regarding expected portfolio returns: the higher the risk tolerance, the higher 
the potential for returns. As Markowitz noted, intelligent investors will often maximize expected 
return while minimizing risk. By allowing investors to make active decisions and trade their risk 
exposure within a passive portfolio, the SuperTrust carried on in the Markowitz tradition:  
 
All of the recent basket trading proposals [CIPs and SuperTrust]…tend to make 
trading intentions and motivations more visible to all market participants by 
physically separating passive from active trading (Rubinstein 1990, 19).  
 
The point of separation active from passive trading was best represented in the SuperTrust 
marketing brochure. In the brochure, LOR created an image which represented the two passive 
SuperUnit portfolios as large blocks that were each comprised by two smaller SuperShare 
baskets that controlled risk exposure:  
 
 




The depiction is similar to a jigsaw puzzle, with the four risk-controlling SuperShares being able 
to be separated, traded, and re-combined to form the larger SuperUnits. A former executive of 
index services at a major North American exchange commented on the growing importance of 
using passive portfolios to make investing decisions in the 1990s:  
 
[In 1989/1990] You had people looking at SECTORs, CIPs, and international 
indices, right? Following a passive management strategy, but enabling people 
to make more targeted bets (Interview 20).  
 
The SuperTrust was also the first ETF-style product to use financial theory and academic 
research in its justification for exemptions under the 1940 Act. Specifically, Leland and 
Rubinstein used the importance of the CAPM and the empirical testing of the EMH to justify to 
the SEC that the SuperTrust was in the best interest of investors. Specifically, LOR mentioned 
how the CAPM concludes that investors ought to divide their investments between a single 
standardized market portfolio and a riskless interest bearing asset. The SuperTrust provides both 
of these portfolios through their SuperUnits - the Index SuperUnit provides the standardized 
market portfolio that contains all of the S&P 500 securities in proportion to their market value, 
and the Money Market SuperUnit provides an interest bearing, cash equivalent portfolio.  
In addition, LOR referenced empirical academic studies relating to the EMH. Specifically, 
LOR argued that it was “fruitless” for investors to use stock picking in attempts to beat the 
market (Leland and Rubinstein 10 August 1989). As markets were relatively efficient, the 
application argued that the safest strategy for investors was to allocate their assets across the 
market. As the SEC recognized, the SuperTrust did this by offering “minimal management 
discretion” through their index-mimicking S&P portfolio and the “nature of the Money Market” 
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portfolio (SEC Comment Letter 30 May 1989, 7). The most investor-friendly way to achieve this 
broad market exposure, given the shortcomings of both index equities and index derivatives, was 
LOR’s low cost, fully collateralized, passively managed SuperTrust.  
LOR’s justification for the SuperTrust continued for 25 pages, mentioning how the growing 
popularity of using equity market indices as performance benchmarks made their product a 
useful contribution to the market. Because the SuperTrust provided a diversified portfolio, an 
“efficient means to trade baskets”, and the ability for large and small investors to custom tailor 
their risk exposure, the SuperTrust would facilitate the “trading needs of large classes of 
investors” (Leland and Rubinstein 10 August 1989, 2). Thus, LOR argued, as their product was 
backed by empirically substantiated financial theory, the SuperTrust was in the best interest of 
investors, consistent with the protection of investors, and would not set an undesirable precedent 
for future products applying under the 1940 Act.   
Despite the initial interest from investors, the SuperTrust failed due to its complexities, high 
initial investment requirement, and potential for high fees. Its SuperShares - the baskets that 
allowed investors to customize their risk exposure within a SuperUnit - were the source of much 
confusion: 
 
The basis of the SuperTrust…is so unusual that Parallax employees spend 
much of their time simply explaining what’s going on (Marshall interview 
1993).239 
 
The SuperTrust’s SuperUnits, however, created an important milestone in the burgeoning ETF 
industry. The SuperUnits were the first time that a product could trade the physical assets that 
composed an index identically to a stock.240 As Mark Rubinstein of LOR stated:  
																																																						
239 The five-person Connecticut derivatives firm, Parallax Group Inc., was one of the SuperTrust soliciting dealers. 
240 To reiterate from Chapter Five, the CIPs was backed by futures and not physical stocks.  
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SuperUnits look and feel like a common stock even down to their newspaper 
listing along side other stocks on the AMEX (Rubinstein 1993, 3).  
 
As the founder of an investment management firm stated in an interview about the SuperTrust:   
 
More people are more interested in the market than in a particular stock…I’m a 
great, great believer that Baskin Robbins works because it has 31 flavors. 
People want that (Marshall interview 1993).  
 
While the PHLX CIPs were also tradable like a stock, they were backed by futures and had 
no inventory carrying costs. This meant that investors who traded the CIPs were not invested in 
the physical stocks of the S&P 500 and thus the CIPs did not have to register as an investment 
company.241 In addition, as the CIPs were backed by futures contracts, CIPs were ultimately 
declared a derivative instrument. The SuperShares offered investors the physical underlying for 
the first time, fully collateralizing their positions and creating the immediate precedent to what is 
now recognized as an ETF. Because the SuperTrust’s units were physically invested in the 
constituents of the S&P 500 index, it was necessary for the SuperTrust to be registered as an 
investment company (specifically, a UIT) under the Investment Company Act of 1940. As the 
SuperTrust was the first of its kind and notably complex, LOR and its legal team underwent 
almost four years of negotiations with the SEC. It is this process to which this chapter now turns.  
 
Exemption requests   
	
																																																						
241 The Investment Company Institute threatened legal action over the CIPs because they argued that the product 
ought to be registered as a mutual fund. This issue was eclipsed by the CFTC-SEC lawsuit and never went to court.  
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The regulatory negotiations that the SuperTrust underwent with the SEC has been the subject 
of two detailed Harvard Business School case studies and will not be covered in as much depth 
here.242 In what follows, the key events that shaped the negotiation process between the 
SuperTrust developers and the SEC will be outlined. These events will set the stage for the final 
discussion concerning the regulatory agencement evident in the SuperTrust negotiations.  
In 1988, LOR hired a legal team called Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine to bring the 
SuperTrust to market. Initially, their counsel estimated the process to bring the product to market 
would take six months and $600,000 (Kyrillos 1995). As discussed in Chapter Four, due to the 
lack of organization and substantial processing delays at the SEC, most companies attempted to 
bring their products to market through a SEC no action letter. To file motion for no action, the 
innovator needed to supply a relevant precedent. If there was a clear and relevant precedent, 
requesting a no action letter was often the least expensive and labour intensive approach to 
launch a product. In the case of the SuperTrust, LOR applied for no action using the Americus 
Trust as a precedent on December 15, 1988.243 However, no stranger to controversy, the 
developer of the Americus Trust had been in and out of SEC and Congressional hearings and 
ended up having his Americus Trust exemptions withdrawn. As a former SEC staff attorney 
recalls:   
 
[LOR] had at one point done what everybody does, which was to see how 
much they could ask for and have us bite. That is the regulatory application 
process, to a certain extent…We said, ‘Hey guys, that’s bullshit! At this point 
you’re going to have to come back to us’. And some of that had to do with the 
history that had produced no-action letters (Interview 22).  
																																																						
242 Refer to Tufano and Kyrillos (1994) and the revised case study by Kyrillos (1995).  
243 The Americus Trust was a UIT that held only one stock in its portfolio. The Trust could be broken down into two 
UITs called PRIMEs and SCOREs. The PRIME gave the holder the right to any capital appreciation of the stock, 
while the SCORE gave the holder the right to any dividend and capital gains distributions from the stock. The 
Americus Trust never succeeded.  
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LOR’s request for no action on the SuperTrust was denied in early 1989 because the SEC 
Division of Investment Management had rejected the similarities between the SuperTrust and its 
named precedent, the Americus Trust. Because the Americus Trust was not deemed a suitable 
precedent, the SuperTrust could not be exempted under Americus’ provisions. After their request 
was denied, LOR had two options: first, they could submit an appeal to the denied no action 
request, or second, they could prepare a formal application to the Division of Investment 
Management for exemptive relief from the 1940 Act without a named precedent.  
Attitudes at the SEC towards the SuperTrust were mixed, ranging from scepticism to 
nonchalance (Interview 3, 7, 22, 15, 32), which gave LOR the sense that the Division of 
Investment Management would be “sympathetic” to an exemptive application (Kyrillos 1995): 
  
You know, [The Division of Investment Management] was easy to work with. 
There was no antagonism from the regulators; just their usual scepticism. The 
‘you have to convince me’ kind of attitude (Interview 3).  
 
A member of the Division of Investment Management describes their doubts over the viability of 
the product, but confirms that LOR met the most important provision for exemption - the 
SuperTrust did not appear to violate the fundamental provisions of the 1940 Act:     
 
We frankly didn’t think [SuperTrust] was going to go far…It was a pretty 
complicated and highly expensive method of hedging. I never really 
understood the attraction. But the reasons I didn’t think it was going to work 
was not related to investor protection. I looked at it more as, ‘These guys have 
a business and now that’s blown up and now they’re trying to find their next 
line of business and, god bless them, but I don’t think it’s going to work!’ 
(Interview 22).  
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The many informal meetings between LOR and SEC officials made LOR confident that their 
application for exemptive relief would be well received. On April 3, 1989, LOR filed their first 
applications for exemptions from Section 4(2) and 22(d).  
Section 4(2) of the 1940 Act describes the characteristics of UITs. One characteristic in 
particular states that UITs, under the 1940 Act, “issue only redeemable securities, each of which 
represents an undivided interest” in securities. The SuperShares component of the SuperTrust 
were not redeemable, as they could only be traded over an exchange or recombined into 
SuperUnits. More so, SuperShares were a clear division of interest in the representative 
securities in the SuperUnits.  
Section 22(d) relates to the shares of investment companies and dealers in the shares of 
investment companies. Specifically, it states that dealers are not permitted to purchase or sell 
shares of an investment company at anything other than NAV. As the SuperUnits would be 
traded over an exchange, dealers would be transacting at prevailing market prices of the units, 
not their NAV.  
LOR’s first application for exemption under the above sections of the 1940 Act was rejected. 
Between April 3, 1989 and July 6, 1990, LOR would submit six successive applications244 as the 
SEC required detailed justification about how the SuperTrust was within the best interest of 
investors, contributed to market stability, and did not violate the fundamental provisions of the 
1940 Act. Increasingly, LOR relied on arguments from financial theory such as the CAPM and 
EMH to justify the benefits their product would bring to market (Rubinstein 1998; 1990). By 
																																																						
244 The amended and/or restated applications for exemptive relief were filed with the SEC on the following dates: 3 
April 1989, 7 September 1989, 6 February 1990, 2 April 1990, 3 July 1990, and 6 July 1990. Other relevant dates 
include: Notice of Application (SEC Release No. IC-17612, 25 July 1990), and the filing of the SuperTrust 
prospectus and Forms N1-A and S-6 (SuperTrust and Capital Market Fund Registration Statements) on 6 March 
1992.  
	 191	
1990, LOR’s legal costs were nearing four million dollars when, on October 19, 1990 - three 
years to the date after the market crash - the SuperTrust received provisional exemptions to 
launch their SuperUnits on the AMEX245 (SEC Release No. IC-17809).  
During the period of negotiations between the SEC and LOR, the SEC was threatened yet 
again with litigation from a derivatives exchange over the jurisdiction of a hybrid financial 
product. The CBOE argued that the SuperShares component of the SuperTrust represented an 
options-like product that used the S&P 500 index license. However, the S&P had previously 
granted the CBOE exclusive use of its S&P 500 index for options products, causing the CBOE to 
argue that SuperShares ought to be under their jurisdiction. Wanting to avoid the same fate as the 
CIPs, the SEC and LOR agreed that the SuperShares component of the SuperTrust would be 
traded on the CBOE. This, however, further complicated the product as the mutual fund shares 
would be redeemable to the mutual fund, the SuperUnits would trade over the AMEX, and the 
SuperShares would trade on the CBOE. Because the SuperUnits had the potential to be broken 
down into SuperShares, all investors invested in the SuperTrust needed the appropriate licenses 
to trade options on the CBOE, even if they had no intentions to divide their SuperUnits into 
SuperShares.  
After almost four years of negotiations between the SEC, LOR, and the AMEX, and 
negotiations between the CBOE, LOR, and SEC, the SuperTrust launched in 1992. The launch of 
SuperTrust was significant for it was the first product to be granted exemptions to allow the 
physically-backed ETF structure to trade on a stock exchange. More so, its entrance to the 
																																																						
245 The SuperShares component of the SuperTrust were listed on the CBOE. 
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market was the first time that a index-based product was officially declared by regulators to be in 
the public interest.246  
 
The SEC as Leviathan? Internal conflict and control 
 
You have to remember that there’s fiefdoms. It’s very easy to think of the SEC 
as a place. And it’s not. It’s more like a man of war. It’s a collection of 
different living things all together in one shell (Interview 22). 
 
Undoubtedly, LOR’s SuperTrust application was an exercise in patience. A Harvard 
Business School study on the regulatory proceedings of the SuperTrust concluded that it was 
unclear whether or not “…the SuperTrust approval process was so complicated because the 
product was radically different or because LOR was involved” (Kyrillos 1995).247 However, oral 
histories discussing the SuperTrust exemptive process tell a story of intra-SEC disorganization 
and conflict, not one centred around the credibility of the innovators.  
The SEC, as an institution, was tasked with the protection of investors and ensuring that 
legislation was not violated to the detriment of the market and its participants. However, the 
various divisions within the SEC “each had their own victim” (Interview 3) in the wake of the 
1987 market break and struggled to reconcile their divergent attitudes towards the SuperTrust. 
As a member of the LOR team states:   
 
At the LOR and the AMEX, there was enormous frustration that, while some 
SEC and other regulators had been calling for basket and indexed securities, 
																																																						
246 “The Commission…may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction…from any 
provision or provisions of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, if and to the extent that such exemption is 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protect of investors…” (1940 Act §6(c)). 
Though the CIPs predated the SuperTrust, they did not need exemptions under the 1940 Act and did not have to 
formally address their benefit to the public interest.  
247 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, LOR was known to be the developer of portfolio insurance, a product 
initially thought to be the cause of the 1987 market crisis. Though this claim was not substantiated in any of the 
official post-crash reports, the LOR team had become rather infamous to regulators and traders alike.   
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the regulators seemed to squabble amongst themselves and were delaying 
clearance of the ST [SuperTrust] (Interview 7);  
 
Interviewer: Was the SEC receptive [to the SuperTrust]?  
Interviewee 3: I think so - particularly the SEC Trading and Markets people.  
 
The Division of Trading and Markets was receptive to the SuperTrust application as the 
SuperTrust offered a fully collateralized hedging mechanism that would not require active 
trading in periods of market volatility. As the Division of Trading and Markets was tasked with 
maintaining the efficient and orderly functioning of markets, its directors “wanted something that 
might prevent another market break” (Interview 3) and worked closely with the SuperTrust’s 
sponsoring exchange - the AMEX - to ensure appropriate standards would be upheld. The 
Division of Corporation Finance, alternatively, was preoccupied with ensuring that the correct 
information about investment products was being circulated in the market so that investors could 
make informed decisions. The members of the Division of Market Regulation were considered 
“real guardians of their rules and regulations…And always sceptical of creating new precedents” 
(Interview 3) that might have unintended consequences for investors. As summarized by a 
former attorney within the Division of Market Regulation, “Our main thinking was, ‘does 
[SuperTrust] fundamentally violate the provisions of the [1940] Act?’” (Interview 22).   
In short, attorneys operating within the SEC in the 1980s and 1990s agreed that the 1987 
market break was a much bigger factor to the Divisions of Corporation Finance and Trading and 
Markets than it was to Market Regulation, which was preoccupied with upholding the statutes of 
the 1940 Act and related legislation. The different attitudes within the SEC itself and the 
complexities of the SuperTrust product were the source of the long delays in granting an 
exemptive order:  
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My feeling at the time was that the SEC especially, with its divergent divisions, 
struggled to understand the ST (Interview 7). 
 
  
A practicing securities lawyer who specializes in 1940 Act legislation explains:  
 
I would say that the level of comfort that the SEC needs varies depending on 
what type of action we need to take. If it’s just a question of standing by and 
not formally disapproving it, that’s one thing. If they need to take various types 
of formal action, then the bar is higher in terms of getting the divisions 
comfortable with it (Interview 29).  
 
Despite the struggles to satisfy the various Divisions, SEC attorneys were hesitant to bring 
the SuperTrust application to the SEC Commissioners for a formal hearing because they did not 
think the product would be popular or achieve long-lived success. Thus, after much internal 
conflict, the Division of Investment Management was chosen to lead the negotiations with LOR 
with the understanding that the rest of the Divisions would remain informed throughout the 
process and follow the lead of Investment Management’s attorneys.   
The first ETF products - of which CIPs was the first and the SuperTrust a close second - were 
introduced at the crux of a turn in the United States markets. This turn occurred as index-based 
strategies were heralded as a modern solution to the difficulties of diversification and hedging 
experienced in the 1980s, and regulators such as the SEC began removing barriers to entry for 
formally defined products into the marketplace. However, despite the apparent willingness of the 
SEC to embrace basket innovation, conflict abounded. First conflict with the CFTC over the 
CIPs product, and second with the intra-organizational conflict within the SEC that caused 
prolonged negotiations with LOR over the SuperTrust.  
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Negotiating the ETF precedent   
	
As discussed in Chapter Two, regulatory agencement focuses on three related processes. 
First, how regulators participate with their devices, such as the interpretive process of rules like 
those within the 1940 Act. Second, regulatory agencement analyses how regulators attribute 
qualities to financial products in guiding the innovation from a product-concept to tradeable 
instrument. Third, regulatory agencement focuses on the points of intersection between 
regulators and innovators during the development phase of a new financial product. Bringing 
attention to the commonalities between regulators and innovators works to illuminate why these 
parties may be considered co-constituents of the innovative process and not simply dichotomized 
entities.   
The SuperTrust is a useful study to examine regulatory agencement and the assemblages that 
enable this process. First, the documented history of negotiations between the SEC and LOR 
provide evidence that the SEC participated in attributing particular characteristics to the product 
itself. This process represents an instance of how innovators and regulators were able to move 
beyond dichotomized relations to co-constitute the product development process, transitioning 
the SuperTrust from a concept to tradeable product. Second, the relationship between the 
innovators and regulators held no evidence of ‘cat and mouse’ dynamics. As demonstrated 
throughout the negotiations, both parties had intersecting goals regarding investor protections 
and benefits, and structured their negotiations around concepts of diversification and risk control 
first addressed in financial theory. Using a common standard to assess the benefits and 
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shortcoming of the SuperTrust demonstrates how the SEC and LOR were able to use points of 
intersection, not rivalry, to bring the product to market.   
In the case of the SuperTrust, the SEC was able to resolve its internal issues relatively early 
but continued to delay the LOR application for years. Many of the delays were caused by the 
Division of Investment Management rejecting particular attributes of the product itself or asking 
for particular provisions to be included in the SuperTrust structure. In providing suggestions to 
the LOR team, the SEC was able to participate in shaping what particular characteristics were 
and were not to be brought to market, representing how regulators and innovators both 
participate in attributing characteristics to financial products. For example, as stated earlier, the 
name of the SuperShares units changed several times throughout the application process at the 
request of the SEC. Originally, the SuperShares were to be named Upside Appreciation, Index 
Income, Downside Protection and Money Market Income Supershares. However, after the 
exemptions to the product structure were granted, the SEC argued that the names may be 
misleading to investors and delayed the approval for listing until the SuperShares were renamed 
in a manner the SEC deemed appropriate.  
In addition, The SEC requested that LOR restructure particular elements within the Money 
Market component of the SuperTrust because the Divisions were concerned that the hedging 
vehicle may be interpreted as having a futures component. As the failure of the CIPs project was 
still making headlines, the Commission wanted to ensure that the SuperTrust structure would 
uphold inspection from the CFTC.248  
																																																						
248 As explained by a member of LOR’s legal counsel, the CFTC provided guidance in shaping the early 
SuperTrust application. However, the CFTC was ultimately comfortable with the SEC taking the lead in 
bringing the product to market as long as certain restructurings took place.  
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Last, throughout the numerous applications, the SEC drafted statements that were to be 
included in both the SuperTrust’s prospectus and marketing material. Consider the following 
comments from the Division of Market Regulation: “The SuperTrust prospectus must clearly 
disclose that…”; “The Division believes that Applicants should add the following as a 
condition…”;  “The Division will support the requested relief…by the inclusion of the following 
new condition…”; and “Please amend the application…or include the following new condition 
[and] make corresponding changes to the Fund’s prospectus and governing documents” (SEC 
Comment Letter 30 May 1989, 3-15). Comments such as these demonstrate that the SEC was 
indeed a participant in the design and marketing of the SuperTrust product, interpreting their 40 
Act rules to make subtle changes that would, it was hoped, maintain investor protections.  
The delays caused by the above regulatory shaping of the SuperTrust are a material example 
of how regulators came to participate directly in the qualification of early ETFs. By making 
alterations to the product structure and marketing material, regulators subtly impressed their 
interpretations of the 1940 Act on the product structure. These impressions represented a 
material change between the SuperTrust’s original concept and the form it took when it launched 
on the AMEX four years later. In other words, in examining the documented history of the 
SuperTrust, regulatory mediation assisted in attributing qualities that converted the Supertrust 
from a concept to a formally defined and tradeable financial artefact.  
A second aspect of regulatory agencement evident in the SuperTrust case is found in 
examining the innovator and regulator relationship and its points of intersection. First, there was 
clear demand for a basket product after 1987 (see Chapter Five), meaning that both LOR and the 
SEC were willing to bring an innovation to market. While LOR did indeed attempt to see “what 
they could get away with”, the SEC was “not hostile” towards their innovation, even going as far 
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as being described as “sympathetic” towards LOR’s application (Interview 29). As for LOR, it 
was in their best interest to maintain positive and productive relationships with the SEC. As an 
attorney specializing in ETF legislation explains:  
 
In every case I’ve ever dealt with, I’ve never dealt with a client that was 
willing to try to disobey SEC requests…it would poison the client’s 
relationship with the SEC. And a client needs a relationship with the SEC in 
order to thrive. In order to launch anything…By virtue of necessity, the 
relationship has to be much more collaborative as no innovation can launch 
without getting the SEC divisions comfortable with it (Interview 29).  
 
Evidently, LOR did maintain a positive relationship by providing any further justifications the 
SEC asked for instead of filing for appeal and “calling the SEC’s bluff”, which was certainly 
within their right to do.249 
However, the justification for the SuperTrust primarily came down to academic theory. The 
consensus that occurred over the theoretical foundations of the innovation was the beginning of a 
conceptual alignment between innovator and regulator purpose. It was the prominent role of 
academic theory such as the CAPM and EMH that enabled the regulator and innovator to 
uncover their common orientation and understanding of what constituted investor benefit. That 
is, the embedding of theory into the SuperTrust’s structure, written justifications, and 
amendments requested by regulators exposed how the SEC and LOR purposes were aligned. For 
example, the SEC Division of Investment Management was preoccupied with ensuring investor 
protection. After 1987, the SEC was encouraging innovations that would allow investors to take 
advantage of the benefits of new trading technologies that made low cost, transparent, and 
																																																						
249 Attorneys have explained that it is almost always within an innovator’s legal rights to challenge the SEC requests 
for changes to a product concept in court. As one attorney explains, “while it is not formally impossible to sue the 
SEC and possibly get a judgment in court against them, [laughing], no one would ever do that! You have to work 
with the SEC to run your business!” (Interview 29).   
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efficient trading possible. The rise of index strategies, in response to the popularity of portfolio 
theories, provided the aforementioned benefits to investors. More so, after the 1987 market 
crash, the increased positive attention paid by the SEC to basket products indicated that they 
believed passive index-based investing to protect investors from volatility and instability. As a 
result, the SEC never reproached LOR’s invocation of financial theory to justify the benefits of 
passive investing in all six of the LOR applications. The Division of Investment Management, 
while sceptical of its potential success, believed that the SuperTrust embodied the best 
characteristics of portfolio theory and offered a way for investors to safely insure themselves 
against risk: the only contentions from the SEC were in regards to achieving clarity over the 
product structure itself.  
While the primary goal of the SEC was the protection of investors, LOR was preoccupied 
with providing investor benefit. As discussed previously, the SuperTrust was developed to 
correct the major failing of portfolio insurance and provide investors with the most beneficial 
attributes of each the stock and derivative markets. The SuperTrust was LOR’s attempt to give 
average investors the same access to risk control that large institutional investors had been using 
for decades (SuperTrust Concept Brochure 1988; SuperTrust for Capital Market Fund Inc. 
summary graphics 1992). Due to the pervasiveness of portfolio theory in the marketplace, LOR’s 
justification of the benefits of SuperTrust were similar to the SEC arguments relating to investor 
protection: both LOR and the SEC advocated for products that increased trading efficiency, 
increased the availability of passive portfolios, and allowed for enhanced risk management to 
protect investors from volatility such as was experienced in the 1987 crash.  
The regulatory agencement that occurred in the case of the SuperTrust demonstrates that the 
process of financial innovation is co-constituted by both innovators and regulators with each 
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party actively participating in the qualification of the product. In the case of the SuperTrust, a 
common environment was constructed from the widely adopted devices of financial economics 
that caused innovators and regulators to negotiate using the same conceptual outlook: both 
prioritized the concepts of diversification and risk management to make their case for investor 
protections and benefits, concepts first pioneered by Markowitz, Sharpe, and Fama. Thus, 
regulating innovation was not just a matter of dichotomized power relations, as new political 
economy may suggest. Using a framework of regulatory agencement to examine the SuperTrust 
illustrates how innovators and regulators both actively participate in transitioning an innovative 






















The refinement of innovation 
 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, this chapter will trace how the ETF concept was 
refined from its first instantiation to the modern ETF structure traded today. The refinement and 
redefinition process is particularly interesting for it involves innovations from both the United 
States and Canada. As both countries were involved in the refinement and redefinition of the 
product concept, important questions surface involving how transnational innovation flows occur 
and the conditions under which they contribute successfully to the innovative process. Second, 
this chapter will provide a detailed case study on the transition of a Canadian ETF product to the 
United States. In 2000, Canadian iUnits ETFs were successfully transitioned to the American 
markets and rebranded as iShares. This process is significant for it was the first time that ETF 
developers directly adopted Canadian marketing and educational strategies for retail investors in 
the United States. In conclusion, this chapter will address questions that transnational innovation 
flows elicit for understanding socio-technical processes, financial engineering, and bricolage.  
 
Innovation flows: ETFs across borders, across investors   
 
The socio-technical origins of Toronto Index Participation Units (TIPs)  
	
Often credited as the first ETF in the world, the Toronto Index Participation Units (TIPs) 
were developed by the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) and approved by regulators (the Ontario 
Securities Commission) incredibly quickly compared to its American predecessors, the CIPs and 
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SuperTrust. Launched on March 9, 1990, the TIPs was the first ETF to be developed and 
marketed specifically to retail investors250 in North America.  
The TIPs was officially called the Toronto-35 Index Participation Unit, or TIPs-35. The ‘35’ 
component of the title refers to the Toronto Stock Exchange 35 Composite Index (TSE-35) that 
the fund tracked. The TIPs were designed near-identically to the CIPs product launched by the 
PHLX: like CIPs, the stocks in the TIPs basket were held in the same proportion as they were in 
the index251 and were priced at one-tenth of the underlying index level.252 The major difference 
was in how the TIPs and CIPs constructed their underlying baskets. Unlike CIPs that were 
backed by futures to replicate the index, TIPs were backed by physical shares of the stocks in the 
index. As explained by the TSE: 
 
The Exchange decided not to structure the TIPs as IPs [Index Participation 
Units], principally because of…the desirability of having a derivative product 
with real securities rather than cash values as the underlying interest…TIPs 
will allow investors convenient access to a diversified portfolio of senior 
Canadian equities (TIPs-35 Application 27 September 1989, 7).253  
 
The TIPs product is popularly referred to as the world’s first ETF because it was the first 
product to use physical stocks in its basket, as opposed to the CIPs that used derivatives. While 
the SuperTrust’s SuperUnits were broken down into one UIT that tracked the S&P 500 stocks 
and one UIT that tracked the mutual fund’s cash investments, it’s complicated structure was only 
																																																						
250 ‘Retail investor’ is the industry term for ‘small investors’ or ‘individual investors’. Retail investors invest their 
own capital and will often hire an investment advisor to oversee their accounts and make decisions about their 
portfolio. The vast majority of retail clients do not have access to the same amount of capital as institutional clients.  
251 “IPs are designed to place the holder in an economic position similar to that of a purchaser of a portfolio of stocks 
consisting of those that make up the underlying index, with each stock represented in the portfolio in the same 
proportion as in the index” (TIPs-35 Application 1989, 6).   
252 “It is anticipated that TIPs will be priced by the market based on 1/10th of the Index level (or a lesser or greater 
fraction depending on the trust’s success at tracking the Index levels)” (TSE-35 Application 1989, 9). 1/10th pricing 
means that if an index was valued at 500, an ETF share would be priced at $50.  
253 TIPs were also structured with a physical underlying rather than derivatives due to the preferential treatment of 
dividend distributions within a trust under Canadian tax laws (Interviews 5, 10, 11, 20; TIPs-35 1989).  
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partially an ETF product. The TIPs product isolated the SuperUnit that tracked the S&P 500 and 
added the physical stocks instead of mutual fund shares. So, while the CIPs and SuperTrust 
ought to each be considered ETF products, the first modern-era, physically-backed ETF product 
was indeed the TIPs-35.  
The creation of the Canadian TIPs, while strikingly similar to the PHLX CIPs, underwent a 
very different development process. While the CIPs were largely developed in secret in hopes of 
avoiding copycat products, the Toronto Stock Exchange created an advisory committee that 
consisted of indexers, active managers, futures and options industry representatives, and 
individuals that used cash baskets, such as those that ran equities trading desks at investment 
banks such as Royal Bank of Canada. In the year the advisory committee was created, 1989, the 
TSE offered two indices: the TSE-100 and TSE-300.254 These indices were not ideal for basket 
trading, the TIPs advisory committee found, as interested groups complained that both indices 
were too broad for Canadian markets and had poor liquidity. As one of the TIPs developers 
explains:  
  
As for the 100 index, there probably weren’t 100 large cap companies in 
Canada…and the 300 was kind of awkward because it was just too damn hard 
to buy the bottom 50 names at times - actually, often (Interview 5).   
  
A TSE-60 index was discussed within the committee but was ultimately rejected by the 
derivatives representatives in attendance on the grounds that “a fixed number of names would 
suit their trading better, their baskets better” (Interview 5). In the Canadian marketplace at the 
time, finding 60 large-cap companies that would remain relatively stable enough to remain on 
the 60 index was difficult. Derivatives traders were concerned that if the smaller companies on 
																																																						
254 The Toronto Stock Exchange created and maintained its own indices until it sold this portion of their business to 
Standard & Poor’s in later years. Specifically, the TSE-60 became the S&P/TSX 60 on December 31, 1998.  
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the TSE-60 index routinely changed position within the marketplace, the index constituents 
would be changing constantly. To address the concerns of the derivatives community, the 
advisory committee settled on a TSE-35 index, comprised of the 35 largest Canadian companies 
traded on the TSE. Settling on 35 names was thought to be the most efficient grouping in the 
Canadian marketplace for basket trading and basket products:  
 
Interviewer: Would it be fair to say that the Toronto-35 index was developed 
for the sole purpose of an ETF product?  
 
Interview 20: Yup, that’s right…the Toronto-35 index was intended to be 
investable and also designed as a basket-weighted index, not a traditional 
market-cap weighted index. And it was designed to be highly liquid, very 
investable, with the opportunity for people to do cash-to-index arbitrage in 
order to keep the index in line with the broader market.  
 
It appears that equities traders also had a large influence in the negotiations for the TSE-35 
index. At the time of negotiations, Canadian equities trading desks were using spreadsheet 
trading, which allowed trading desks to launch all of their orders from a single spreadsheet 
instead of submitting trades one-by-one. A former executive of the TSE recalls:  
 
[A prominent equities trader involved in negotiations] swears up and down that 
the reason there were 35 stocks in the index was because the then-version of 
Lotus 1-2-3 that they were using could comfortably fit 35 cells on one screen 
(Interview 20).255 
 
As a result of negotiations within the advisory committee, the TSE-35 index was created for 
the purpose of underlying the TIPs ETF basket. While the index also benefitted institutional 
traders and the derivatives community, the TSE-35 was designed specifically to give Canadian 
																																																						
255 Lotus 1-2-3 was the fastest computer application used for spreadsheet trading. Lotus developers pioneered new 
coding that allowed for instantaneous calculations and updates. It was launched by IBM on January 26, 1983. 
Microsoft overtook the Lotus application in the 1990s and Lotus was discontinued in 2014.  
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retail investors convenient access to a diversified and highly liquid basket that they could enter 
and exit out of at any time.  
Unlike the hostile environment encountered by the CIPs development team, the Canadian 
markets offered an ideal environment for ETFs to emerge. First, there was a lack of industry 
interests in the Canadian futures industry, and second, there was a clear priority placed on 
innovations benefitting the interests of Canadian retail investors by exchanges and regulators 
alike.  
During this time in Canada, futures were traded on the Montreal Exchange. While the 
Montreal Exchange was a prolific innovator - it was the first in North America to trade currency 
options, the first to trade gold options through international linkages,256 the first exchange to 
become fully automated,257 and the first foreign exchange to oversee the everyday operations of 
an American exchange258 - it was often thought of as “the little Canadian exchange” (Freeman 
1985, 1) as its volumes were miniscule in comparison to its American counterparts. As explained 
by a former TSE executive:  
 
[In the U.S.] there was significantly entrenched interests around futures. In 
Canada, obviously, we didn’t have that. There really was very little liquidity at 
all around the index or index futures in particular. You didn’t have that 
entrenched self-interest of the futures exchanges. The Montreal Exchange 
wasn’t going to go to the mattresses to protect their futures, unlike the United 
States (Interview 20).  
  
																																																						
256 MX established linkages for cash-settled (instead of bullion-settled) gold options trading with Amsterdam and 
Australia in the late 1980s.   
257 Of the exchanges in North America that used the specialist system, the MX was the first to completely remove 
the specialist system. MX transitioned to full automation in 2001.  
258 The MX was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Boston Options Exchange (BOX) as the MX was 
the sole provider of BOX’s electronic trading systems. The system provided was the Sola Trading platform. The 
Sola Trading Platform was engineered by the MX specifically for derivatives trading and is still used today.  
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The status of futures in Canada was significant to the emergence of the TIPs ETFs because ETFs 
are commonly seen as alternatives to index futures. Thus, as was seen in the CIPs case (Chapter 
Five), futures exchanges viewed ETFs as a threat that would cut into their market share if ETFs 
gained traction. In the United States, early ETF innovators were keenly aware of the competitive 
dynamic with the futures industry:  
 
The entrenched businesses, whether it’s the Merc259 or Board of Trade, you 
knew…you were up against them too (Interview 20).  
 
As there was not a robust or liquid futures market in Canada in the late 1980s, the TSE did not 
have to negotiate with the Montreal Exchange for the TIPs’ entrance into the market. As there 
existed no influential industry lobby to support index futures in Canada, the TIPs product was 
introduced to the financial market with no opposition. Interestingly, the TIPs product also 
received no objections from the Canadian mutual fund industry:  
 
It was really two worlds. We had very little engagement with the mutual fund 
guys at all. Again, [like the Montreal Exchange], they didn’t feel like their 
retail core was being disintermediated (Interview 20).  
 
The second environmental condition that enabled TIPs to launch quickly with immediate 
success was the priority that exchanges placed on the Canadian retail investor. Product 
developers (Interview 10) and exchange executives (Interview 5) alike expressed similar 
sentiments:  
 
There was that real belief…that we were doing something that was helping 
individual investors in improving their investing experiences and outcomes. 
We wanted to feel good about the work we did…to feel like we’ve made 
people better off (Interview 5);  
 
																																																						
259 ‘Merc’ is industry slang for the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.   
	 207	
‘What would be in the best interest of the investor?’ That really guided our 
product strategy (Interview 10).  
 
The priority given to the needs of small investors resulted in an ETF structure that was easy 
to understand and more accessible than both the CIPs and SuperTrust. As the TIPs were 
deliberately designed for retail clients and their investment advisors, they did not require the 
special accounts or derivatives-trading qualifications that the CIPs and SuperTrust did. Any 
advisor could easily understand the TIPs, purchase it for any client account, and explain it in an 
uncomplicated manner no matter their clients’ financial literacy. The simplified structure of the 
TIPs also made negotiations with Canadian regulators much easier than in the United States.  
The relationship between the TSE CIPs innovators and their regulator, the Ontario Securities 
Commission, was a collaborative and productive one:  
 
A lot of jurisdictions, including Canada, tell you what you can do. But in the 
US, they tell you what you can’t do (Interview 5).260  
 
Canadian innovators found that the proactive approach the Ontario Securities Commission took 
towards the product made the approval process much quicker than in the US. Whereas the CIPs 
were in development between 1985 and 1989, and the SuperTrust between 1987 and 1992, the 
TIPs were developed and brought to market in just two months:261 
 
I don’t recall that there was a lot of pushback or significant issues related to the 
product or prospectus…As far as the acceptance of the product, it was fantastic 
(Interview 20);  
																																																						
260 It is important to note that there is no national securities regulator in Canada. Each province has their own 
regulator. As the TIPs were a product of the TSE, the Ontario Securities Commission was the primary regulator.  
261 Oral histories suggest that the CIPs concept was incubating for years before the first documents were produced. 
A SuperTrust developer suggested that they first began to think about the product concept on October 20, 1987 - the 
day after the market break (Interview 23), though documents were not produced until the following year. The TIPs 
application was submitted by the TSE in September 1989 and was approved by the OSC in November, 1989 (OSC 
Ruling Order dated 7 November 1989). 
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In Toronto, it was much more of an enthusiastic adoption by the regulators - 
that helped” (Interview 10).  
 
 
ETF innovation flows: From the U.S. to Canada and back again 
	
Despite the very different environments the Canadian and American ETF developers were 
operating in, innovation flowed easily across borders and concepts were shared and improved 
upon with each reinterpretation of the ETF concept. To reiterate, the first ETF concept was the 
CIPs in Philadelphia, followed by the SuperTrust in California, the TIPs in Toronto, and the SPY 
in New York. The CIPs and SuperTrust made their applications with no named precedents, 
whereas the TIPs and SPDR developers, to varying extents, credit CIPs and SuperTrust as 
relevant precedents:  
 
TIPs are designed to fill a role in the marketplace in Canada similar to that of 
index participations (“IPs”) in the United States (TIPs-35 Application 27 
September 1989, 6);  
 
The first attempt, as far as I’m aware, to do a unit trust product representing a 
basket of shares was actually at the NYSE, and it was something called 
SuperShares (Interview 20).  
 
Once it was clear that the CIPs were to be delisted, individuals from the TSE contacted the 
PHLX developers and met them for an informal meeting in Philadelphia. As oral histories 
suggest,262 the TSE asked for permission to adopt the CIPs concept for Canadian retail investors. 
As the SEC lost the CIPs’ legal appeal and the PHLX refused to have their product traded as a 
																																																						
262 To the author’s knowledge, there is no documented evidence of this meeting. No participants from Toronto could 
be found to verify the details from their point of view. However, the meeting was confirmed by two former PHLX 
members and one former TSE member (though the TSE member was not in attendance at the actual meeting).  
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futures contract, the PHLX agreed and Canadian developers went to work to simplify the design 
of the CIPs and restructure it for Canadian investors.  
Unlike previous ETF attempts in the U.S., the TIPs succeeded by capitalizing on the 
strengths of the CIPs and SuperTrust and adapting them for Canadian retail clients. For example, 
the SuperTrust was struggling to attract assets because of its complicated splitting function - the 
function that allowed, for example, one SuperUnit to be divided into two SuperShares. TIPs 
developers realized that the SuperTrust was not only excessively complicated even for the 
financially literate, but its high fees and inappropriate pricing structure made the product largely 
inaccessible: 
 
The issue [the TSE had with SuperTrust] was that it was a very, very large 
sized basket. I think the underlying value was two-point-something million 
which took it completely out of the realm of the retail space (Interview 20).  
 
The SuperTrust was just not financially or conceptually accessible to the retail investor 
despite its claims to the contrary.263 However, TIPs innovators saw an opportunity in the 
SuperTrust’s structure. In isolating the Index SuperUnit, the TIPs innovators were able to 
develop the component they felt would best serve their retail community and substitute its 
underlying - the mutual fund shares - with the physical stocks in the TSE-35 index: 
 
																																																						
263 Refer to Chapter Six for examples of the SuperTrust marketing strategy.  
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Figure 5. Isolating the TIPs-35 from the SuperTrust. Depiction is the author’s own. 
	
In addition, because the TIPs-35 was a product made by the Toronto Stock Exchange, there were 
no management fees charged to investors. This made the TIPs substantially less expensive and 
more tax efficient for retail clients than mutual funds.264  
After its launch, the TIPs grew exponentially in its assets under management and began to 
attract the attention of the American exchanges. As a former TSE executive recalls, “there were 
conversations back and forth with the guys at the AMEX” (Interview 20) over the TIPs 
development process and the potential of a physical ETF for American markets. In fact, when the 
first physical ETF product filed for SEC approval in the United States, developers included the 
TIPs-35 prospectus in the application’s appendix:  
 
Well of course there were a lot of things preceding it back in the day. But we 
always told Nate Most and his team at the AMEX when they tried to explain 
																																																						
264 The TIPs-35 had approximately 5 basis points of operating expenses (0.05%). These expenses were charged back 
to the fund and subsidized by the TSE so the product could be completely free for investors. The tax benefits of 
ETFs as compared to mutual funds are discussed in Chapter Eight.  
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that they were the real innovators, that, you know, ‘Nate, whose prospectus 
was stapled to whose prospectus as an example of another product?’ (Interview 
20).  
 
The first physical ETF in the United States was called the Standard & Poor’s Depository 
Receipt 500 - most commonly referred to as the ‘SPY, ‘spider’, or ‘SPDR’ - and submitted its 
first request for exemption from the 1940 Act on June 25, 1990, just three months after the TIPs 
launch in Canada.265 Similarly to the TIPs, the SPY was a physical ETF, meaning it was backed 
by physical stocks in the same proportions as the index it tracked, which was the S&P 500. Just 
as the TIPs was able to refine the CIPs product by removing the derivative component and 
replacing it with physical stocks, the SPDR was able to refine the TIPs physical basket by 
creating something called a creation/redemption mechanism.266   
The creation/redemption mechanism has become the integral component of modern ETFs. 
When an ETF company wants to create ETF shares, it enlists the help of an authorized 
participant, which is typically an investment bank or institution with substantial capital. To 
create SPDR ETF shares, for example, the authorized participant will physically purchase all of 
the stocks in the S&P 500 index in the same weight as they exist in the index. The authorized 
participant will then transfer the stocks to the ETF issuer in exchange for ETF shares. After this 
transaction, the ETF issuer has the physical stocks that enable it to track the index, and the 
authorized participant has ETF shares which it can trade over an exchange. This is the ‘creation’ 
part of the mechanism:267  
																																																						
265 Since its launch on the AMEX, the SPDR ETF has grown to be the most popular and heavily traded ETF in the 
world. As such, it has been the subject of innumerable research publications, books, and articles so its structure and 
history will not be covered in detail here. For an excellent overview of this product, refer to Gastineau (2000), 
Groves (2011), State Street Global Advisors (2013), and Sullivan (2013).  
266 As discussed previously, the structure of physical ETFs such as the SPDR are also adapted from the SuperTrust’s 
S&P 500 Index SuperUnit. The SuperUnit was identified as a precedent in SPDR negotiations as it was with TIPs.  
267 In the United States, creation/redemption transactions may only be executed in blocks of 50,000 units as per SEC 
rulings (specifically, the 1940 Act). 
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Figure 6. ETF creation process. Depiction is the author’s own. 
 
The redemption mechanism also works in reverse: The AP may purchase ETF shares over the 
exchange and exchange their ETF shares for the physical stocks being held by the ETF issuer. 
This will remove ETF shares from the market.  
The creation/redemption mechanism created by the SPDR developers was important because 
it provided a simple mechanism to keep the ETF share price in line with the value of its index. 
Because ETFs trade over an exchange at market value, their price may, on occasion, deviate 
from the value of their constituent securities. This is typically referred to as a tracking error. If 
short-term price deviations occur, the authorized participant will intervene by conducting 
arbitrage. For example, if the SPDR ETF shares rise above the value of their underlying S&P 
500 securities, the authorized participant will purchase the discounted S&P 500 stocks and sell 
the SPDR ETF shares. This arbitrage will reduce the tracking error between the ETF price and 
the price of its underlying stocks. Because this process allows the authorized participant to profit 
from exploiting the discrepancy in price between the ETF and underlying stocks, it is in their 
best interest to immediately capitalize on deviations, efficiently keeping the ETF in line with the 
index it tracks.268  
																																																						
268 The creation/redemption system is also efficient for retail investors in ETFs as the authorized participant pays the 
trading expenses involved with acquiring or disposing of ETF shares. If mutual funds need to create shares, the 
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The creation/redemption mechanism refined the structure of the TIPs ETF. The TIPs took 
longer to clear and settle than the SPDR because a variety of TSE members, not an authorized 
participant, had to agree to assemble the stock baskets and deliver the TIPs to purchasers during 
a set-distribution period.269 While similar to TIPs, the SPY’s creation/redemption mechanism 
was proven to be more effective and now underlies all physical ETF structures, enabling trades 
to clear and settle within three trading days - the standard for any stock trade.  
While there exist thousands of ETFs in North America that represent incredibly varied 
structures, the first product structure to be approved, traded, and marketed using the terminology 
of ‘exchange-traded fund’ in the United States was the physical, index-tracking SPDR ETF. 
However, the historical trajectory of innovation demonstrates that this product did not emerge ex 
nihilo; it was instead a product that emerged from the deliberate adoption of previous 
innovations combined with its unique socio-technical environment. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the technological revolution in American financial markets 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s created the infrastructure necessary for baskets of stocks to be 
traded with the push of a button which, in turn, made index options and futures possible for the 
first time. The Philadelphia Stock Exchange, looking for an opportunity to capitalize on the 
exploding popularity of index derivatives, created the first formally defined ETF called CIPs 
(Chapter Five). Concurrently, the developers of portfolio insurance were working on the 
																																																						
trading costs are passed on to investors. Refer to Chapter One or Chapter Eight for a discussion comparing ETFs and 
mutual funds.		
269 Distributions of TIPs initially took 15 trading days to settle, then later dropped to 5 days. The following process 
typically took place: on the day prior to issuance, TIPs were listed for trading. All purchases of TIPs within the 
distribution period would be settled by the issuance of TIPs shares against the delivery of stock baskets by Exchange 
members. This process would continue on an as-needed basis. The Exchange would invite members to act as 
underwriters for the TIPs: “…the Exchange will announce the issue day and the proposed size of the issue and invite 
underwriters to commit for an allotment of TIPs…This allotment will bind underwriters to purchase the allotted 
number of TIPs…the underwriters will deposit baskets of shares and any accrued distribution amounts with the trust 
and will be issued certificates for TIPs” (TIPs-35 Application 1989, 8).  
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SuperTrust. As previously discussed, the SuperTrust used portfolio theory and new trading 
technologies to construct a product that could control risk through diversification, protecting 
investors from another market crisis (Chapter Six). Despite receiving landmark exemptions to 
the 1940 Act, the SuperTrust launched to modest interest and was eventually delisted, meeting 
the same fate as its predecessor, the PHLX CIPs.  
At this point in ETF history - 1989 - ETF innovation transitioned from experimental 
development inspired by institutional trading strategies to building upon the concepts of the 
SuperTrust and CIPs products which provided clear documented histories and regulatory 
precedents. A deliberate effort from the TSE to bring the CIPs product to market with 
modifications for Canadian investors resulted in the first physically-backed index ETF. This 
product was then deliberately adopted by the AMEX and modified into a physical ETF fit for 
American investors and regulation.  
However, the SPDR was not initially popular in the United States, unlike the CIPs was in 
Canada. From the SPDR’s launch in 1993 and continuing for several years after, the influx of 
assets was modest, trading volumes were disappointing, and no substantial marketing effort was 
made to attract investment.270 In what follows, Barclays Global Investors (BGI) and their suite of 
iUnits ETFs in Canada will be introduced. iUnits developed in Canada and later transitioned to 
the United States and were rebranded as iShares. The subsequent launch of iShares in the United 
States (discussed later in this chapter) represented the first time that a concerted effort was put 
behind educating American retail investment advisors and their clients about the benefits of 
																																																						
270 Companies were hired on behalf of the SuperTrust to market the product through distribution channels. However, 
individuals from these marketing companies have admitted that the product was difficult to sell because their clients 
- and their own sales staff - had difficulties understanding the product structure. These difficulties resulted in lower 
than expected sales. Refer to Chapter Six for discussion.   
	 215	
index ETFs. The deliberate effort behind marketing ETFs catalyzed their exponential growth and 
proliferation across the US marketplace.   
 
iUnits to iShares: A case study in transnational innovation  
	
Proxy contests and the establishment of iUnits in Canada  
	
By 1999, the TSE offered two sister ETFs - the original TIPs-35 ETF and the TIPs-100 ETF 
that tracked the TSE-100 index. While the two TIPs products were largely influenced by CIPs 
and SuperTrust, their ultimate purpose was different. Notably, the TIPs were designed to be 
marketed and sold as a retail product from their inception, making them the first ETF products in 
North America to be both constructed for and marketed to the retail community. However, as the 
TIPs were a product of the Toronto Stock Exchange and charged investors no fees, the TSE was 
not able to afford as significant a marketing push as they felt the product deserved and decided to 
exit the index fund business. In 1999, the TSE issued a proxy vote to combine the TIPs-35 and 
TIPs-100 and transfer the new product’s management to an independent firm.  
In October 1999, Barclays Global Investors Canada Ltd. (BGI) had launched their first ETF 
called the iUnits S&P/TSE 60 Index Participation Fund that tracked the 60 largest stocks in 
Canada. As their iUnits were achieving early success, BGI solicited to have the TIPs ETFs rolled 
into the iUnit ETF. However, State Street entered a surprise bid for the TIPs ETFs in hopes of 
establishing their own presence in Canada’s promising ETF market. What resulted was one of 
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the first proxy fights in Canadian financial history.271 A proxy fight or proxy contest is, as the 
name implies, a competitive bid by two or more institutions for the control over a financial 
organization. As the TIPs ETF was the subject of the proxy contest, the TIPs shareholders were 
the legal owners of the TIPs and were thus required to submit their preference of future TIPs 
administration through a proxy vote. As a former executive of BGI Canada recalls:  
 
Oh my god, we were elated at our whole strategy and we could see a bright 
future ahead of us and, all of a sudden, this challenge from State Street [for the 
TIPs]. They formed a very aggressive attack about why theirs was a better 
product. It was a fascinating process! We effectively had a war room where 
everyday we tried to figure out what State Street was doing (Interview 5).  
    
To counter State Street’s bid, BGI launched an aggressive marketing bid for the TIPs rollover 
that involved purchasing primetime television ads, creating a dedicated and investor-friendly 
website for their iUnits, and hiring academics from the University of Toronto to write both 
academic and print media articles about the merits of BGI and their ETFs.272 The following 
passages are representative examples of the print media marketing published by BGI:  
 
A greater critical mass and higher fees will permit the manager, Barclays 
Global Investors Canada Ltd., to put a bigger spotlight on the advantages of 
buying an index fund than the TSE could ever afford (Toronto Star 2000, C4);  
 
I really like the new i60s…But readers shouldn’t sell their TIPs to buy them. 
That would be a horrible thing, which would trigger a capital gain and 
commissions. [Wait until] the conversion takes place, there will be no 
additional costs (Kirzner 2000, 1).  
																																																						
271 While proxy fights were relatively rare in Canada until 2003 (when 5 proxy fights were initiated), they grew 
steadily from the financial crisis in 2008 until 2012 when 30 proxy fights were recorded. For an excellent legal 
summary of proxy fights in Canada, refer to Proxy Contests: Issues and Trends published by the Hedge Fund 
General Counsel Summit (2013).  
272 The (now defunct) website was www.iUnits.com, and BGI worked with individuals within the Rotman School of 
Management to produce promotional literature. At least one of these individuals, Eric Kirzner, held a position of 
interest in the TIPs-35 management. Kirzner, in particular, was instrumental in pioneering the concept of “armchair 
investing” and participated in many Toronto Star articles about passive, index based investments such as the i60s. 
Refer to Luukko (Toronto Star 20 November 1999, U1), Cruise and Griffiths (Toronto Star 15 November 1999, D2), 
and Toronto Star (21 February 2000, Business 1) for examples of Kirzner’s efforts.  
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The lower management expense and the higher returns of IPUs [Index 
Participation Units] are, of course, very attractive. But the thing I like most 
about IPUs is that they avoid gambler’s ruin…IPUs go up when the market 
goes up and down when the market goes down (Kirzner interview in Cruise 
and Griffiths 1999, D2). 
 
BGI Canada won the proxy contest against State Street due in large part to their already 
established presence in the Canadian ETF market, something State Street did not yet have. In 
early 2000, the TIPs-35 and TIPs-100 were rolled into BGI’s ETF, the iUnits S&P/TSE 60 Index 
Participation Fund (popularly referred to as the ‘i60s’). While many institutional investors 
immediately sold their iUnits because of the fee increase,273 the vast majority of retail investors 
stayed invested and new investors quickly began to accumulate: 
 
We knew then we had remade the indexing game for retail. Within a few 
months, we knew. They were very popular…I think we definitely felt like we 
were fighting above our weight and contributing to what, collectively, had been 
a lot of innovation (Interview 5).274  
 
Newspaper articles making the iUnits accessible began appearing with more frequency. 
Analogies were often used to make the product relatable to those without advanced investment 
knowledge. Consider the following examples from newspapers discussing iUnits:  
 
If you think your chances of making a good investment are about as random as 
throwing a dart at the stock tables, there’s an increasingly popular alternative. 
It’s called indexing. In effect, the manager of an index fund flings a whole 
basketful of darts, hitting everything in sight (Luukko 1999, U1);  
																																																						
273 The iUnits product had a fee of 0.17 percent of assets, whereas the TIPs were subsidized by the TSE and thus free 
to hold. iUnits promoters justified the fee increase by comparing their 0.17 percent fee to popular Canadian index 
mutual fund management fees, which averaged between 0.5 percent (Altamira Precision Canadian Index Mutual 
Fund) and 0.9 percent (CIBC Canadian Index Mutual Fund). 
274 In addition to creating the world’s first physical ETF (TIPs-35), Canadian developers also created the world’s 
first bond ETFs, currency hedged ETFs, and synthetic ETFs. Most of these innovations are attributed to iShares, a 
division of BGI (now known as BlackRock). The iShares were first launched as iUnits in Canada. However, once 




Figure 7. Toronto Star cartoon, 1999. 
 
BGI’s marketing of index ETFs was focused on providing accessible education to those 
without advanced financial literacy. Specifically, various media outlets were used to compare the 
cost-benefits of ETFs versus mutual funds, the relatively safety of ETFs, and separating the 
product from the concept of gambling.  
 
Transitioning iUnits to iShares in the United States  
	
The success of the TIPs and iUnits in Canada inspired BGI to translate their Canadian 
strategy south in order to access to the American retail market. In 1997, Barclays U.S. had 
reached a valuation ceiling and executives believed the only way to catalyze growth was to enter 
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the retail investment market.275 As Barclays U.S. did not have any retail products in the U.S. at 
this time, the executive committee began evaluating their options, which were thought to be 
either purchasing a mutual fund operation or attempting to construct one from scratch 
(Interviews 5, 10, 20). Each of these options would be extraordinarily expensive with no 
guarantee of success as the American mutual fund industry was filled with legacy institutions 
had been firmly entrenched in the marketplace since the 1920s. As a former BGI executive 
recalls:  
 
I have never been a fan of strategies were you go and try to copy what someone 
else is doing and then you try to convince investors that they should do it with 
us because we’re doing it better, right? And that’s exactly what we would have 
been facing with the mutual fund industry (Interview 10). 
 
BGI U.S. began looking for alternate pathways to increase their valuation through the retail 
market. BGI U.S. had followed the success of the TIPs-35 in Canada and began recruiting 
individuals involved with either the TIPs product, the Toronto Stock Exchange, or with BGI’s 
Canadian operations: for example, four interview participants for this project had begun working 
in the Canadian ETF industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s. By the late 1990s, all had either 
been recruited by BGI U.S. or had been transferred to the BGI U.S. offices in senior executive 
positions. As one transferred executive recalls, the prominence of Canadians throughout BGI’s 
American offices contributed to the enthusiasm for ETFs at BGI U.S.: 
 
[A BGI colleague] said, ‘You know, I’ve been hearing about these exchange 
traded funds, TIPs, and I thought we maybe could use those to try and get into 
the retail market instead of using mutual funds’. I said, ‘That is a brilliant idea! 
Why didn’t I think of it?!’. It seemed obvious in retrospect…We went to see 
the Chairman, who was also a Canadian, so he knew a lot about the Canadian 
markets and had TIPs too (Interview 10).  
																																																						
275 In 1997-1998, BGI was the largest institutional trader in the United States but had yet to enter the retail business.   
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The concept of iShares (known in Canada as iUnits) was pitched to the board of Barclays 
Bank in 1998 and BGI U.S., now with many Canadian ETF developers amongst its ranks, 
received an enthusiastic response. In 1998, the executives at Barclays Bank had decided to 
reorganize and invest heavily in various strategic initiatives that would expand their business and 
create new products for clients.276 The initiatives included an organizational restructuring of the 
firm, developing the quantitative side of BGI’s business, and, after BGI’s pitch, developing the 
iShares suite of ETFs in the United States. A former BGI executive reflects on the meeting they 
had with Barclays Bank about the potential for ETFs in the United States:  
 
Canadian connections allowed [Barclays] to grasp very quickly that this was a 
great idea…What really mattered was the fact that we had several Canadians at 
the top of the firm who knew all about TIPs. Had we not been investing in TIPs 
personally at the time, it’s not even clear to me that the idea would have gotten 
traction at Barclay’s (Interview 10). 
 
Once the funding was allocated, BGI began work on developing the iShares brand. The iShares 
operation was to work completely independently from BGI, with management going so far as to 
house the iShares development team in a building entirely separate from the rest of BGI. This 
was in order to develop a distinct innovative culture centered around retail clients instead of 
BGI’s established specialty, which was institutional clientele.   
The iShares were able to be brought to market rather quickly as compared to the SuperTrust 
and SPY, which each took upwards of three years. The iShares applications (for the first 17 
ETFs) were submitted on April 30, 1999 and received SEC approval for launch on the AMEX on 
																																																						
276 There were five initiatives developed for BGI. These initiatives, in large part due to the iShares business, would 
take BGI from an approximate $500 million USD valuation in 1998 to $13.5 billion USD when BGI was sold by 
Barclays to BlackRock Global Investors in December of 2009.  
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April 17, 2000. As previously mentioned, the iShares developers had a template to work with 
courtesy of the SPDR and TIPs,277 so the majority of production time was spent negotiating 
exclusive contracts with index providers instead of justifying the 1940 Act exemption requests to 
the SEC:  
 
Interviewer: It must have taken quite a while to have all of your flagship ETFs 
approved with the SEC?  
 
Interviewee 10: Well it was negotiated not just through the SEC, but it was 
negotiations with all the index providers because we had to get Standard & 
Poor’s, and Russell, and everyone on board and contract it…So what I 
remember is the negotiations with the index providers (Interview 10).  
 
At the time, index providers such as Standard & Poor’s would license the use of their indices 
on an exclusive basis for qualifying products. For example, if Vanguard mutual funds had 
wanted to construct a mutual fund that tracked the S&P 500, they would need to negotiate and 
pay for an exclusive contract to use the S&P 500 brand name. However, these contractual 
agreements had only begun in the 1980s, when Merrill Lynch requested use of the S&P 500 
index for its Unit Investment Trust. As a former executive at S&P recalls:  
 
In those day at S&P, S&P evolved out of a financial publishing firm…We 
realized that folks out there were willing to pay to license the index and create 
products around it. Folks would come in and bring us all these prospectuses 
and want to license the index, and it started to become a steady flow to the 
point where by 1987 we had roughly 40 license contracts outstanding. And 
they were literally thrown in a file cabinet! Nobody knew what the terms were, 
everything was haphazard…There was no standardization whatsoever 
(Interview 15).  
 
																																																						
277 iShares took the same open-end fund structure as the SPDR, but drew their main inspiration from the TIPs: “We 
were very familiar with TIPs. [We] knew everything about them, or almost everything about them. So we really 
didn’t need to go back to get more input” (Interview 10).  
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The S&P index division’s profitability increased dramatically throughout the 1980s with the 
explosion in popularity of index futures and index options:  
 
After the crash in 1987, the volume took off in futures and options because you 
had development of a lot more structured products and risk management which 
didn’t really exist before that…We were getting really, really profitable money 
on each product because we were getting paid per transaction (Interview 15).  
 
By the time iShares began contacting index providers such as S&P, it was necessary to build 
relationships with each provider as competition for index products was continuing to increase. 
By 1998, BGI was meeting with S&P at least once every six months to discuss how the index 
was being used by their traders in the market and was providing insights for the S&P index 
developers about new index possibilities (Interviews 15, 18).  
The relationship built between index providers and innovators was crucial to the profitability 
of business ventures, the importance of which exchanges such as the PHLX learned the hard 
way: because the S&P had “extremely close” and “friendly” ties with the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange and the PHLX was often left out in the cold, requiring them to pursue their own index 
business as they could not get licensing from S&P (Interviews 15, 1). When the Philadelphia 
Exchange first began circulating information on their CIPs product, S&P executives noticed that 
the CIPs index was identical to the S&P 500, minus six or seven stocks (Interview 1). The S&P 
threatened litigation over the CIPs product unless the Philadelphia developers could prove that 
the CIPs was indeed different from the S&P 500 index futures and options offered at the Chicago 
exchanges, which had exclusive contracts to use the S&P 500 brand. Philadelphia successfully 
proved their product’s uniqueness, and they were granted an exclusive license to launch the CIPs 
using the S&P 500 brand after paying a fee.  
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 To avoid a similar fate to the PHLX, the iShares team spent over one year negotiating 
contracts with various index providers and ensuring their relationships were mutually 
beneficial.278 Standard & Poor’s quickly granted BGI iShares use of their indices because of the 
quality associated with BGI’s name:279 when asked to list the criteria that would determine 
whether or not a firm received a S&P license, a former S&P executive replied, “Basically, the 
brand name of the firm. Anyone we perceived who wasn’t a fly-by-night operation, we would 
license. Obviously the bigger firms had an easier time” (Interview 15).  
After the index contracts were formalized, the iShares brought their suite of ETFs to the 
SEC. Unlike their predecessors in the US ETF market, iShares developers were building upon 
previous ETF precedents and did not have to develop a close working relationship with the SEC 
regarding a permissible product structure. To BGI’s advantage, BGI Canada’s successful 
experiences with ETFs in Toronto had been observed closely by the SEC, with one executive 
commenting that “the Securities Commission was more familiar with ETFs in Canada than the 
U.S.” (Interview 5). 
By the year 2000, the SEC was becoming increasingly familiar with the structure of ETFs, 
how they were traded, and the protection and benefits ETFs offered for the investing public. As a 
result, the SEC began granting exemptions without requesting increased justifications for how 
the product was to benefit the public. What resulted was a streamlined approach to the ETF 
application process (Interviews 3, 29). In addition, particular SEC staff attorneys were known to 
																																																						
278 Interview participants from the S&P, AMEX, NYSE, and BGI referred to these index provider-innovator 
relationships as “gentleman’s agreements” where firms would give index providers insight into the trading practices 
in the markets and S&P would grant licenses subject to suitability. These agreements were always bespoke and the 
cost of an exclusive index contract varied from firm-to-firm.  
279 The brand name of the index is just as important to the firm: An industry-wide survey in 2000 indicated that 45% 
of investment advisors believed the brand name of an ETF’s index was “very important”, while 36% rated it as 
“moderately important”. 100% of ETF experts surveyed in the same year agreed that brand-name indices were 
needed for an ETF’s success because brand names would attract interest from specialists and market makers (Data 
provided by Interviewee 26 on behalf of the Financial Research Corporation).  
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be more proficient in the 1940 Act structure and ETF exemption process than others. Due to 
close ties between BGI and the SEC from previous projects, BGI attorneys and product 
developers knew who the “right people” were to speak with if there were any questions 
regarding their exemptive order (Interview 10). In addition, because of the respect associated 
with BGI’s name and its size in the marketplace, when developers did bring a question about 
iShares to the SEC, “…the SEC would give us an audience and they would listen carefully”, 
which helped to expedite the approval process (Interview 10). Thus, BGI was able to keep their 
iShares launch secret until they were ready - and certain - that their paperwork was correct and 
would be approved by the SEC without delay.280 On  April 17, 2000, 17 iShares ETFs were 
approved by the SEC for launch on the AMEX with little to no competition from other firms.281  
 
ETF education and marketing efforts  
	
By the time the iShares project received clearance from Barclays Bank in 1998, BGI 
executives noticed that other ETFs besides the SPDR were entering the market.282 However, 
none of these products were being marketed to retail clients and their investment advisors. The 
lack of ETF promotion throughout the United States led BGI executives to consider ETFs a 
“sleeping giant” (Interview 5) that held enormous potential to benefit both retail investors and 
BGI’s valuation. For example, the SPY was being “under-marketed and under-utilized” 
(Interview 20) and had no strategy to attract assets. As a former AMEX ETF consultant recalls, 
																																																						
280 The original iShares application required one small amendment at the request of the SEC. Upon correction, the 
entire product suite of the 17 ETFs was passed.  
281 For a complete list of the initial iShares suite that was launched in May 2000, refer to Appendix B. The initial 
SEC application date of the iShares suite was April 30, 1999. 
282 In 1998, there were 29 ETFs listed on American exchanges. 28 were listed on the AMEX and 1 was listed on the 
NYSE. The popularity of the AMEX as an ETF listing exchange will be discussed in Chapter Eight.  
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as late as 1997, the AMEX only required three part-time staff members to answer inquiries and 
distribute information about the SPY:283   
 
Frankly, State Street had already shown up in the U.S. with the SPDR but they 
were doing nothing with it. There was no marketing other than that it was 
there. So it was kind of a nascent area, it was interesting, some people were 
using [ETFs] but they weren’t promoted…We [iShares] had walked into a 
vacuum (Interview 5).  
 
In addition to the SPDR, other ETFs called World Equity Benchmark Series (WEBS) and 
CountryBaskets were launched on the AMEX.284 Both WEBS and CountryBaskets allowed 
investors to gain targeted exposure to 17 foreign indices of countries around the world. However, 
like the SPDR, these ETFs had not yet attracted substantial interest. BGI recognized an 
opportunity:    
 
A lot of the focus for both the WEBS basket and the CountryBasket that they 
were sponsoring was focused on institutions. So what we did was get at the 
retail market…we set up a marketing effort to teach investors about the 
benefits and get them to use them…And we had a fairly big budget from 
Barclays Bank to do that. Nobody had kind of thrown that concerted effort and 
the necessary financing behind it before…though the [TIPs and iUnits] 
provided us a template to work with” (Interview 10).  
 
During the early years of ETF marketing, index providers such as the S&P would travel to 
conferences around the United States to promote their S&P sponsored products.285 The iShares 
developers at BGI would do the same, often in participation with representative of their listing 
																																																						
283 The AMEX was the original distributor and sponsor of the SPDR, so it was the point of contact for inquiries 
about the ETF. “In all fairness, when they started there weren’t any calls. They started getting phone calls when they 
started getting out there to small and mid-sized investment managers. Then calls would rotate amongst three people” 
(Interview 15).  
284 WEBS and CountryBaskets are discussed in Chapter Eight.  
285 An Index Committee was tasked with marketing S&P licensed products at industry conferences around the 
United States. In the late 1980s, this committee was founded with approximately eight individuals and was 
considered a part-time job for those in S&P’s Index and Data Division (Interview 15).   
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exchange, the AMEX. Specifically, a large marketing effort was made by BGI directly to retail 
clients about the lower fees and the preferential tax treatment that ETFs offer in comparison to 
mutual funds.286 Less tax penalties and lower fees were concepts that were immediately grasped 
by retail investors, though more persuasion was needed to educate retail advisors as to why ETFs 
were better options than their well-established mutual funds. As will be discussed in Chapter 
Eight, these efforts to promote ETFs to retail advisors was often referred to as “missionary 
work”, “preaching”, and “spreading the gospel” as ETFs were not yet popular, did not have a 
significantly entrenched history, and did not offer the same lavish rewards to investment advisors 
as the mutual fund industry did.  
Despite initial skepticism from their distribution channels, the early efforts of iShares paid 
off. In the first two trading days after the iShares launch, four of the iShares ETFs attracted $1.2 
billion USD.287 While initial volumes largely came from institutional trades, the retail industry 
quickly caught on and volumes continued to grow.288 The explosion of ETF volume and depth of 
the ETF marketplace will be the subject of focus for the following chapter, Chapter Eight. In 
what follows, an analysis of the ETF innovation flows between the United States and Canada 
will be provided.  
 
Refining the ETF: A job for bricoleurs?  
	
Documented evidence demonstrates that the first formal ETF-style products were the CIPs 
and SuperTrust in the United States, which established the early definitional and regulatory 
																																																						
286 The taxation of ETFs and mutual funds is discussed in Chapter Eight. 	
287 Data provided by Interviewee 26 on behalf of Financial Research Corporation.   
288 The relationship between retail investors and ETFs will be discussed in Chapter Eight.   
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precedents for ETF-style products. Through the regulatory mediations that brought them to 
market, the CIPs and SuperTrust became concretely defined artefacts that produced rules and 
definitions about what ETF-style products were. Because of the formalization process, the early 
concepts of ETFs were easier to transfer across borders than the undefined and bespoke trading 
strategies of the decade prior. As strategies transitioned into formally bound products through 
socio-technical processes, the concept of what an ETF ought to be became increasingly refined 
as each product built on the precedent set by those that came before.   
What are the implications of an international innovative process such as the one discussed 
above? A product with origins in the United States, transferring and altering its structure to suit 
Canadian legislation, and transitioning back to the United States seems to clearly invoke Miller’s 
opportunistic cat-and-mouse dynamic289 where innovators seek to exploit any regulatory 
loopholes: the ETF’s entrance in to the Canadian marketplace was undoubtedly easier for 
innovators due to the regulatory and market environment. However, the cat-and-mouse dynamic 
falls short of offering a substantial theoretical structure to analyse the multi-faceted social and 
technical refinement and redefinition of the ETF product.  
To successfully apply Miller’s cat and mouse dynamic to the refinement of the ETF 
innovation, developers would have to be motivated by profit potential and exploit the loopholes 
or shortcomings of the regulatory apparatus. However, these motivating elements were not 
evident in many of the development cases. For example, while the PHLX attempted to create the 
CIPs to profit from developing a niche market, they worked closely with the SEC in order to 
ensure the product was within the boundaries of the existing securities legislation. The failure of 
the CIPs came not from the maneuvering of innovators versus regulators, but from inter-
																																																						
289 Refer to Chapter Two for a discussion of Miller’s theory of financial innovation. 
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regulatory conflict. The Canadian case of ETF development is also difficult to categorize as an 
innovation motivated by cat-and-mouse dynamics. Because the TIPs was a product of the 
Toronto Stock Exchange, its operating expenses were subsidized and thus was completely free to 
purchase, leaving no profit potential for the exchange.290 More so, the Ontario Securities 
Commission was in full support of the project for they believed it would benefit the small 
investor. There were no lengthy negotiations in Canada and no counterproductive or competitive 
dynamics between the Ontario Securities Commission and the Toronto Stock Exchange. As 
described earlier in this chapter, both regulators and innovators were working towards the same 
goal: providing retail investors an easy to understand, fully transparent product that would, they 
hoped, make investing experiences less intimidating and expensive than before.  
Perhaps more specifically, the translation of innovation across borders also presents an 
interesting study on how we are to understand the refinement of innovation. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, the framework of bricolage provides a useful contrast to processes of financial 
engineering that imply a defined goal and a set of purpose-driven tools to accomplish it. 
Bricolage, alternatively, is a process constituted by the gathering and recombination of resources, 
translating their original purposes to serve new ones. In the words of Levi-Strauss, the 
bricoleur’s universe “…is the contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or 
enrich the stock or to maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or destructions. The 
set of the ‘bricoleur’s’ means cannot therefore be defined in terms of a project. It is to be defined 
only by its potential use” (1966, 17).  
To understand the ETF’s transnational innovation process as bricolage is to understand the 
process’s fluidity, never having defined a beginning or end. This is in opposition to financial 
																																																						
290 The product itself had no fees that were passed on to investors. However, investment advisors would typically 
charge a fee for buying and selling products over the exchange on a client’s behalf.  
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engineering, which implies a clearly defined, final structure as a goal of innovative effort. As 
each reinterpretation of the ETF built on the developments of its predecessors, with developers 
using the devices at hand in order to translate the structure into something other than its original 
representation, the bricoleur’s accumulation and repurposing of resources is evident. However, 
the relationship drawn between human beings and their objects in bricolage remains problematic 
when applied to highly technical fields such as financial markets.  
As a meta-framework, bricolage subscribes to the human-centric conception of agency 
which, as described in Chapters Two and Four, provides an incomplete account of how agency 
forms and is expressed in the financial markets. Bricolage describes actors manipulating and 
shaping their environments. While this is not problematic in itself, it does deny the unique socio-
technical agency that is illuminated when one considers how human beings simultaneously shape 
and are shaped by their devices. With socio-technical agency, human beings are more than 
bricoleurs: humans are products of their social and technical environments and are thus able to 
express unique forms of agency that are irreducible to either themselves or their technical 
devices. For example, the cognitions of human beings are built in to their devices (such as 
computing programs) which are then used to equip human beings who participate in the financial 
markets. The human being and the devices they use to interact with the financial market create 
the financial actor through enabling a socio-technical expression of agency: it is this fusion 
between human beings and their devices that brings about the particular form of agency 
expressed in the financial markets and creates a ‘financial actor’. Bricolage denies this 
expression of agency because it describes the human being as an independent actor who reaches 
into their environment to collect and recombine devices without being affected by them. In 
reality, each interaction with devices equips the human being and projects their socio-technical 
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agency in a new way, either through the formation of desire or the formation of action (Refer to 
Chapter Four for a discussion on socio-technical agency and the financial markets).  
Innovation, for the bricoleur, is inherently unstable as devices - rules, technical objects, and 
cognitive interpretations - are constantly being disassembled, recombined, and translated into 
new artefacts: Engelen et al’s (2011) latticework of innovation is particularly adept at explaining 
the impermanence of financial innovations. However, in describing innovation in this way, 
financial artefacts are no longer seen as deliberate constructs or achievements of social and 
technical assemblages. Instead, innovations are seen as a side effect of one’s interpretation and 
manipulation of an external environment.   
The concept of bricolage does present an a priori problem: if innovation is to be understood 
as vast lattice works of ever-changing interconnections, combinations, and repurposing, anything 
‘new’ is to be understood as a reinterpretation of ‘old’. While this would (non-problematically) 
indicate that an innovation is a product of its environment, it does not address how the artefacts 
that comprise the environment are first created by (and simultaneously give shape to) those who 
are in participation with them. As was demonstrated in Chapter Four, emerging trading 
technologies allowed human beings to participate in the financial markets in new ways. Soon 
after, market participants began constructing strategies and products that were reliant on the 
technological infrastructure so much so that participating in the financial markets is now possible 
only through participation with socio-technical devices. This socio-technical form of agency, as 
analysed in Chapter Two, provides a deeper understanding of the innovation process as it focuses 
on human beings and their devices, which is particularly beneficial to technologically advanced 
fields such as finance.  
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More specifically, the refinement of ETF was not solely a recombining and repurposing of 
available infrastructure. To make the ETF structure possible, new regulations were drafted, new 
entities such as authorized participants were constructed, and new technological systems were 
developed. While product designs of later ETFs were unquestionably adapted from their 
predecessors, the differing interpretations of the ETF concept in Canada and the U.S. were a 
result of the different social and technical environments the innovators were working within. 
These environments - shaped by available technology, regulatory relationships, systems of 
investor education, and corporate governance - each produced a unique ETF structure that was 
defined in ways distinct from its predecessors. For example, while both Canadian and American 
ETF developers named the CIPs ETF as a precedent to their products, the differing social and 
technical relationships in the two countries produced very different results for very different 
investors, such as the SuperTrust and the TIPs. While this example does not disqualify bricolage 
from providing a useful framework of analysis, the large variance in style of ETFs that resulted 
in each the U.S. and Canada suggests that there were deeper social and environment assemblages 
that influenced the ETF design.  
To reiterate, the purpose of this chapter was to analyse the international flow of early ETF 
innovation between the U.S. and Canada. In doing so, questions were raised concerning how the 
refinement of innovation challenges what we know about financial engineering and bricolage, 
and how socio-technical analysis may contribute to this discussion. The specific case study 
presented was the transition of BGI’s iUnits in Canada to BGI’s iShares in the United States, 
though this case study was set within a broader historical analysis that included innovations that 
came both before and after BGI’s ETFs. Concluding analysis suggests that the refinement of the 
ETF concept from the U.S. to Canada and back again was not simply recombining already 
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existing artefacts for new uses, nor was it a simple case of financial engineering: with each 
translation of the ETF concept, new rules and systems of education had to be defined, 
concretized, and then legitimated by financial actors. The refinement of the ETF product concept 
- from early experimentation with the CIPs to a more streamlined design of the SPY - 
demonstrates that bricolage only goes part way in providing a complete explanation for 
transnational flows of innovation: to provide a more thorough analysis, the impact of the socio-

























The Retail Channel: The ETF’s Final Frontier 
 
ETFs are now one of the fastest-growing and most popular investment vehicles in the United 
States with total assets under management soon expected to eclipse mutual funds. The purpose of 
this chapter is to examine the factors that enabled the ETF industry to proliferate at an 
unprecedented rate after its lacklustre start with the failed CIPs and SuperTrust projects. 
Specifically, three developments will be analysed for their role in contributing to the growth and 
depth of the ETF marketplace. First, the historical shift from commission to fee-based advisory 
structures will be analysed as an event that created demand for discount advisory operations - 
‘mom and pop’ investment shops - and packaged, cost-efficient retail products such as ETFs. 
Second, the amendments to the Unlisted Trading Privileges legislation will be discussed because 
the amendments allowed exchanges to immediately list one another’s ETFs and compete for 
order flow. This greatly enhanced the competitive relationship between the AMEX and NYSE 
and resulted in a multitude of new ETFs being brought to market and the ultimate downfall of 
the AMEX, who once held a monopoly over ETF listings. Third, these events will be analysed 
for their role in constructing something known as the registered investment advisory (RIA) 
channel, a channel that created a strong demand for ETFs and catalysed the explosive growth of 




“If there’s one thing banks love, it’s charging fees”291  
	
May Day: The deregulation of trading commissions292   
	
Since the inception of formalized financial exchanges, member firms would charge a 
commission fee for their brokers to place trades on behalf of their clients. The SEC oversaw the 
commission structures, which were fixed at high rates and made trading unaffordable for average 
individuals. Most often, commission rates were charged as a percentage of the trade value or 
price per share. Prior to the deregulation of commissions on May 1, 1975, the vast network of 
informal agreements led to exchanges such as the NYSE being called ‘clubs’ that were only 
accessible to institutions or individuals with substantial personal wealth. These agreements were 
as old as the exchanges themselves and the gentlemanly accord of the time offered no incentive 
for participants to negotiate for lesser rates. In fact, brokers that attempted to give discounts to 
their clients risked being banned from trading on the NYSE. In order to remain competitive 
under the fixed commission structure, many firms offered free services like customized research 
reports in order to add value to their clients. This system of fixed, high commissions meant that it 
often cost the same per share to trade $100 or $100,000 worth of stock, leaving smaller retail 
investors with no affordable way to access the market. As a former executive of an electronic 
trading platform recalls, brokerages “…didn’t do anything illegal, they just didn’t have the 
incentive to change the system” in order to benefit smaller investors (Interview 16). As another 
																																																						
291 Interview 15.  
292 For an exceptional overview of the political events and NYSE-led opposition in the decade leading up to May 
Day - which, for purposes of brevity, cannot be included in this project - refer to Welles (1975). Welles’ book, 
supplemented by document analysis and interviews conducted by Nocera (1994), have provided much of the context 
to this section as the majority of interviewees for this project were not yet working in the 1960s.  
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executive reiterates, “no one wanted to deal with a smaller customer” (Interview 8) for there was 
perceived to be no profit potential in making small, infrequent trades.  
Fixed commissions were integral to the profitability of member firms at the NYSE and the 
SEC was complicit in the regulation of such agreements. For example, when trading volumes 
would decline, it was common practice for national exchanges such as the NYSE to request that 
the SEC allow a commission increase to make up for lost revenues. Prior to 1975, the NYSE had 
standard commission rates set at 10%, which the SEC increased to 15% at the request of the 
NYSE in 1973 (Market 2000 Report 1994; Wells 2000).  
In the late 1960s, the U.S. Department of Justice began inquiries into trading and fee 
structures of the NYSE and recommended that regulations on commissions be enacted in order to 
promote “efficiency, innovation and healthy, progressive change” (Department of Justice inquiry 
1970). As a result of initial inquiries by the Department of Justice, the SEC began studying the 
commission structure of national stock exchanges and concluded that fixed commission rates 
were considered an “anticompetitive practice…[that] continues to work against the development 
of a fair and efficient market system” (Market 2000 Report, I-2). As a result of prompting from 
the Department of Justice, the SEC mandated that volume discounts be applied within the system 
of fixed rate commissions (Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8324 and 8399, 1968) and 
began what would be almost four years of oral hearings293 about the commission structure on 
national exchanges such as the NYSE. The SEC hearings resulted in a report entitled the 
Statement of the SEC on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets, and was used to inform 
Congress on various issues of the securities markets. One of the conclusions of the Future 
Structure Statement was that the public was entitled to “competition focused on providing the 
																																																						
293 The majority of hearings on fixed commissions were held by Congressman John Moss (D.-California). 
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best combination of price, service, and transaction cost” (Future Structure Statement 37 FR 5286, 
1972). 
While the vast majority of brokerages and national exchanges were vehemently opposed to 
the idea of deregulating commissions, the then-president of the NYSE, Robert Haack, risked his 
career to voice his support for deregulation. In an address before the Economic Club of New 
York in 1970, Haack criticized fixed commissions and concluded that:  
 
Unless the New York Stock Exchange is willing to compete effectively with 
markets where commission fees are presently negotiated it faces a continued 
reduction in its share of overall trading, and at an accelerated pace. Whatever 
vestiges of a private club atmosphere which remain at the New York Stock 
Exchange must be discarded (Haack 1970).  
 
Members working alongside Haack at the NYSE mentioned that Haack had kept his speech 
private until he delivered it, knowing that his statement would not be supported by the NYSE 
leadership and its member firms (interviews in Nocera 1994). Haack seems to have accepted that 
his statement would not be popular within the NYSE, admitting “I have spoken with great candor 
which will alternately be applauded and deplored” (Haack 1970). Within the year, Haack had 
been forced to step down as president of the NYSE294 and was replaced by NYSE Chairman 
James Needham, an individual strongly opposed to commission deregulation. In the years that 
followed, Needham threatened to sue the SEC if it deregulated commissions: “If we don’t get 
what we want, I’ll see them on the steps of the courthouse at Foley Square” (Needham quoted in 
Nocera 1994, 116). Needham’s threats, amongst others from NYSE member firms, were 
																																																						
294 Instead of firing Haack for his comments, a move that would likely cause a public relations ordeal, the NYSE 
Board of Governors reorganized the executive positions within the Exchange to eliminate the President’s position 
until 1980. In the interim, Needham, the NYSE Chairman, was chosen to absorb Haack’s responsibilities.  
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addressed in a speech by the SEC Chairman, Ray Garrett Jr., at the Securities Industry 
Association National Convention:  
 
In the interest of all of us and the country, I hope you will join me in striving 
for composure. I know that it makes great copy if Jim Needham and I, or others 
in the industry, start calling each other dirty names, or…if we start threatening 
to meet each other on steps belonging to some square named Foley. If we start 
playing “chicken” with one another, proving just how stubborn we all can be, 
unfortunate things will happen (Garret 1974, 2-3).  
 
Exchange lobbyists and brokerage firms tirelessly petitioned the SEC, leading the SEC 
Chairman to call the meetings “a parade of horrors to scare the members of the Rules 
Committee” from drafting deregulation legislation (Garrett 1974, 4). Of all of the national stock 
exchanges in the U.S., only one advised the SEC that it was willing to voluntarily comply with 
deregulation - the other stock exchanges indicated that they would not comply unless the changes 
were mandated by law (SEC Annual Statement 1975, 6). However, despite industry efforts to 
pressure the SEC and Congress to retain fixed commissions, former NYSE President Haack’s 
speech turned out to be prophetic in the years to come.  
In 1971, the SEC expanded the volume-discount legislation and required national exchanges 
abolish fixed commission rates for trades in excess of $500,000 USD. This meant that large 
institutions and wealthy individuals could now choose amongst brokerage firms that competed to 
offer the best service and price (Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9105 and 9132, 1971). One 
year later, the $500,000 USD trade minimum was reduced to $300,000 USD in hopes of offering 
more investors competitively priced commission structures (Future Structure Statement 37 FR 
5286, 1972). The NYSE and its member firms, strongly against the concept of unfixed 
commissions, raised their commission rates to 15% in response to the SEC Future Structure 
Statement. While the SEC acquiesced to the NYSE’s commission rate increase, the approval was 
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tied to the condition that the NYSE would begin deregulating commissions for high value trades 
and move towards complete deregulation by May 1, 1975. Due to the dollar threshold the NYSE 
set for negotiated rates, discounted trading was only available to institutions or individuals with 
substantial personal wealth prior to May 1, 1975. 
In 1974, the SEC proposed Rules 19b-3 and 10b-22 under the Securities Exchange Act 
(Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11703, 1974) that would prohibit national exchanges from 
allowing their members to set fixed commission rates for any trade irrespective of its value:  
 
Under present circumstances, the free play of competition can provide a level 
and structure of commission rates which would better serve the interests of the 
investing public (SEC Annual Statement 1975, 7).295  
 
The proposed rules were made effective on May 1, 1975, leading to the moniker ‘May Day’ 
(Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11203).296 Effective on May Day, brokerage firms would 
be forced to compete for business and offer the best service at the lowest price for their clients. 
This legislation transitioned the clubby and gentlemanly atmosphere of national exchanges to a 
transaction-based environment where brokerages were forced to develop new programs to attract 
investors of all sizes.  
On May Day and beyond, opposition from industry continued as brokerages attempted to 
maintain profits in the wake of deregulation. While brokerages were advertising their new 
investment plans for small investors, oftentimes these plans had such substantial hidden fees 
built in that they were cost prohibitive to clients. For example, Merrill Lynch created a 
																																																						
295 The SEC held multiple hearings to receive input on the proposed deregulation rules. Despite heated opposition, 
the rule change was passed (SEC Annual Statement 1975, 7).  
296 The abolishment of fixed commissions was codified into the Securities Exchange Act Section 6(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. 
§78f(e)(1), by the 1975 Securities Exchange Act Amendments in order to “eliminate all unnecessary or 
inappropriate burdens on competition”. Effective May 2, 1975, the SEC began a program to monitor the effects of 
deregulation on the brokerage industry under Rules 17a-20 and Form X-17A-20 (Securities Exchange Act Release 
No. 11395, 1975). 
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‘Sharebuilding Plan’ specifically to attract small, ‘everyday’ investors, but introduced many 
hidden fees for account opening and maintenance. Small trades within the Sharebuilding Plan 
were also subject to a 5% commission increase in the first year so that retail investors often did 
not make much, if any, profit. There were also accounts of Merrill Lynch brokers discouraging 
individual investors from opening accounts if they were not planning on active trading.297 
Despite opposition from some members, reports show that at the market open on May Day, 
large institutional commission rates dropped by 50%, with brokerages trading in their 
“gentlemanly affairs” for “two-fisted, bareknuckled brawls over…vicious price cutting” (Elia 
interview in The New York Times 1975). As the market environment adapted into July 1975, 
institutional commission rates had stabilized an average of 19.5% lower than their regulated 
levels (SEC Annual Report 1975, 8) and large individual block trades had stabilized at 
approximately 50% of their regulated levels (SEC Commission Rate Trends 1982).   
However, small investors were still struggling to afford market access. At market open on 
May Day, the price of trading small individual orders actually increased (SEC Commission Rate 
Trends 1982). By July 1975, where institutional and large block trades were substantially less 
expensive, commission rates for small investors had only dropped by <2% (SEC Annual Report 
1975, 8). Despite the brokerage community’s lack of interest in competing for small retail 
accounts, May Day deregulation eventually went on to influence retail commission structures: by 
1982, the commission rates charged for small retail trades had dropped by an average of 20% 
from their regulated levels (SEC Commission Rate Trends 1982, Appendix 2 and 3). 
																																																						
297 The accounts regarding Merrill Lynch activities in the early 1960s/1970s were provided to Nocera (1994) for his 
interview research. As stated previously, no interviewees for this project could be found that were operating at 
brokerages in the 1960s/1970s.  
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Gradually, smaller investors began to enter the market as commission rates became more 
affordable. Lower rates, in turn, attracted more investors, which increased brokerage competition 
over the burgeoning retail industry. For example, between 1975 and 1990, individual shareholder 
accounts with NYSE member firms grew from 25 million to 51 million and trading fees for small 
accounts had dropped by over 50% (Market 2000 Report 1994, 6). The growing affordability of 
trading for average individuals and the entrance of competition into pricing structures has led 
May Day to be described as “the most momentous day on Wall Street since the predecessor of 
the New York Stock Exchange was formed in 1792” (Zweig 2015) and a day that “broke one of 
the oldest cartels” in the United States (Ofer and Melnick 1978, 641). Perhaps most importantly 
to the ETF industry, May Day created the opportunity for small retail investors to access the 
market through a new medium called discount brokerages.  
 
From suits to Schwab: The allure of discount operations  
	
Before May Day, individual investors paid high commissions to have their investment 
advisors provide advice about investment strategies and to buy and sell financial products on 
their behalf. Fixed commissions meant that brokerages firms often competed against one another 
by providing ‘value-added’ (free) research, reports, and advice to their clients about the financial 
markets. After May Day, brokerage firms were forced to compete for business from individual 
investors based on the rates they charged for trading.298 As a result, discount brokerages began to 
emerge - the first of which was named after its founder, Charles Schwab. Discount brokerages 
																																																						
298 The quality of trade execution (e.g. speed of execution, accuracy of execution, market selection and ancillary 
services) was also an important field of competition for brokerage firms post-May Day, though this was of greater 
importance to institutional investors than small investors that only placed the occasional trade. For an empirical 
study about how the varied quality of execution affected commissions after 1975, refer to Ofer and Melnick (1978).  
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are called such because they provide the traditional trading services to clients but do not provide 
any ancillary services or give financial advice. The new ‘bare-bones’ approach to trading and 
investment allowed discount brokers to charge commissions that were much lower than the 
traditional and elitist full-service brokerage firms.  
Buying and selling stocks without a stockbroker enabled average investors to access the 
financial markets affordably for the first time. Whereas the clubby atmosphere of full service 
brokerages prioritized institutions at the expense of individuals before May Day, after May Day, 
discount brokerages began competing to attract an untapped market: the price-conscious retail 
investor. As a current ETF developer and former Merrill Lynch executive recalls:  
 
May 1 was a seminal moment because that’s where this road turns. We laughed 
at them [Charles Schwab]. We said, ‘There’s no way anybody’s going to 
operate a discount operation. That would be ridiculous when you have guys 
like us who wear three-piece suits at Merrill Lynch! Come on!’ And that began 
a whole new world (Interview 9).  
 
The exponential rise in discount brokerages was, in part, attributable to the entrance of 
commercial banks into the financial market. As banks began buying failing brokerage firms in 
the 1970s, they began structuring investment services similarly to commercial bank services by 
charging fees instead of commissions. As a result, many early ETF developers that were funded 
by banks began attending investment advisor conferences to market their products:  
 
There wasn’t really anybody who knew anything about retail marketing, so it 
really was a ‘hit or miss and learn as you go’ type of effort. We went to the 
Charles Schwab RA [registered advisor] conference in 1995…It was then we 
realized that there was the market for these products (Interview 15).  
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The market for the ETFs, developers soon realized, was the small clients managed by investment 
advisors who were, until the 1980s and 1990s, largely ignored or prohibited (by price barriers) 
from accessing the financial marketplace.   
 
The conflation of big banking and small investment  
	
An influential development in the shift to fee-based investment was the entrance of banks 
into the brokerage industry, a trend escalated in part by the failure of many brokerage firms. In 
the 1960s, as the SEC and Congress began investigating the effects of commission fixing, 
unprecedented trading volumes were being experienced at the NYSE. Between 1965 and 1968, 
for example, average daily volumes on the NYSE grew from 5 million to over 12 million shares. 
The rapid increase in volume led to a crisis in many brokerage firms as their pen-and-paper 
recordkeeping could not keep up with the volume of trades. Haack, the former NYSE President, 
estimated that 90% of the funds used to liquidate 10 member firms were used to correct their 
record-keeping mistakes (Haack 1971). The number of mistakes and unsettled trades led to this 
period of the late 1960s being called ‘the paperwork crisis’.299 
Computers were the only way to keep pace with the amount of trades being conducted over 
the NYSE, though computing infrastructure in the late 1960s was extraordinarily expensive. The 
cost to implement such infrastructure was prohibitive for small brokerage firms, forcing them out 
of business. For those firms that could afford the electronic infrastructure, steep learning curves 
for employees often meant that execution failures and recordkeeping mistakes remained as 
																																																						
299 For an excellent account of the development of the paperwork crisis, refer to Wells’ Harvard Business School 
review (Wells 2000).  
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prominent as with pen-and-paper organization. The trade corrections and cost of employee 
education and training led many of these more prominent firms to fail.300 As a result of the 
increase in trading and lack of affordable infrastructure to manage it, many brokerage firms 
suffered insurmountable failures of trade execution that forced them to close their doors 
permanently. To make matters worse, a substantial decrease in trading volume between 1969 and 
1970 meant that those firms who had survived by investing in expensive automation equipment 
were not making enough revenue and went into forced liquidation. By 1971, 100 member firms 
of the NYSE - representing approximately one-sixth of the brokerage firms in the U.S. - had 
been liquidated or taken over by larger firms (Wells 2000). 
The vast majority of buyers of the fledgling brokerage firms were commercial banks, which 
had recently been granted more flexibility from the Federal government to enter the investment 
industry.301 For example, the largest member firm on the NYSE in the 1960s - Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith - was sold to a bank, Merrill Lynch & Company, alongside other 
traditional brokerage firms such as Smith Barney: 
 
There were a lot of very interested parties - certainly investment banks, and 
banks in general - they had a hunger to get products as they needed products to 
sell (Interview 3).  
 
The significance of banks purchasing brokerage firms is that traditional commercial banks 
typically use fee structures to generate revenue from their clients. When commercial banks began 
																																																						
300	For example, the collapse of a large firm, Hayden, Stone, Goodbody, and Dupont Brokerage, was attributed 
directly to back-office (recordkeeping) failures (Elias 1971). 	
301 The Glass-Steagall Act was passed as part of the U.S. Banking Act of 1933 and restricted any relationship 
between commercial banking and investment banking. Under Glass-Steagall, for example, commercial banks could 
not be involved in the activities of investment firms. In the 1960s, federal regulators re-interpreted two provisions of 
the Act and allowed banks to become involved in particular investment activities. One result of the 1960s 
reinterpretation of Glass-Steagall was that commercial banks could derive a portion of their revenue from 
investment activity. Glass-Steagall provisions were incrementally relaxed until the Act’s full repeal in 1999.  
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purchasing brokerage firms, they began restructuring the firms to charge investors fees instead of 
commissions. As a former Merrill Lynch executive recalls: 
 
[Banks] changed the brokerage industry significantly because brokers worked 
on commission - when you did something you got paid. Now the whole idea 
was that banks wanted fees for the broker to work. Brokers are now on the 
same side of the table as their customer (Interview 9).   
 
Due to the popularity of discount brokerages and the growing ownership of brokerages by 
commercial banks, the landscape of the retail investment environment began gradually to 
change:  
 
Banks only know how to charge fees. Fee for this and fee for that. For 
whatever. Now that they’re in possession of these brokerage firms…they’ve 
given us an idea of what we can expect for the future (Interview 9).  
 
The future, in this case, was a movement to replace commission rates based on assets with a flat 
fee that could be charged for investment services such as buying and selling, account 
maintenance, advice, and access to ancillary services. Gradually, into the 1990s, a flat fee would 
be charged by an investment advisor to work for their clients. As brokerage firms began moving 
towards fee-based businesses and the amount of retail client accounts began growing rapidly, 
many brokers began to open their own small businesses as registered investment advisors 
(referred to in the industry as RIAs). With the assistance of affordable computer programs that 
would construct optimal portfolios based on a client’s risk levels, financial advisors no longer 
had to construct portfolios stock-by-stock for each client. As one of the largest model developers 
in the U.S. recalls:  
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As I began to see them move more towards the fee based business, I had to do 
the same. So I started creating products and models that an advisor could put 
into his portfolio. We were, in essence, managing for him so that when a 
change took place we’d send an email to the advisor, the advisor would simply 
go into the customer’s portfolio and execute. This allowed them to take on 
more clients and lower fees into the 1990s and 2000s… In one year, our model 
garnered $4.5 billion. So then we created an ETF, which garnered another $5 
billion (Interview 9).  
 
Commercial banks were also interested in developing new products to sell to clients through 
their newly acquired retail investment services. Many early efforts by commercial banks to 
develop investment products failed from the outset, with firms such as Chase Bank abandoning 
the ETF due to issues about product valuation and structure.302 As an early ETF developer 
describes:  
 
It’s almost like automobiles in the 1920s. There were almost 3,500 automobile 
companies. But there were only three that actually made cars that were 
worthwhile, like General Motors. The ETF? Same thing. The ETFs that really 
flourished have been for the professional advisor (Interview 8). 
 
 
Deutsche Bank’s ETF experiment 
  
Deutsche Bank was one of the first commercial banks to experiment with ETF development, 
creating a suite of products called CountryBaskets. CountryBaskets were the first foreign index 
ETFs in the U.S. markets and launched in March 1996 after several years of development and 
four SEC applications.303 The reasoning behind Deutsche Bank entering the ETF business was to 
																																																						
302 These issues have been confirmed verbally by an individual who had been working with Chase Bank during the 
ETF concept development. No document records could be found to verify as the early products did not make it 
beyond the concept phase.  
303 The original SEC application for the WEBs (World Equity Benchmarket Series) was filed on September 14, 
1994, and took four resubmissions before the product suite was approved for listing. CountryBaskets and WEBS 
were launched within 48 hours of one another. WEBS also tracked foreign indices, but was launched by Morgan 
Stanley. WEBs launched on the AMEX and CountryBaskets launched on the NYSE.  
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expand their retail sales after acquiring investment firms in both the U.S. and U.K.304 With 
interest growing in the SPDR ETF that was launched in 1993, U.S. Deutsche Bank executives 
believed that ETFs could be the retail product needed to boost their sales. However, the 
American executives were faced with skepticism from Deutsche Bank headquarters in Frankfurt, 
Germany which controlled U.S. investment funding. As Germany did not launch ETFs until 
2000, German executives were unsure about the potential of funding an American ETF product 
in a relatively unestablished market with little trading volume. In attempts to pique the interest of 
its headquarters abroad, Deutsche Bank’s U.S. ETF team devised a cunning plan:   
 
We started getting phone calls when ETFs like the SPDR started getting out 
there to something like small and mid-sized investment managers…So in order 
to get the attention of Deutsche Bank [in Frankfurt], we had friends of ours 
orchestrate a huge trade in SPDR to go across the trading desk at Deutsche. 
Just so they would look at the ticker and not recognize this non-corporate entity 
so they would have to go check out what the product was (Interview 15).  
 
In order to further satisfy the Frankfurt executives that ETFs were legitimate products, 
the CountryBaskets ETF team at Deutsche Bank U.S. decided to break with tradition 
and list their ETFs the NYSE instead of the more popular ETF exchange, the AMEX: 
 
Politically, within Deutsche Bank, it was a lot easier to sell the product idea 
internally with the New York Stock Exchange than the American Stock 
Exchange behind it because you had to go over to Frankfurt and they didn’t 
know the AMEX over in Frankfurt (Interview 15).  
 




304 Deutsche Bank had purchased C.J. Lawrence in the U.S. and Morgan Grenfell in the UK. These research and 
investment banks ended up running Deutsche Bank’s investment services in the U.S.   
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The only thing people really knew was that the SPDR was fairly successful 
because it was the S&P 500. It was unclear whether or not these country 
indexes would ever really be successful…There was a lot of skepticism - it 
wouldn’t work, wouldn’t be traded, wasn’t a mutual fund, wasn’t a popular 
type of product. So we got put into our own stand alone group because 
Deutsche Asset Management, which was based out of Frankfurt, they didn’t 
know what to do with us (Interview 15).  
 
Once CountryBaskets were launched on the NYSE, the Deutsche Bank ETF team, 
which was comprised of only a few individuals, was tasked with raising enough interest 
from the investment community to make their product profitable. One area of potential 
was the burgeoning retail channel for small investors:  
 
I got assigned what was perceived to be the leftovers from the marketing 
channel at Deutsche Bank, which were family offices that were just getting 
started then and the RA [registered advisor] business…And we found the RA 
business really by accident, because an RA called one day…the guy explained 
to me that he was managing money for a fee, but most of these were mutual 
funds. He came to New York and educated us to the whole RA market. We 
then made a big push into the RA channel by offering [ETFs] as an alternative 
to mutual funds (Interview 15). 
 
By 1996, the CountryBaskets ETFs were able to attract approximately $400 million USD in 
assets, though trading volume was low and there were not enough retail advisors willing to 
transfer client assets from mutual funds to a relatively new product with an unproven 
performance record. Despite Deutsche Bank’s launch of the first foreign index ETFs, 
CountryBaskets were delisted in 1996 at the directive of Deutsche Bank’s Frankfurt 
headquarters.  
 
ETF demand as a function of the fee-based transition 
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As fee-based firms attracted many small retail investors previously unable to access the 
markets, advisors became increasingly attuned to the price sensitivities of their clients. Advisors 
realized that purchasing even a few stocks and trading those intermittently throughout the year 
could become quite expensive for their clients as fees were charged per trade. To bring value to 
their small clients, fee-based advisors were constantly seeking ways to optimize portfolios 
through cost-effective diversification.  
As previously discussed, mutual funds were the preferred choice for decades as they 
provided diverse market access and their shares were priced with a management fee built-in. 
However, any trading done within the mutual fund portfolio passed its trading expenses and 
trading profits onto clients every year through capital gains distributions. This meant that in a 
volatile year where a mutual fund share price lost value, its investors would still be responsible 
for paying the fund’s capital gains taxes from selling profitable stocks throughout the year. In 
other words, mutual fund investors were “buying someone else’s tax history…if I bought an 
interest in a fund and that fund starts actively trading, at the end of the year, I’ll get their tax bill” 
(Interview 22). As a Congressional testifier on the mutual fund industry explains, the tax burden 
placed on mutual fund investors305 is often unacceptable: 
 
If the portfolio manager sold a security out of my mutual fund for a profit, the 
mutual fund company, under our arcane tax law, has to do a dividend. So they 
dividend out those profit-taking trades even though the overall position is down 
in value…The tax is harmful to long term mutual fund investors (Interview 8). 
 
																																																						
305 It is important to note that the tax structure of mutual funds is governed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
ETFs in the United States, beginning with the SPDR ETF, were exempt from the tax laws that mutual funds were 
subject to. Both the IRS and the SEC exempted ETFs through private letter rulings. 
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ETFs were exempt from mutual fund tax laws because the early ETFs were considered packages 
that replicated the market, not custom-designed products. As a former law-maker for early ETF 
products explains: 
 
As long as you had simple broad-based indices and you had very limited ability 
to manipulate the portfolio, it wasn’t like buying a mutual fund that invested in 
Korean securities or whatever the hell it wanted” (Interview 22).  
 
Ultimately, this reasoning from both the Internal Revenue Service and the SEC meant that ETF 
investors were not subject to the same taxation as mutual fund investors:  
 
I could have, in a really bad year like the crash of ’08, a mutual fund portfolio 
be down 25% or 30% and still owe the government money for capital gains on 
securities that were in that mutual fund package. If an ETF goes down 35% and 
I don’t sell it, there’s no similar tax. So there’s a fundamental, un-level playing 
field which is encouraging more and more people to move into tradable ETFs 
(Interview 8).  
 
Into the early 2000s, the majority of mutual funds were considered active management 
strategies, meaning that portfolio managers actively traded the stocks within the mutual fund’s 
portfolio to beat the fund’s benchmark market.306 As academic and industry research routinely 
demonstrated, the chance that any portfolio manager had of beating the market was slim, no 
matter their education or skill (Chapter Six). As both theory and research showed, mirroring the 
market was the ideal strategy as above-market returns could not be guaranteed or expected over 
the long term. In addition, mutual fund management fees were higher than the management fees 
of ETFs as the portfolio management team had to be compensated. As index ETFs had no 
portfolio management team, they were able to offer substantially lower fees than mutual funds. 
																																																						
306 The active management approach was instrumental in the IRS determination that mutual funds were designed 
products. Again, due to the early structure of ETFs that simply replicated an index, ETFs were considered a 
‘package’ or ‘wrapper’.  
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While index tracking mutual funds had been developed and were incredibly popular, their tax 
structure and portfolio management team still made them more expensive to hold than ETFs. 
Thus, the most investor-friendly, cost and tax effective product for fee-based advisors to sell 
their retail clients was ETFs. ETFs required little internal trading (though, unlike mutual funds, 
offered the ability to do so), meaning that investment advisors could buy and hold the product for 
their clients without worrying about (1) trading it frequently, or (2) the trading occurring within 
the fund itself.307 As an ETF developer explains:  
 
When an advisor has to buy five products and make changes throughout the 
year, it becomes relatively expensive for his customer and he would prefer to 
have it all wrapped up into an ETF (Interview 8). 
 
The transition from fixed commissions to fee-based investment services made investing 
affordable for individual investors. With commercial banks increasingly becoming involved in 
investment services, retail investors emerged as the untapped market to sell investment products 
to. As retail clients are cost-sensitive, fee-based advisors were looking for products that would 
not require constant trading and would not trigger unnecessary tax burdens. ETFs, due in part to 
their diverse baskets, gave retail clients access to entire markets for little cost, making them the 
natural choice for fee-based investment. However, while ETFs were less expensive and more 
tax-efficient than mutual funds, the mutual fund industry offered many perks for advisors who 
bought their products. The trappings of the mutual fund industry influenced many advisors to 
continue purchasing mutual funds in client accounts instead of ETFs (the resistance to ETFs will 
be discussed later in this chapter). As a developer explains:  
																																																						
307 It is important to note that fee-based remuneration also reduces the incentives for advisors to churn their client 
accounts. Churning refers to the practice of excessive trading to generate commissions. Churning is prohibited under 
securities laws though must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  
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Mutual funds saw [ETFs] as a defensive strategy that if there was a bear 
market, people could use these ETFs instead of selling their mutual funds, 
which created all kinds of capital gains. ETFs were a more efficient way to do 
it. But the point was that ETFs had become a vehicle to capture lots of assets in 
a much more efficient way from a pricing and tax point of view than mutual 
funds (Interview 6). 
 
As a result of their many advantages for retail investors and the fall in price of computing 
power, the selection of ETFs in the market increased substantially. A securities lawyer 
specializing in exchange traded products emphasizes the ease of which even small, independent 
investment advisors can develop and access their own ETFs: 
 
There are companies now that will do all the work for you, help you market 
[ETFs]. It’s like ETF in a box. Anyone can do it. And that is the natural 
phenomenon of technology (Interview 8).  
 
While over 100 ETFs were available in the United States by 2001, their future remained 
questionable as ETF providers were struggling to attract trading volume and assets. However, 
with the rise of the dot-com bubble, ETF volumes dramatically increased and the two major 
American exchanges - the NYSE and AMEX - began to compete over ETF listings by invoking a 
little-used rule that had been recently rewritten by SEC legislators.     
UTP Amendments: Waging war between giants  
	
The AMEX and NYSE relationship   
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The AMEX received its name in 1953 and grew out of decades-long trading arrangements 
that took place on the streets of New York.308 Since the 1950s, the AMEX’s substantial growth 
relative to the NYSE was a result of three strategies. As a former AMEX president explains:  
 
Making sure that you got in early on the IPO stocks was one [strategy]. Product 
innovation would have been another. People were constantly trying to find the 
next big thing. Out of that group, ultimately, came the ETF business. And a 
third was trying to improve the trading experience for people - expanding the 
size of the orders that could get automatically executed, trying to reduce 
turnaround times, trying to make for better investor experiences (Interview 25).  
 
Since its inception, the AMEX specialized in listing the stock of newly emerging and small 
corporations. The benefits to emerging corporations being listed on a national exchange was that 
they were able to issue stock to aid in their capital formation, a vital aspect of their business 
growth. As the emerging businesses eventually grew into large corporations, many would 
transfer to the prestigious NYSE - a ‘legacy exchange’ - that catered directly to large ‘blue chip’ 
corporations and institutional traders. As a former Chairman of the AMEX acknowledged in 
their annual address to the Exchange:  
 
[The AMEX] has long been the prime market for newer, smaller risk-taking 
corporations. Many companies that now populate the Fortune 500 list had their 
start here. They were nurtured in the auction market, moving from narrow, or 




308 In the late 1800s, brokers would trade stocks of emerging companies on the streets of New York, becoming 
known as ‘curbstone brokers’. This community organized to establish rules in 1908 and named themselves the New 
York Curb Market Agency. The Agency was renamed to the New York Curb Exchange in 1929 until its renaming to 
the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) in 1953. In 2008, the AMEX was purchased by the NYSE Euronext and has 
since undergone several name changes. For purposes of this project, only AMEX history post-1953 will be 
discussed.  
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Specializing in emerging companies was beneficial to the AMEX because it allowed the 
exchange to establish a monopoly over the niche market, becoming known as a specialist in 
assisting the capital formation of small corporations.309 AMEX was able to assist in the 
development of small companies by offering numerous services to encourage them to list on the 
exchange. While the large corporations listed on the NYSE typically had lobbyists representing 
their interests through national and trade associations, small companies did not. For example, 
small and emerging companies often lacked a platform with which to lobby for tax reforms. As 
Miller noted, changes in tax law often provide a large impetus for financial innovation - either to 
evade new restrictions or take advantage of beneficial tax breaks.310 As a service to its members, 
the AMEX often acted as a medium between its listed members and lawmakers. For example, in 
July 1980, the AMEX founded the American Business Conference whose purpose was to allow 
small and emerging companies to network with government officials and industry 
representatives. While the conference attracted modest attention in its inaugural year, by the mid-
1980s prestigious speakers were recruited from throughout academia, industry, and 
government.311  Throughout the years, the Conference attracted speakers such as Secretary of 
Defense, Secretary of State, Lieutenant Generals, Senators, and executives from over 300 
international firms, giving AMEX-listed companies a platform to meet and discuss their 
domestic and national interests.312    
In addition to providing networking services such as the American Business Conference, the 
AMEX also made a substantial effort to provide the most technologically advanced services for 
																																																						
309 The NASDAQ also assisted small company capital formation. 
310 Refer to Chapter Two for an overview of Miller’s theory of financial innovation.  
311 Agendas for the American Business Conference between 1986 and 1988 have name speakers such as the 
academics John Volker of Princeton, Paul Kennedy of Yale, and Martin Feldstein of Harvard, all of which have held 
prestigious roles in industry and government.   
312 For a historical case study on the AMEX’s American Business Conference, refer to Bruchey (1991, 141-167).		
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its members. As discussed in Chapter Four, the AMEX pioneered many industry-leading 
technologies that enabled it to increase the speed with which trades could be executed. In fact, 
the growing focus on technological infrastructure assisted the AMEX in performing better 
relative to larger exchanges like the NYSE during the market crisis in October 1987.313 For 
example, a common measurement of performance is something called the DK or DK’d rate that 
measures uncompared trades.314 Uncompared trades are trades where the buyer and seller 
information (e.g. number of shares) does not match. Exchanges such as the NASDAQ and NYSE 
were reporting DK rates of up to 10.5% on October 19, whereas the AMEX reported a rate of 
5.5%. While the AMEX Performance Committee concluded that its specialists had “substandard 
performance” that “failed to maintain fair and orderly markets” (Leibler speech 1987), their 
comparative success against the larger exchanges and broker-dealers making markets in over-
the-counter securities ensured continued business for the AMEX (Interview 28). 
As the AMEX’s status evolved and volumes surged into the 1990s, the AMEX broke a 
record for the second highest rate of new listings in history.315 Alongside new listings, the 
primary constituency of the AMEX grew to mid-sized companies, most of which had been with 
the AMEX since their initial public offering. The AMEX also actively encouraged small 
investors to trade on their exchange which further differentiated itself from the NYSE whose 
fixed commissions often made trading unaffordable to individuals without substantial wealth. As 
the Chairman of the AMEX, Arthur Levitt, stated in a 1979 speech:    
 
Most importantly, we have to convince the individual investor that the market 
system is fair and that the same kind of investment opportunities that are 
																																																						
313 The events leading up to and the impact of the market crash on October 19, 1987 are discussed in Chapter Five.  
314 ‘DK’ or a ‘DK’d trade’ is industry slang for ‘don’t know’, and has become the term used to refer to uncompared 
trades.  
315 Between 1987 and 1988, the AMEX secured the second highest number of new listings in U.S. exchange history 
with 111 listings. The new listings came primarily from the over-the-counter market.  
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available to institutions are also available to individuals…[we must] bring the 
individual investor back to the market to aid the capital formation efforts of 
small companies (Levitt 1979).  
 
 By the end of 1977, approximately 70% of the AMEX’s business came from the trading activity 
of individual investors (Levitt 1978, quoted in Bruchey 1991, 87). The focus on small 
institutions and investors allowed the AMEX to substantially grow its market share relative to 
the NYSE, which focused primarily on large, established corporations and institutional investors.  
Because the AMEX was one of the most technologically advanced exchanges and the most 
popular to list emerging companies, its reputation was gradually built as an exchange that 
encouraged investor friendly risk-taking and innovation. As a result, the AMEX was routinely 
chosen for the listing of new products and quickly built a monopoly over the listing of ETFs: by 
2001, the AMEX was the sole listing exchange for 117 of the 119 domestic ETFs on the market, 
while the NYSE gained listing fees from only one ETF product.316 As a former ETF consultant 
recalls:   
 
New York was trying to win ETF listings but the AMEX really sewed up that 
business because they had all the expertise. AMEX would subsidize the 
company’s legal filings to list there, and they just had so much more 
infrastructure that it was hard for the New York to compete (Interview 15). 
 
As the AMEX and NYSE each specialized in the listing of different corporate demographics, 
the exchanges were were able to maintain the gentleman’s agreement - not to directly interfere 
with the business of another exchange - for decades.317 However, the growing public interest in 
																																																						
316 The only ETF to be listed on the NYSE was the iShares S&P Global 100 ETF. Deutche Bank’s CountryBaskets 
ETFs were also launched on the NYSE but were liquidated shortly after launch.  
317 This is not to say that the exchanges were not competitive with one another. As markets expanded throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, both the AMEX and NYSE competed aggressively to attract new listings. However, many market 
participants acknowledge that AMEX was the first choice for small, emerging companies and the NYSE was the 
first choice for larger, more prestigious companies. 
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ETFs and new legislation regarding listing rules would soon challenge the AMEX and NYSE’s 
gentlemanly relations.  
  
UTP amendments and their lackluster response 
	
In the original Securities Exchange Act of 1934, exchanges were free to list any security 
already trading on another exchange without applying for permission. In 1936, amendments were 
imposed so that any exchanges wishing to trade a listed security would have to apply for formal 
privileges to do so from the SEC, which took between 45 and 60 trading days to approve. This 
legislative ruling intended to provide a ‘head start’ to the primary exchange and extend their 
competitive advantage over any exchanges that choose to subsequently list the security in 
question. As discussed, it was legislated prior to 1994 that a security may not trade on any 
exchange other than its primary exchange, unless a secondary exchange formally applied for 
Unlisted Trading Privileges (UTP) to list the security (15 U.S.C. §78l(a)). If a secondary 
exchange wished to exercise UTP for a security, they must formally apply to the SEC. As stated 
in previous chapters, the exchange exercising UTP can compete for order flow with the primary 
exchange, but will not be able to charge fees to list the stock. Leading up to the 1994 
amendments, it was argued by Congress that “the delays caused by the UTP application and 
approval process may have anticompetitive impacts” (1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3299, 3302).  
 In 1994, emphasis on inter-market competition was strong because competition was 
viewed as the best method to offer fair, transparent, and liquid markets for investors:  
 
The NASD strongly believes that the best markets for investors result from 
vigorous, fair competition…[The UTP Act] promotes competition in the 
marketplace by allowing the regional stock exchanges to compete for order 
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flow with the listing exchange (Ketchum Congressional Testimony, supra note 
26).  
 
Pursuant with this view, the 1994 amendments to the UTP Act were passed by Congress with the 
support of the SEC in the belief that immediate intermarket competition for order flow would 
enhance the speed of trade executions, enhance liquidity, tighten spreads, and lower transaction 
fees between exchanges, ultimately benefitting the investor and protecting the market from 
events such as the October 1987 market break. Resulting from the Act, any regional exchange 
could begin listing a security as soon as the security’s first trade on its primary exchange was 
reported to the consolidated tape, effectively removing barriers to competition and allowing 
exchanges to compete for order flow vis-à-vis other exchanges.  
The 1994 UTP Act amendments were an important catalyst to the spectacular growth of the 
ETF market in the 1990s for they eliminated procedural formalities in order to facilitate 
intermarket competition. However, this change did not take place overnight. The NYSE did not 
immediately exercise their UTP rights for the AMEX’s ETFs for two reasons. First, there was 
the “old, legacy Wall Street gentleman’s agreement” which decreed “not to interfere with the 
business of another exchange” (Interview 15). Second, the volumes on ETFs were not promising 
until the later part of the 1990s. As any exchange that lists another’s product is not privy to 
listing fees, the NYSE was hesitant to violate the gentleman’s agreement for a product that may 
not generate substantial interest. However, as fees dropped and trading volumes began to grow 
into the early 2000s, ETFs that allowed investors to participate in the tech bubble exploded in 
popularity.  
 
From boring to booming: An explosion in ETF volume 
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The most popular ETF used to access the tech industry during the tech bubble was called the 
QQQ,318 which tracked the 100 largest domestic and international technological companies 
traded on the NASDAQ. As a former Senior Vice President of the AMEX explains:   
 
If you think about that time in the market… the internet bubble that was going 
on. A lot of those stocks were part of the NASDAQ 100 so there was a huge 
amount of interest in that index…The notion that you didn’t need to choose the 
right stock when buying a vehicle like QQQ made it hugely popular (Interview 
25).  
 
With the growing popularity of the QQQ ETF into the early 2000s (accounting for approximately 
one-third of the AMEX’s average daily trading volume), the NYSE, for the first time in its 200 
year history, exercised UTP to offer the QQQ product even though it would not receive listing 
fees in doing so. In 2002, after achieving success in gaining a market share in the QQQ, the 
NYSE extended its UTP and began offering 34319 more of AMEX’s ETFs on the NYSE, directly 
challenging the AMEX for trading volume of the popular new products.320 As a former 
consultant for the AMEX recalls: 
 
What happened was the New York decided to instigate and change the model 
of relations (Interview 15).  
 
Responding to this direct challenge from the NYSE, the AMEX exercised Unlisted Trading 
Privileges in August 2002 to list 120 of NASDAQ stocks,321 allowing AMEX to trade the QQQ, 
the underlying securities in the QQQ, and many other stocks comprising the S&P 500 index. 
																																																						
318 The QQQ was the ticker symbol for an ETF called the NASDAQ 100 Index Tracking Stock. This ETF was 
developed by Invesco PowerShares and was launched in 1999.  
319 This total includes 17 Merrill Lynch HOLDRs ETFs, 9 sector SPDR ETFs, the S&P 500 Mid-Cap 400 ETF, and 
7 fixed-income ETFs.  
320 See: “The NYSE and the AMEX are going to war over Exchange Traded Funds”; Bresiger, supra note 65; 
“Another ETF Blow by Big Board”, Traders Magazine, 1 August 2002; Hall 2004.  
321 Clary, Isabelle. “AMEX Rolling Out NASDAQ Stocks Auction Style”, SEC Industry News, 12 August 2002.  
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This move attracted arbitrageurs who could trade ETFs and the underlying ETF constituents on 
the same exchange. The AMEX also eliminated transaction fees on all NYSE-listed products 
(later extending the offer to all ETF products) “…in order to maintain a competitive, level 
playing field. We’re not going to allow [the NYSE] to gain any sort of competitive advantage” 
(Brent, supra note 15).322 Quickly following suit with the suspension of trading fees was the 
NYSE, who then also successfully lobbied for regulatory changes to its Front End Capture 
System which allowed it to execute faster trades than the AMEX.323 The results were “…a 
damaging but not fatal blow to the AMEX, which has pioneered an array of ETFs but watched 
helplessly as volume was picked up by other traders” (Wall Street Journal, 5 August 2002). The 
flow of ETF volume away from AMEX only increased when electronic communications 
networks like Island began trading ETFs on much faster systems than both the NYSE and 
AMEX. In addition, some electronic platforms - such as Instinet - offered trading rebates to 
further incentivize the use of their platform: 
 
Once the UTPing started, that was the opening for Island and Archipelago to 
come in. [Before ETFs] they weren’t getting a lot of trading volume because 
they weren’t a price discovery mechanism.324 There was no price discovery 
mechanism for an individual stock on the electronic exchanges but they didn’t 
need it on an ETF because it’s all index based. So the index was calculated by a 
third party and they were just competing on what the indicative net asset value 
was. And they were able to do that better (Interview 15).  
 
The attraction to the newer, faster, electronic exchanges was almost immediate. As a former 
CEO of one of these electronic platforms explains:  
																																																						
322 See also: “AMEX Puts ETF Transaction Charges On Hold”, Wall Street Letter, 5 August 2002.		
323 The Front End Capture System required that orders be entered into an electronic database before they are sent to 
the auction market. NYSE successfully petitioned to first send orders to the auction market, and then enter orders 
into the electronic database within 90 seconds (67 Fed Reg. at 1528; Exchange Act Release No. 34-43, 689).  
324 Price discovery relates to the process of determining a security’s spot price through active buying and selling in 
the marketplace. For example, if demand for a security is high and there is low supply, its price will increase.  
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We had started trading so much volume so that, in essence, it embarrassed the 
institutions into trading with us. If you were buying stocks in the public market, 
meaning the market makers were advertising to the public that they were 
buying at 15 and selling at 15 and a half, fund managers kept buying stock at 
15 and a half, when there was an order out on [our platform] at 15 and a 
quarter, it became too embarrassing for them to pass away from us (Interview 
16).  
 
On 19 March 2002, Island set records by capturing 45% of the total market volume in the QQQ 
ETF, 24% of SPDRs ETFs, 24% of Diamonds ETFs, and 32% of HOLDRs ETFs in one day 
(Hall 2004, 1140). The faster speeds at which these electronic networks were able to trade came 
down to technological infrastructure and the fact that they did not need to maintain gentlemanly 
accord with the larger exchanges:  
 
You could, first of all, trade baskets very quickly and very efficiently. The 
prices tended to be better [on the electronic networks] and the people who 
created ETFs don’t need research from Wall Street and they don’t need IPOs 
from Wall Street. So their incentive was to get the lowest transaction cost 
possible and get the best prices possible (Interview 16). 
 
The escalation of the use of unlisted trading “proved to be the beginning of the end for AMEX” 
(Interview 15) for it reduced AMEX trading profits at a time when the exchange was already 
stretched thin for resources. As a former AMEX Vice President recalls:  
 
In some ways, we were victims of our own success. For the longest time, 
equities paid all the bills and they were the real powerhouse, and eventually the 
options business really took off. Then ETFs came along and became their own 
department…When you went into technology planning and building budgets, 
we were constantly fighting for resources. At the time, we were competing 
against exchanges that were simply focused (Interview 25).325   
 
																																																						
325 Examples of ‘simply focused’ exchanges would be the electronic networks such as Island, or the Chicago Board 
of Options Exchange that only dealt with options.   
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Despite the setback to AMEX, the UTP legislation accomplished what regulators had hoped: the 
gentleman’s agreements were slowly eroded and competition was increased in the market to the 
benefit of the public who were charged increasingly lower fees, could have trades confirmed 
almost instantaneously by their brokers, and were offered enhanced product choices. As a result 
of the entrance of electronic exchanges, spreads on ETFs became tighter, liquidity was added to 
the market, trading fees were lowered, and trading efficiency increased as exchanges sought 
competitive advantage over one another. In short, the only way to remain competitive in the 
market under the new UTP legislation was to increase the efficiency of trading technologies 
whilst offering new cost-effective ways for investors to access the marketplace.   
ETFs v. mutual funds: A David and Goliath story?  
	
The trappings of the mutual fund industry  
	
As discussed in Chapter One, the mutual fund industry in the United States originated in 
1924326 and, until 1976, consisted exclusively of active-management strategies where portfolio 
managers used their expertise to pick stocks expected to outperform the general market. On 
August 31, 1976, Vanguard created the first index tracking mutual fund.327 Like an ETF, index 
mutual funds replicated an entire index in their portfolio. Unlike an ETF, index mutual funds 
																																																						
326 The first mutual fund in the United States was called the Massachusetts Investors Trust and launched on March 
21, 1924. This was a private fund that was not made public until 1928. It was structured as an open-end investment 
fund, meaning that the mutual fund could continuously issue and redeem shares. Refer to Chapter Six for an 
explanation of investment company structures.  
327 Vanguard’s index mutual fund is called the Vanguard 500 Index Fund and still trades today (ticker symbol: 
VFINX). This mutual fund tracks the S&P 500 Index, which consists of the 500 largest U.S. companies that trade in 
the U.S. equities markets.  
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were required to pass any trading expenses on to their shareholders in the form of capital gains 
distributions and charged substantially higher fees for their products.328  
Product fees are set by the degree of investment oversight needed. For example, mutual funds 
typically have higher expenses than ETFs because they require portfolio managers to make 
frequent decisions about investment strategies. Within the mutual fund universe, active mutual 
funds typically have higher expenses than index-tracking mutual funds due to the frequency of 
trading and decision making required. In 2014, all active funds in the United States (including 
ETFs and mutual funds) had an average asset-weighted expense ratio of 0.79%, while passive 
(index) funds had average fees of 0.2%. These fees are of critical importance to both large and 
small investors for they impact the return on investment.  
Consider the following example where an investor holds three investments with the 
following management expense ratios: mutual fund A charging 2.3%, mutual fund B charging 
0.8%, and an ETF charging 0.2%. If the investor invests $10,000 into each fund and receives a 
10% annual return on each product over the course of 10 years, mutual fund A will be worth 
$20,500, mutual fund B $23,900, and the ETF $25,500.329 Even if the ETF was to return 2% less 
per year than mutual fund A, the ETF would still achieve higher returns after 10 years due to the 
difference in expenses.   
As retail-friendly innovation proliferated and investors had increased options of both mutual 
funds and ETFs, the management expense ratios of the products became a large deciding factor. 
The importance of fees in retail investment decisions is clear when examining capital flows 
																																																						
328 Mutual fund fees encompass three categories: first, a management fee that covers the cost of investment 
management and trailing commissions paid to advisors that sell the product; second, the operating expenses of the 
fund such as account openings and closings; and third, the taxes that are due on administration fees charged by the 
fund. Altogether, these expenses are referred to as a Management Expense Ratio (MER).  
329 Final figures are rounded to the nearest hundredth dollar and are reduced by $100 to approximate for brokerage 
fees. The majority of fund providers and regulatory websites across the U.S. and Canada offer programs where 
investors can calculate their own fee-adjusted potential returns.  
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between investment products: between 2004 and 2014, the least-expensive quintile of funds 
received 95% of capital inflows, amounting to approximately $3.03 trillion USD. Because ETFs 
are most always less expensive than their comparable mutual funds, ETFs are likely to be in the 
lowest quintile of expense ratios.  
Despite their higher expenses, the mutual fund industry has continued to compete 
aggressively for market share relative to ETFs by lowering fee structures. For example, between 
2009 and 2014, 24% of mutual fund fees dropped by >10%, and 39% of mutual fund fees were 
dropped by <10% (Morningstar Fee Study 2015). The competition between mutual funds and 
ETFs benefit investors by ensuring that management expense ratios of most products continue to 
trend downwards, with the majority of ETFs remaining consistently lower than mutual funds.330   
As mutual fund products still hold more assets than ETFs and continue to receive higher fees, 
fund companies can afford to incentivize financial advisors to purchase their funds for end-
clients. One of the methods that mutual funds have always used is a commission payment to 
advisors who sell their products to customers called a ‘trailer’, ‘trail’, or ‘trailing commission’. 
This payment is made directly from the fund company to advisors who sell the company’s 
products and is typically calculated using a percentage of assets sold (though calculations may 
vary between fund companies). For example, a mutual fund will pay a financial advisor a trailing 
commission of approximately $5 to $10 per year for every $1,000 of client funds they invest into 
the mutual fund. This commission is paid indirectly by the client because the trailing commission 
expenses are built into the management expense ratio of the mutual fund. Again, the 
																																																						
330 There are new ETF products that are actively managed and use complex derivative instruments to achieve inverse 
and multiplied returns of their benchmarks. These ETF products may be more expensive than the average mutual 
fund due to their complex structuring. However, the trend into the 2000s and beyond is for fees to continue to be 
reduced as competition for assets increases (refer to the Morningstar Fee Study 2015 for current analyst outlooks).  
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management expense ratio is built into the price per share of the mutual fund, so end-investors 
are not often aware of the trailing commissions they are paying.331 
In addition to trailing commissions, mutual fund companies use powerful sales techniques to 
influence investment advisors to purchase their products. These sales techniques often include 
educational retreats in exotic locations or all-expenses-paid conference tickets. As an early ETF 
developer explains:  
 
Think about it. If you’re a retail advisor and your choice is a S&P 500 mutual 
fund which, at the time, offered golfing in Palm Springs in January and 
seminars aboard yachts in the Caribbean and trailer fees and all of the other 
things that went along with it, are you going to sell the SPY ETF? Or the TIPs? 
Or are you going to sell the related Fidelity mutual fund? Well, you’re going to 
sell the Fidelity fund of course (Interview 20).  
 
The benefits that came from mutual fund companies meant that establishing a client 
base for the early ETFs was difficult because ETFs - due to their low cost - could not 
provide the same level of benefits:  
  
At that time, mutual funds were paying the investment advisors and we didn’t 
realize that was the way that that business worked. So we [ETF providers] were 
confined to the really small yet growing group within those RIAs who were 
just charging fees based on assets under management as opposed to getting 
paid by the mutual fund trails and what have you…It was missionary work 
(Interview 15). 
 
In addition to offering lucrative benefits to retain the investment advisor community, many 
mutual fund companies expressed skepticism about the potential of ETFs and chose not to fund 
ETF development. For example, it was common for many of the early ETF developers to pitch 
																																																						
331 Mandated by SEC rulings, the management expense ratio (MER) is made explicit to investors in any mutual fund 
and ETF in the product’s prospectus. However, the portion of a mutual fund’s MER that is used to pay trailing 
commissions is not made available to the public, though there have been recent efforts to try and change this.  
	 265	
their product concepts to mutual fund companies that had large budgets to fund innovation. An 
ETF consultant recalls their efforts to market ETFs in the 1990s and 2000s:  
 
Any large company that had a large mutual fund presence, when we went in 
there with the [ETF] product, they’d say, ‘This intermediates us from the 
product, fees are lower, we don’t like this idea of trading, we don’t want to get 
involved with it’. I remember one company said, ‘This is just odd. A one-off 
deal. Outside of a few products this will never amount to anything’. Well, 
that’s their problem now (Interview 15); 
 
[Mutual fund companies] did not believe there was an intermediary to the retail 
investor who was going to take a chance selling this stuff (Interview 5).  
 
Despite the skepticism from the mutual fund industry and its influential sales tactics, 
the ETF industry managed to proliferate at an astonishing pace. Was the success of the 
ETF due to savvy marketing and institution-to-institution competition, or were there 
deeper processes involved? Can agencement offer an alternative theory of the ETF’s 
recent success as something other than marketing prowess?  
  
ETF proliferation in the retail channel: Agencement or effective marketing?  
	
As discussed in previous chapters, the first ETFs had no concerted marketing efforts behind 
them. Instead, sponsoring exchanges and firms relied on institutional relationships and word of 
mouth amongst their members to generate interest in the products. For example, Chapter Five 
describes how the Philadelphia Stock Exchange developed and launched the first ETF product - 
CIPs - in secrecy, relying only on its relationships with large institutional traders to promote and 
trade the product on its trading floors. The SPDR ETF also had no organized marketing strategy 
at the time of its launch on the AMEX in 1993. Like the Philadelphia Exchange, the AMEX 
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relied largely on its institutional traders to generate interest in the SPDR (Chapter Seven). Last, 
the quiet launch of the TIPs ETF at the Toronto Stock Exchange was not followed by a large 
marketing effort as the TIPs was launched as a free promotional product of the Exchange. Thus, 
no fees were being collected from its trading and the Exchange could not afford to not market it 
aggressively (Chapter Seven).   
Into the late 1990s and 2000s, markets were expanding rapidly and the financial optimism 
encouraged companies to put a more concerted effort behind funding and marketing ETFs. BGI 
iShares,332 for example, was the first ETF brand to develop an aggressive marketing campaign 
before their initial product launch. Perhaps most importantly, iShares were the first ETFs in the 
United States to be marketed directly to retail investors through popular media such as television, 
radio, and print media advertisement. These efforts undoubtedly contributed to the rapid 
proliferation of the iShares brand throughout the retail channel of financial advisors and 
investors, which itself was developing in the late 1990s and 2000s. Is it enough to call the 
success of ETFs a success of marketing, or must the analysis go further? While ETF sales to 
retail clients are certainly linked to marketing strategies with retail investment advisors and 
education efforts for retail clients, the early ETF campaigns are only one of many reasons for the 
proliferation of the product. To attribute ETF growth solely to marketing efforts does not go far 
enough to provide an explanation of the environment out of which the innovation emerged in 
such a highly technical industry.  
Despite the opposition to ETFs from mutual fund companies, several environmental factors 
were able to proliferate the inflows of investment in ETFs at an unprecedented rate. The 
innovations in technological infrastructure made ETFs affordable to construct and trade. The 
																																																						
332 As discussed in Chapter Seven, BGI sold its iShares business to BlackRock in 2009. The ETFs still trade under 
the iShares brand today.  
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technically-equipped environment that ETFs emerged from were a result of infrastructure such as 
electronic trading technologies and communications linkages established in the decades prior.333 
As a former ETF developer confirms:  
 
The fact that you had big drops in the price of computing power really - 
without that, we wouldn’t have ETFs. The fact that the processing is so 
inexpensive, you could assemble the baskets to create or redeem the creation 
units fairly inexpensively. Otherwise the product wouldn’t have worked. So 
you know, that’s from the structuring point of view. And from the innovation 
point of view, which was going on at the trading desks, everything was getting 
faster, cheaper, commissions were dropping. That enabled the desk to trade 
these more often and throughout the day (Interview 15).  
 
ETFs were also able to proliferate because the transition to fee-based structures made 
advisors more highly attuned to the price-sensitivities of their retail clients. The lower fee 
structure, preferential tax treatment, and transparency of ETFs made it easier for retail advisors 
to market ETFs than mutual funds to many of their clients:  
 
We realized it was a two-part sell. It was an index sell and it was the 
tradeability sell: ‘Trade these! They are more tax efficient and lower cost’ 
(Interview 15).  
 
Despite the benefits advisors were receiving from investing their clients in mutual funds, 
ETFs continued to grow in popularity as brands such as iShares put a concerted effort into 
marketing ETFs directly to clients. The AMEX too, as the premier listing exchange of the early 
ETFs, was instrumental in developing a strong retail marketing strategy for ETFs by promoting 
their benefits vis-à-vis mutual funds:  
 
																																																						
333 Refer to Chapters Four and Five for a discussion on the shift to technological solutions in the U.S. financial 
markets and how this shift impacted product development.  
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We ran ads when I was in charge [of AMEX ETFs and options]…Some of the 
early ads that we ran went along with the education of the concept of indexing 
and once you’ve done that, the mindset certainly took root (Interview 25).  
 
As discussed previously, the ETF characteristics also influenced SEC attorneys that ETFs 
were a product well suited to retail investors. As former SEC attorneys explain:  
 
[The ETF] was a readily understandable product with a very, very light fee 
structure, so from a policy point of view we didn’t feel like there was a huge 
information requirement issue [for retail investors] (Interview 22); 
 
The product itself had a lot of natural advantages simply based on the concept 
of indexing. [ETFs] were going to outperform four out of five index managers 
out there. It had low costs, it allowed you easy entry intraday as opposed to 4 
o’clock pricing that was available with index mutual funds…We felt and I still 
believe that ETFs are a superior product [to mutual funds] (Interview 25).  
 
Third, the mutual fund industry had been plagued by a scandal and volatile markets in the 
2000s which shook investor confidence and questioned the ability of portfolio managers to profit 
in volatile environments. One of these crises, the mutual fund timing scandal, was uncovered in 
2003 and greatly increased the outflow of investment from mutual funds and into ETFs.  
As discussed previously, mutual funds are priced at 4pm Eastern every day, so investors who 
place trades throughout the day will not receive their valuations until the market closes. In 2003, 
the SEC uncovered that many mutual fund companies were allowing their preferred clients to 
place mutual fund trades after 4pm for that same day’s closing price. Not only was this practice 
of market timing illegal, it allowed particular investors (primarily large institutional investors) to 
benefit from knowing the price of the mutual fund they would be purchasing before others.334 
After a full investigation, the SEC acknowledged that market timing existed in the mutual fund 
																																																						
334 This practice is commonly referred to as ‘market timing’ or ‘late trading’. The SEC seems to have acknowledged 
that market timing has been an issue for mutual funds as early as 1981, where the potential for mutual fund timing 
was mentioned in a SEC no action letter.  
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industry as early as 1981 but continued to allow mutual fund portfolio valuations to be updated 
after 4pm if a significant event occurred or if orders came in from broker-dealers, banks, and 
401(k) plan administrators (Investment Company Act Release No. 26288, 2003). In a 2004 
Performance and Accountability Report, SEC staff acknowledged that their passivity towards the 
mutual fund timing scandal negatively impacted investor confidence in the mutual fund industry:   
 
Indirect performance measures, including the [negative] rate of mutual fund 
ownership…indicate that investor concerns about the integrity of the securities 
market has waned (2004, 61).  
 
In addition to the market timing scandal, the financial crisis in 2008 and sustained market 
volatility in the years following led to severe losses in assets under management from many 
actively managed funds. Between 2008 and 2009, hedge funds in the United States lost 
approximately 33% of their assets to ETFs as investor confidence in the ability of portfolio 
managers to achieve returns - or even keep pace with - market fluctuations diminished 
significantly.335 Taken together, the volatility and timing scandal lead to substantial outflows 
from mutual funds into ETFs. Between 2006 and 2014, domestic equity ETFs received net 
inflows of $855bn USD while domestic equity mutual funds recorded outflows of $595bn 
USD.336  
Since the mutual fund scandal was uncovered in 2003 up until the end of 2014, the number of 
ETFs available in the US markets grew from 119 to 1,396337 and allow investors to access seven 
																																																						
335 Figures pulled from the Investment Company Institute (ICI) ETF Research and Statistics division (2014).  
336 Market data recorded by the Investment Company Institute (ICI) ETF Research and Statistics division (2014).  
337 These figures exclude ‘funds of funds’, which are ETFs whose portfolios contain other ETFs. Figures are pulled 
from the Investment Company Institute (ICI) Fact Books and Research Data Publications, 2003 - 2014.		
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different asset classes.338 To gain a rich understanding of the forces that caused the ETF to 
flourish so rapidly, two processes have been analysed. First, the social and technical 
environmental conditions present at the start of the ETF’s proliferation were surveyed. These 
conditions include such processes as the development of technical infrastructure that enabled 
ETF creation and trading, and the development of the retail investment channel that was 
catalyzed by the deregulation of trading commissions and the entrance of commercial banks into 
the brokerage industry. Second, the effects these environmental characteristics had on the way in 
which human beings interacted with the financial market were analysed. These effects include 
the adoption of technical infrastructure into decision making so that financial agency is now a 
fusion of technical devices and human beings. In addition, the rise of discount brokerages and 
fee-based investment advisory services changed the way in which financial advisors gave their 
clients advice and what products they recommended. The structure of fee-based services, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, was a natural fit for the ETF’s low cost, low maintenance, and 
tax-friendly attributes. As discussed in this chapter, these environmental conditions were linked 
to a rise in ETFs being marketed direct to retail investors as mutual fund alternatives. Taken 
altogether, the proliferation of ETFs throughout the U.S., coinciding with the development of the 
retail channel, is an example of how socio-technical agencement is responsible for the successful 
proliferation of the ETF.  
 
																																																						
338 These asset classes include equity, fixed income, commodity, currency, real estate, hybrid (e.g. equity and fixed 
income) and volatility. For a breakdown of the number of U.S. ETFs available categorized by asset class, investment 





This project has sought to construct the first historical sociology of the ETF and introduce it 
as a subject of analysis to those in the social studies of finance. To accomplish this, research and 
analysis was centred around the early trading strategies and product concepts that precipitated 
the first formally defined ETFs. As these precursory developments occurred mostly in the United 
States, with substantial contributions from Canadian developers, this project was geographically 
isolated to the United States and Canada. Specific entities of focus included the exchanges 
involved in ETF-related innovation such as the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX), American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSE), and institutions such as Leland O’Brien Rubinstein Inc. (LOR), the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Barclays 
Global Investors (BGI), and Deutsche Bank.  
Perhaps most importantly, this project aimed to present an alternative to the institutional-
level analysis of financial innovation and regulation prevalent in new political economy, field 
theory, and much of economic sociology (Chapter Two). In order to provide a deeper level of 
analysis, the theoretical grounding for this research invoked concepts popular within the social 
studies of finance such as socio-technicality, assemblages, and agencement. This narrative 
illuminated in what ways human beings and their devices interacted and, in the process of 
interaction, became co-constitutive of institutional decision making around early ETF 
innovation.   
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To analyse the ETF within a subset of actor-network theory (agencement) is to think of its 
emergence as a product of relationships. Thus, this project addressed two separate, yet related, 
relationships integral to financial marketplaces. First, this project examined relationships that 
existed between regulators and financial innovators, and second, this project analysed the 
relationship that was developed between emerging trading technologies and market behaviour 
(market behaviour, in this sense, refers to both innovative and regulatory actors).  
To reiterate from earlier chapters, agencement and assemblages were a central narrative 
theme of this project. The primary reason for invoking agencement was to introduce the ETF to 
sociological inquiry, specifically, the social studies of finance, and emphasize its emergence as a 
product of oft overlooked relationships. As discussed in Chapters One and Two, there has been a 
growing field of sociological inquiry relating to the emergence and effects of innovations within 
the financial domain. To date, however, there has been no sociological scholarship written about 
the ETF despite its global surge in popularity since its appearance 28 years ago.339   
Framing the study of the ETF as an agencement focused attention on the subtle relationships 
that are often overlooked in the institutional-level analysis of financial organization. Both 
interview research and documentary evidence suggested that the two relationships most 
important to the ETF’s emergence were the relationships formed between human beings and 
their devices (socio-technical relationships) and, more generally, the relationships formed 
between financial innovators and financial regulators.  
																																																						
339 Throughout this project, the launch of the PHLX CIPs in 1989 has been used as the origin date for ETFs. It is 
important to note, however, that most media sources refer to either the TIPs (Toronto Stock Exchange, 1990), or the 
SPDR (AMEX, 1993) as the first ETFs. Due to the CIPs’ use as an ETF precedent in regulatory applications and the 
adoption of its purpose and structure into later products, this research maintains that the first ETF in the world was 
the CIPs in 1989.  
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Throughout this project, agencement was used as a framework to empirically trace the socio-
technical production of agency and its effects on ETF-related innovation. For example, Chapter 
Four analysed how the introduction of computing technology gradually altered the ways in 
which individuals participated in and thought about the financial markets. For example, the 
introduction of electronic trading systems was demonstrated to have had specific effects on the 
types of trading strategies employed on major financial exchanges in the United States. 
Specifically, it was discovered that the development in technological capability (such as the 
NYSE’s DOT system) between the late 1960s to the 1980s assisted traders in transitioning their 
strategies from block trading to basket trading to index replication strategies - out of which came 
the first ETF product concept. The technical reorientation of the markets during this period also 
shifted the way in which regulatory agencies such as the SEC perceived the role of technology 
and its use within the market for surveillance and process streamlining. As this chapter 
concluded, the rather crescive cognitive and material integration of technicality in financial 
markets ultimately brought about a new agencements: the socio-technical actor was an 
irreducible integration between both human and technological activities. As the assimilation of 
electronic technologies in the financial markets continued, an environment emerged where 
financial activity became inseparable from the human and technological networks that provided 
financial infrastructure. Again, it was out of this socio-technical environment that the first ETF 
concept - Cash Index Participation Units (CIPs) - emerged in Philadelphia (Chapter Five).  
The empirical analysis of socio-technical relationships continued in later chapters to 
demonstrate how cognitive developments were materially integrated in ETF product design and 
regulation. For example, Chapter Six analysed how academic theories directly contributed to the 
shift that occurred from active investment strategies to passive, index-based strategies. In 
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particular, documentary evidence was produced that demonstrated how academic theories were 
used as precedents to approve ETF-style products such as Leland O’Brien and Rubinstein’s 
SuperTrust. The SuperTrust case study showed how the integration of technical and semiotic 
developments facilitated the emergence of activities such as diversification and arbitrage, which 
later became foundational elements of the modern ETF structure. From this socio-technical 
frame of analysis came one of the primary findings of this project: the ETF innovation was 
largely attributable to the fusion of human beings and their technologies. As a product that 
emerged, in part, as a consequence of the market’s turn from human-centric to socio-technical, 
the ETF may be construed as an agencement, or, a result of the unique form of agency produced 
from the recently transformed financial environment.  
The second relationship analysed in this project was the one that formed between ETF 
innovators and regulators. By using agencement and, to a lesser extent, assemblage theory, this 
project discovered that the relationships forged between innovators and regulators were crucial, 
collaborative, and, perhaps most importantly, co-constitutive of early ETF design. For example, 
in Chapter Five, it was demonstrated how the jurisdictional disputes between the SEC and CFTC 
pushed the SEC to partner with product developers at the Philadelphia Stock Exchange to ensure 
that new products would fall under securities, not futures, legislation. In addition, Chapter Six 
examines how the SEC and developers at Leland O’Brien Rubinstein negotiated through five 
successive product applications to bring their product, the SuperTrust, to market. In the case of 
the SuperTrust, documentary evidence shows how the SEC attributed definitional and structural 
qualities to the product throughout the innovative process. In addition, Chapters Four and Eight 
discussed in what ways the SEC and innovators like BGI iShares emerged from similar socio-
technical environments. It was argued that a shared socio-technical environment influenced the 
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way in which innovators and regulators developed their outlook on the viability of index-based 
trading and how regulatory processes were defined and streamlined. Specifically, innovator-
regulator relationships were analysed to advance an alternative narrative from what currently 
exists in the literature on the regulation of innovation.   
To reiterate, the innovator-regulator relationships were of particular interest because they 
were not explainable by prominent theories of financial regulation - particularly capture theory 
that emphasizes competitive ‘cat and mouse’ power dynamics. Capture theory could not offer a 
suitable explanation for the regulation of ETF innovation for it appeared that both innovators and 
regulators constructed elements of the product itself, either through encouraging particular 
characteristics or directly inserting definitions or qualities to the product itself. The material 
evidence of collaboration - notably, the direct attribution of qualities to the ETF by regulators 
and the perception of the regulator-innovator relationships by participants - meant that 
traditionally theorized ‘cat and mouse’ power dynamics were not applicable to ETF innovation.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, collaboration in the regulation of innovation has been analysed 
through theories of joint regulation. However, the innovator-regulator relationships involved in 
ETF innovation routinely moved beyond the joint-regulation framework as well. For example, as 
discussed in Chapters Five and Six, regulators such as the SEC and innovators such as the PHLX 
and Leland O’Brien Rubinstein actually co-constructed a product’s prospectus. In this instance, 
then, regulation was not just a matter of overseeing innovation by providing the necessary checks 
and balances; regulators such as the SEC became a constituting element of - and inseparable 
from - the innovation itself.  
Removing the stark delineation between regulators and innovators becomes necessary when 
regulators are actively involved in attributing qualities through the concept-to-product process of 
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innovation. Thus, this project has sought to construct an alternative narrative of regulators as 
collaborative instead of confrontational with emerging innovation. This collaborative 
relationship-building was demonstrated empirically by reviewing documentary evidence of ETF 
product applications and examining the ways in which the regulators mediated the transition 
from concept to a formal listing. In addition, interview responses from both regulators and 
innovators were substantially similar when asked to describe innovator-regulator relations: in the 
case of individuals interviewed prior to 1990, all described innovator-regulator relations as either 
collaborative, mutually reinforcing, and helpful, with only two respondents classifying 
innovator-regulator relations as rooted in skepticism or competition. In the cases in which the 
perception of the relationship was negative, the interviewees were found to have been involved 
in modern ETF developments not surveyed by this project. In other words, both regulators and 
innovators entered into productive relationships that went deeper than just joint agreements; the 
relationships enabled regulators and innovators to concomitantly produce and attribute qualities 
to early ETF innovation through a process similar to, though not quite the same as, socio-
technical agencement.  
As a result of research findings, this project developed a concept called regulatory 
agencement (Chapter Two) that illuminated the extent to which the innovator-regulator 
relationship was able to mediate the ETF from concept to product. Regulatory agencement put 
forth an explanation of innovator-regulator relations alternate to those provided by capture theory 
and joint regulation in three ways. First, it brought attention to how the SEC participated with 
socio-technical devices to bring about a new environment that enabled process streamlining 
(Chapter Four). Second, regulatory agencement illuminated the points of intersection between 
the SEC and ETF innovators to determine how the decision making capabilities of each entity 
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may have been constructed by a shared environment that was conducive to collaboration 
(Chapter Six). Third, regulatory agencement was used to develop a narrative concerning the 
extent to which regulators participated in the qualification of early ETF innovation (Chapters 
Five, Six, and Seven).  
In summary, the purpose of this project was to construct the first sociological history of the 
exchange traded fund. In doing so, this project demonstrated the empirical robustness of 
agencement as a theory and introduced the ETF as a sociological subject, particularly to scholars 
operating within the social studies of finance. There were two primary findings of this project: 
first, that invoking agencement was useful in empirically framing the ETF origin story as a 
product of the socio-technical turn of the U.S. financial markets in the 1970s and 1980s. Second, 
this project developed an alternative theory of the regulation of innovation called regulatory 
agencement.  
As this project was the first time that the ETF was brought into sociological analysis, there 
exist substantial opportunities for future empirical, theoretical, and critical work on the subject. 
Empirically, this project traced a history that focused on major events that precipitated early 
ETFs such as the 1987 crisis and the 1989 SEC-CFTC lawsuits. Due to practical constraints of 
time and resources, this history would benefit from additional analysis of events including, but 
not limited to, the relationship between U.S. stock and futures markets and the impact relations 
had on index-based trading and development, the relationship between legacy mutual fund 
companies (e.g. Vanguard) and early ETF providers, the impact of the mutual fund scandal of 
2003 on ETF inflows (Chapter Eight), and in what ways back office operations were affected by 
the meteoric rise of both trading volume and financial products between 1970 and 1990. These 
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themes emerged as peripheral events to those discussed in the body of this research, though are 
of no less importance to the sociological study of the ETF.  
Theoretically, this project attempts to understand processes of financial innovation and the 
regulation of such innovation. While there exists no shortage of literature on these subjects, the 
diversity of explanations of innovation and regulation still leaves room for contribution. Thus, 
this project adapted agencement to regulatory agencement in order to fit the unique assemblage 
of regulators and innovators that formed to bring the first ETFs to fruition. As a concept 
developed for this project, regulatory agencement offers potential for future theoretical 
refinement and application in field research.  
In addition, due to limitations in time and space, this project depicted the ETF as an entity 
whose definition remained static once formalized as an index-replicating innovation. In other 
words, this project only defines the ETF as an index-replicating instrument despite the multitude 
of recent changes that have occurred in its product structure. This decision was made in order to 
mark a clear end to the case study timeline. Clearly, the development of a financial product is not 
as black and white, nor does a financial product exist in an atemporal, static marketplace. The 
process of financial innovation is inherently fluid; as concepts emerge and are formalized, others 
disintegrate or shift. While this ebb and flow of constraint and possibility is shaped by complex 
socio-technical assemblages, the purpose of constructing the ETF as a case study was to examine 
the ETF’s origin: notably, how the concept itself first emerged, was qualified, and finally, 
launched as a marketable product. While this project focuses on the advent of index-replicating 
ETFs, there have been many modern developments in the global ETF industry that provide 
promising fields of exploration.  
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Where do we go from here? Since the early 2000s, when this project’s timeline ends, the ETF 
industry has continued to rapidly expand its offerings. In 2002, bond ETFs were introduced to 
the U.S. markets; 2003 saw the introduction of alternative-weighted ETF indices;340 in 2004, the 
first ETFs that tracked commodities and currencies were introduced;341 2007 broke records for 
the most ETFs launched in a single year;342 the SEC approved actively-managed ETFs in 2008; 
and in 2010, ETFs had broken the $1 trillion USD barrier in global assets under management 
(Investment Company Institute Fact Book 2010). This upward trend continued into 2014 when 
ETFs broke records for net share issuances worth $214 billion USD (Investment Company 
Institute Fact Book 2014).  
In 2015, the ETF industry has surpassed $2 trillion USD in assets worldwide and has now 
begun prompting industry and academic researchers to question if market is saturated and the 
extent to which these new ETF offerings are beneficial to investors. For example, studies linking 
the rise of index trading to higher systemic market risk (meaning that stocks are becoming 
increasingly correlated) have begun to appear throughout industry and academia (Bradley et al 
2011; Bradley and Litan 2010; Bradley and Litan 2011; J.P. Morgan Delta One Derivatives 
Team 2011; Sullivan and Xiong 2012)..343 In addition, the U.S. Congress has invited experts to 
testify about growing public concerns over the complexity of new ETF structures and the extent 
																																																						
340 Prior to 2003, ETF indices were all weighted by the constituents’ market capitalization. For example, if Stock A 
is worth $20 million and the total market is worth $100 million, Stock A would represent 20% of the index and thus 
20% of the ETF’s basket. In other words, the larger the corporation, the larger its representation in the index. 
Alternative index weightings may be calculated by using corporate fundamentals or stock price, amongst other 
custom-chosen statistics.  
341 ETFs that track commodities and/or currencies are also referred to as “non-1940 Act ETFs”, for they are not 
regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940. As discussed in Chapters One and Five, the CFTC oversees 
financial instruments backed by commodities or futures. Refer to Appendix E for further information. 
342 269 new ETFs were approved for listing between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2007 (Investment Company 
Institute Fact Book 2007). 
343 Refer also to J.P. Morgan Delta One Derivative team data presented throughout Bradley and Litan (2010; 2011) 
and Bradley et al (2011).  
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to which they may or may not be of any economic benefit. When interviewees were questioned 
on their future outlook for the ETF industry, the vast majority agreed that the present market was 
fully saturated in its product offerings and presented a range of outlooks from apathy to 
scepticism and fear about future ETF developments - especially around derivative instruments 
that provide inverse or leveraged returns and active management strategies. One interviewee 
went as far as to claim these new ETFs ought to be considered “weapons of mass destruction” 
that “harm investors and businesses and destroy the capital formation process” of the financial 
markets (Interview 8).  
While this dissertation does not offer critique or reflection the potential of the ETF 
marketplace, it does offer a foundation for what ought to be a fruitful area of sociological inquiry 
and critical analysis. By providing the first historical account of the emergence of the ETF 
innovation, this project has analysed how socio-technical relations impact the development of 






















Please note that all legal proceedings and laws have been cited in text using 
legal style referencing and do not appear again in this bibliography. In addition, 
as there are a substantial amount of Securities and Exchange Commission 
rulemaking releases quoted throughout this project, they will not be listed 
individually in this bibliography. All releases may be located by their release 
numbers quoted in text at: https://www.sec.gov/rules.shtml.  
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Appendix A  
 
The below chart indicates typical trading volumes in S&P 500 stocks (the ‘Stock 
Market’), S&P 500 futures (referred to as the ‘Futures Market’) the week leading up to and 
including October 19, 1987. Note the sharp rise in the average basis error on October 19 and 20, 
which indicates the extent to which a derivative has deviated from the value of its underlying 
asset(s). In this case, the futures market was uncoupled from its underlying index, the stock 
market. Data provided by Furbush (1988, 71), on behalf of the U.S. Office of Economic Affairs:  
  
 
 Trading and Basis Error of the S&P 500 index, 1987  
 
























 Four iShares ETFs were launched on the AMEX on May 19, 2000, and an additional ten 
on May 26, 2000. Within this period, iShares also took over and re-launched the World Equity 
Benchmark Series (WEBS) ETFs. All phases of the original iShares launch are separated by date 
and broken down by the underlying index, AMEX ticker symbol, and expense ratio below.  
 
May 19, 2000:  
 
Index  Symbol Expense Ratio  
S&P 500  IVV 0.095% 
Dow Jones U.S. 
Technology  
IYW 0.60% 
Dow Jones U.S. Internet  IYV 0.60% 
Russell 1000  IWB 0.15%  
 
May 26, 2000:  
 
Index Symbol Expense Ratio 
S&P MidCap 400 IJH 0.20% 
S&P/Barra Growth IVW 0.18% 
S&P/Barra Value IVE 0.18% 
S&P SmallCap 600  IJR 0.20% 
Russell 1000 Growth  IWF 0.20%  
Russell 1000 Value IWD 0.20% 
Russell 2000 IWM 0.20%  
Russell 3000 IWV 0.20% 
Dow Jones U.S. Financial IYF 0.60% 




iShares rebranded and re-launched the following World Equity Benchmark Series (WEBS) 
ETFS as part of their original ETF offerings. These ETFs provided access to major indices in the 
following countries: Australia, Austria. Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
Source: Quill, G., Zurbrigg, K., and Ziik, E. (2000) on behalf of the Financial Research Corporation.  
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Appendix C   
 
Number of Exchange Traded Funds by Type  
 












1993 1 1 - - - - 
1994 1 1 - - - - 
1995 2 2 - - - - 
1996 19 2 - 17 - - 
1997 19 2 - 17 - - 
1998 29 3 9 17 - - 
1999 30 4 9 17 - - 
2000 80 29 26 25 - - 
2001 102 34 34 34 - - 
2002 113 34 32 39 - 8 
2003 119 39 33 41 - 6 
2004 152 60 34 43 - 6 
2005 204 81 68 49 - 6 
2006 359 113 133 85 6 6 
2007 629 197 219 159 5 49 
2008 728 X 231 X X X 
2009 797 X 228 X X X 
2010 923 248 248 X X 105 
2011 1,134 285 293 365 7 164 
2012 1,194 X 301 X X X 
2013 1,294 X 311 X X X 
2014 1,396 314 317 490 19 256 
Totals include registered and non-registered ETFs under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and exclude ‘fund of 
funds’, which are ETFs that invest in other ETFs. ‘X’ indicates no data available for the specific asset class. 
 
Source: Investment Company Institute Fact Books (1994-2015), retrievable online at www.ici.org/pubs. 
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Breakdown of US-listed ETF market by investment objective  
 































weighted) (261)  
Socially Responsible (6) Currency (39) Inverse 
Leveraged (85)  
- 
- Real Estate (36) - - 
- Hybrid/Multi-
Asset (75)  
- - 
- Volatility (17)  - - 
 
As of 11/12/2014. Figures include US-listed ETFs and ETNs.  
 




Appendix D  
 
	
Source: Data provided by the Consolidated Tape Association and published in the Market 2000 Report (SEC 1994, 





















Summary of ETF legal structures and features 
  
Source: Deutsche db X-trackers U.S. (Deutsche Bank 2017).   
